


HIGHLIGHTS

Figure 1: Number of IDPs and returnees over time



Since 2014, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) unit in Iraq has collected information on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees using a network of key informants across the country.¹ Data for this round were collected from 1 May to 31 August 2024.

IDPs

1,053,038

-45,875

- As of 31 August 2024, DTM identified **1,053,038** individual IDPs (179,776 households).
- Decrease of 45,875** individual IDPs since the previous round (-4%).²
- The highest decrease in individual numbers was in the following governorates: Dahuk (-15,295 individuals), Sulaymaniyah (-11,790), Erbil (-9,372), Ninewa (-5,854), Salah al-Din (-1,272) and Diyala (-1,176).
- The decrease was primarily driven by **camps closure, grants from the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoMD) and IOM Facilitated Voluntary Movement (FVM) programme**.
- In this round, **DTM introduced 'relocation' as a new category**, distinguishing it from 'secondary displacement.' While both involve movement, relocation refers to planned movements driven by factors such as better conditions, safety, aid availability or family ties. In contrast, secondary displacement results from forced factors like camp closures, safety concerns or environmental challenges. Compared to the previous round, the number of new arrivals increased (11,701 vs. 9,013 individuals), including 8,802 relocations, 1,517 secondary displacements, 1,352 failed returns and 30 newly displaced individuals due to security situation.
- The number of IDPs living in **critical shelters** fell by **5,580** individuals compared to the previous round.

179,776 Households

-8,614

2,554 Locations

-28

18 Governorates

103 Districts

Change since the last round

Returnees

4,897,128

+25,212

- As of 31 August 2024, DTM identified, **4,897,128** individual returnees (816,188 households).
- Increase of 25,212** individual returnees since previous round (+1%).
- The highest increase in number of returnees was observed in **Salah al-Din** and **Ninewa** governorates (11,382 and 10,506 individuals, respectively).
- In **Salah al-Din**, returns were related to **departures from the camps**, influenced by the announcement by the Iraqi Council of Ministers about the closure of camps by the end of July 2024. In addition, **improved security and better access to services contributed to returns**. In **Ninewa**, **closure of camps** and the financial support through **IOM FVM programme** helped encourage returns. In addition, many families returned to **reunite with their relatives and benefit from improved public services or better economic conditions in their areas of origin, particularly in Sinjar**.
- This round, most returns from camps were to **Salah al-Din** (58%) and **Ninewa** (37%), with smaller shares returning to Anbar (2%) and Erbil (2%).
- The number of **returnees residing in critical shelters** **increased by 10,524** individuals compared to the previous round.

816,188 Households

+4,202

2,206 Locations

+14

9 Governorates


39 Districts

Change since the last round

1. For more information on the Master List methodology, please refer to the [Methodology](#) at the end of this report.
2. For more information on the rate of change in the IDP and returnee caseloads, please refer to the [Methodology](#).

DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW

Figure 2: IDP shelter types



OVERALL TRENDS

During Round 133 (May - August 2024), DTM identified 1,053,038 IDPs (179,776 households). This is a decrease of 45,875 individuals compared to the January – April 2024 period (-4%).

At the district level, the most significant decrease in IDPs was recorded in **Sumel (-10,432 individuals)** in Dahuk Governorate, **Sulaymaniya (-10,176)** in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, **Erbil (-9,444)** in Erbil Governorate, **Al-Shikhan (-4,631)** in Ninewa Governorate, **Zakho (-3,977)** in Dahuk Governorate, **Al-Hamdaniya (-2,045)** in Ninewa Governorate and **Kalar (-1,656)** in Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

The main reasons behind these reductions in **Dahuk Governorate** are concerns over **camps closure** and the opportunity to obtain the **MoMD grant**, which supports families who leave the camps. The grant amounts to 4 million IQD for individuals originating from Sinjar and 1.5 million IQD for those from other areas in the country.

These reasons were also resonant in **Ninewa Governorate**, accompanied with **IOM support through FVM programme, support from MoMD and preparations for camps closure**. Some families also returned after **rehabilitating their homes** or due to a desire to **reunite with their communities**.

In **Sulaymaniyah Governorate** returns were mainly prompted by **camps closures**, compelling families to return to their areas of origin.

In **Erbil Governorate**, the decrease in IDPs was primarily due to **water scarcity** and **methodological improvements**, specifically enhanced access to key informants, which provided a more accurate update of IDP figures.

In contrast to the above decreases, **Sinjar District in Ninewa Governorate** witnessed an increase of 1,458 individuals, primarily due to **departures from the camps**. However, the **lack of services and the destruction of housing** in areas of origin resulted in many families resettling in nearby locations.

RECENT IDP MOVEMENTS

In this round, DTM introduced **'relocation'** as a new category, distinguishing it from **'secondary displacement'**. While both involve movement, **relocation refers to planned movements** driven by better living conditions (e.g., housing, services or livelihoods), improved safety and security, availability of aid, presence of family or friends, cultural alignment (e.g., similar values or beliefs) or lack of financial means to remain in the previous location. In contrast, **secondary displacement is driven by forced factors**, such as camp closures, safety concerns (e.g., ISIL re-emergence or security force changes), fear of discrimination or revenge and environmental challenges (e.g., water scarcity, flooding or rising temperatures).

In this round, the total of **11,701 new IDPs arrivals** were observed (1% of caseload). Most of these movements involve individuals who were **relocated (8,802; 75%)**, followed by individuals who experienced **secondary displacement (1,517; 13%)**. Additionally, 1,352 individuals experienced failed returns (12%) and **30 individuals** were displaced for the first time. Most of these movements were recorded in **Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Ninewa and Dahuk governorates**.

Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates recorded the **highest volume of relocations (40% and 26%, respectively)**, primarily driven by **better living conditions**, such as housing, services or livelihoods.

Ninewa Governorate recorded most of the IDPs who experienced **secondary displacement (99%)** and from areas where conditions remain severe, such as Sinjar.⁴ The main reason behind these movements was the **announcement of camp closures**.

Additionally, **1,352 failed returns** were recorded in **Sulaymaniyah, Ninewa and Dahuk governorates** (990, 300 and 50 individuals, respectively). Most of these individuals originated from Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates (39% and 34%, respectively). They are from areas of high to medium severity conditions, such as Telafar, Al-Ba'aj and Balad.⁴ These individuals were forced to leave again after return due to **lack of job opportunities, lack of public services and lack of financial means at their area of origin**.

In this round, **30 individuals experienced displacement for the first time**. Among them, 24 were from Balad District in Salah al-Din and were displaced to Halabja in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, while the remaining individuals were from Al-Muqdadiya in Diyala and moved to Dokan, Sulaymaniyah Governorate. The primary reasons for their displacement were due to **generalized violence, the presence of militias and unexploded ordnance and landmines**.

Table 1: Top three districts recording recent movement

District, Governorate	Displaced for the first time	Relocation	Secondary displacement	Failed returns
Erbil, Erbil	0		3,108	0
Sinjar, Ninewa	0	66	1,465	0
Sulaymaniyah, Sulaymaniyah	0		1,800	444

3. DTM collects data on the number of families per location. For camps, it estimates the number of individuals by multiplying the number of households by five (the average size of camp households in Iraq).

4. IOM DTM Iraq, *Return Index, Round 22*, May - August 2024, Baghdad, 2024.

SHELTER TYPES

Consistent with the previous round, four in five IDPs reside in private settings (80%; 839,574), followed by 12 per cent (128,090 individuals) in camps and 8 per cent (85,314 individuals) in critical shelters. In Round 133, IDPs living in camps witnessed the highest decrease (-18%; -29,045 individuals), followed by IDPs in private settings decreased (-1.3%; -11,310) and in critical shelters by (-6%; -5,580).

Critical Shelters⁵

IDPs living in critical shelters may face challenges such as limited access to livelihoods and basic services. Since the previous round, the number of IDPs residing in critical shelters has **decreased by 5,580 individuals**. The most significant reductions were in Sumel in Dahuk Governorate (-1,026), followed by Erbil in Erbil Governorate (-966), Kirkuk in Kirkuk Governorate (-846), and Abu Ghraib and Mahmoudiya in Baghdad (-588 and -486, respectively). In contrast, there was a notable increase of IDPs living in critical shelters in Sinjar in Ninewa Governorate (132).

The decrease in **Sumel** is largely due to a **reduction in the number of IDPs**, as many have returned to their areas of origin and were subsequently removed from the critical shelters list. In **Erbil**, the decline is due to some families **returning to their places of origin**, while others had their **shelters reclassified from collective shelters to apartments or houses**. This change happened after the building owner imposed rent and upgraded the site, providing each apartment with separate health facilities instead of shared ones. In **Kirkuk**, some families were evicted **from government-owned property (schools)**; thus, they needed to move to rented property. Additionally, **some informal shelters have been rehabilitated** and are no longer classified as critical shelters. In **Abu Ghraib**, the landowner **vacated the location** to build a residential complex, and in **Mahmoudiya**, some families **moved to rented houses** to improve their living conditions. In contrast, **Sinjar saw an increase of 132 IDPs living in critical shelters**. This was mainly due to families returning from camps who couldn't live in their usual homes due to service shortages, housing destruction and security concerns. They settled in areas closer to their places of origin, which are classified as critical shelters because they are uninhabitable.

IDP AREAS OF ORIGIN

Slightly more than half (56%) of IDPs originate from Ninewa Governorate, particularly Mosul (39%), Sinjar (26%), Al-Ba'aj (16%) and Telefar (11%) districts. A further 22 per cent of IDPs originate from Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates (11% and 11%, respectively).

Figure 4: Number of IDPs by top 10 districts of origin





Figure 3: Number of IDPs in critical shelters by top 10 districts of displacement



In some districts, only IDPs live in critical shelters. These were evident in districts of Falluja and Ramadi in Anbar Governorate (12,816 and 4,818, respectively), Mahmoudiya in Baghdad Governorate (4,128) and Sumel in Dahuk Governorate (2,208).⁶

5. For IDPs, critical shelters may include uninhabitable apartments or houses, tents, caravans, makeshift shelters, mud or brick houses; unfinished or abandoned buildings; public buildings or collective shelters; religious buildings or school buildings.

6. IOM DTM Iraq, *Displacement Index, Round 10*, May - August 2024, Baghdad, 2024.


The graphs below show the eight governorates hosting the largest numbers of IDPs. They also indicate the change in the number of IDPs since the last round, key districts where IDPs reside and top governorates of origin. For an overview of districts of displacement and returns across Iraq, please see the [IDP Background Map](#).

Figure 5: Top governorates of displacement, corresponding districts of displacement and governorates of origin




▼ ▲ Change since the last round

Figure 6: Top districts of origin and corresponding districts of displacement⁸




7. Only the top 5 districts of displacement per district of origin were reported.

Map 1: Districts of origin of the current IDP population




Map 2: Districts of displacement of the current IDP population



RETURN OVERVIEW

Figure 7: Returnee shelter types



OVERALL TRENDS

During Round 133, DTM identified 4,897,128 returnees (816,188 households). This marks the **increase of 25,212 individuals** compared to Round 132 (January – April 2024). The country-wide return rate is 82 per cent, consistent with the previous round, meaning around one fifth of the displaced individuals have not yet returned. However, the rate of return across top districts of origin is extremely variable, with lower rates observed Al-Musayab in Babylon (5%), and Al-Ba’aj (40%) and Sinjar (47%) in Ninewa. These rates have risen since the last round, reflecting a notable increase in the number of returnees. In contrast, the highest return rates remained steady in Falluja (94%) and Ramadi (91%) in Anbar.

RECENT RETURN MOVEMENTS

Similarly to the previous round, **Salah al-Din** and **Ninewa** governorates **have the highest increase in returnees**. In Salah al-Din, the largest increase was recorded in Balad (6,198 individuals), followed by Al-Fares (4,296). In Ninewa, Sinjar witnessed the highest increase (5,178), followed by Al-Ba’aj (3,828), Al-Hamdaniya (1,050) and Mosul (1,014).

In **Salah al-Din**, the increase in returnees reflects **departures from camps** in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, the **support provided by MoMD** and the completion of paperwork for **security approval**. In addition, Balad experienced returns due to improved services in the area.

In **Ninewa Governorate**, most returns were driven by an **emotional desire** to reunite with relatives and friends and **preparations to leave the camp** ahead of its closure. In addition, the support some households received from the **IOM FVM** programme and MoMD serves as a pull factor. **Sinjar**, in particular, witnessed the **largest wave of returns in years**, driven not only by the camp closures but also by the increase in the return grant from 1.5 Million to 4 million IQD. In addition, the **stable security situation in the area and improving economic conditions** further supported these returns with increased market activity and job opportunities. In **Al-Hamdaniya**, returns were primarily motivated by **improved public services and housing rehabilitation support**. In **Mosul**, many families returned due to the **inability to afford rental**

costs in displacement areas, while improved public services in certain neighborhoods encouraged further returns. These reasons were evident in Al-Ba’aj as well; however, some families experienced failed returns due to a lack of job opportunities and financial stability to remain in the area of origin.

Arrivals from camps

The number of returnees from camps has increased by more than three times compared to the previous round (17,622 versus 3,654). The key districts of return this round were Balad (6,090 individuals) and Al-Fares (4,152) in Salah al-Din, followed by Sinjar (3,828) and Al-Ba’aj (2,430) in Ninewa.

Most of the returnees in Salah al-Din used to reside in Ashti and Tazde camps in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, and most of the returnees in Ninewa are from Shariya Camp in Dahuk Governorate.⁸

Locations of no return

As of August 2024, there are **299 locations of no return**, i.e. locations where displacement during or since the 2014-2017 conflict with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was recorded but have either not recorded any returns or have subsequently recorded that all returnees have re-displaced. Eight locations witnessed return and subsequently were removed from the list since the previous round. These locations were in districts of Al-Ba’aj, Al-Hamdaniya, and Telafar in Ninewa Governorate, Makhmur in Erbil and Al-Muqdadiya in Diyala.

Security concerns were reported as the primary barrier to return in most locations (116 locations), with the majority being in Ninewa and Erbil governorates (42% and 27%, respectively). Additionally, **residential destruction prevented returns in 70 locations**, mostly in Diyala Governorate (59%). Furthermore, in **48 locations, largely in Ninewa Governorate, security forces blocked returns (52%)**. **Drought was the main factor preventing returns in 20 locations**, all of which were in Ninewa. Other reasons recorded, but in smaller numbers, included tribal and ethno-religious tensions, lack of clearance to return, limited employment opportunities, presence of mines and concerns regarding ISIL reprisal due to perceived affiliation.

8. For more details check: IOM DTM Iraq, *Camp Movements*, 1 April - 26 September, 2024, Baghdad, 2024.

Failed returns

The number of failed returns has significantly increased this round compared to the previous one (1,352 individuals vs. 391). **The majority of these failed returns were reported among individuals originally from Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates** (39% and 34%, respectively).

In Ninewa, most failed returns occurred in Telafar and Al-Ba'aj districts (57% and 33%, respectively). Many returnees from Telafar reported that their home residence belongs to the Ministry of Defense; thus, they were evacuated and these individuals were forced to displace again. In Al-Ba'aj, lack of job opportunities and public services were the main reasons forcing individuals to leave their areas of origin once again.

In Salah al-Din, most failed returns were reported in Balad District (76%), where lack of employment opportunities and financial means in the area of origin were cited as the primary reasons for re-displacement.

SHELTER TYPES


Most returnees (95%) reside in their residence of origin, while roughly 4 per cent live in critical shelters, similar to the last round.

Critical shelters⁹

Consistent with the previous round, **Salah al-Din continued to see an increase in the number of returnees residing in critical shelters**, with a significant escalation compared to the last round (9,684 versus 1,944 individuals). Most of this increase happened in Balad and Al-Fares districts (+5,118 and +4,296, respectively). This round, Ninewa also experienced an increase in the number of returnees living in critical shelters (+1,758), predominantly in Al-Ba'aj and Sinjar districts (+1,650 and +1,194, respectively). In contrast, Anbar and Kirkuk governorates saw a decrease in the number of returnees residing in critical shelters (-594 and -264, respectively).

In Balad and Al-Fares, the primary reason for the increase in returnees living in critical shelters is the rise in returns from camps, with families needing to return to their habitual residences, which are not yet habitable. Similar reasons apply in Al-Ba'aj and Sinjar, where families are returning to their uninhabitable homes but they were encouraged by the presence of multiple organizations working to improve the area's infrastructure and basic services, including water, electricity and schools


Figure 8: Rate of return in top 10 districts of origin



9. For returnees, critical shelters include uninhabitable residences of origin; tents, caravans, makeshift shelters, mud or brick houses; unfinished or abandoned buildings; public buildings or collective shelters; religious buildings or school buildings.


The graphs below show: 1) the number of returnees in all governorates, 2) the main districts where returnees reside, 3) the rate of return per governorate and 4) the governorates where returnees were last displaced. For an overview of districts of returns across Iraq, please see the [Returnee Background Map](#).

Figure 9: Top governorates of return, corresponding districts of return and governorates of last displacement




↻ Rate of return

Map 3: Districts of return



Map 4: Areas of no return



METHODOLOGY

IOM's DTM monitors displacement and provides information on the IDP and returnee populations in Iraq. Data are collected through IOM's RARTs, composed of over 58 staff members deployed across Iraq (18% of enumerators are female). Data collection for Round 133 took place between May – August 2024 across 18 governorates.

Data from the IDP Master List and Returnee Master List are gathered through a well-established large network of over 2,000 key informants that includes community leaders, mukhtars, local authorities and security forces. Additional information is gathered from government registration data and partner agencies.

IOM RARTs collect Master List data continuously and report it every four months. However, limited access due to security issues and other operational constraints can affect information-gathering activities. The variation in displacement figures observed between different reporting periods, in addition to true variation of the population figures, may be influenced by other factors such as the continuous identification of previously displaced groups and the inclusion of data on secondary displacements within Iraq.

The displaced populations are identified through a process of collection, verification, triangulation and validation of data. IOM continues to closely coordinate with federal, regional and local authorities to maintain a shared and accurate understanding of displacement across Iraq.

CALCULATIONS USED TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS

The number of individuals is calculated by multiplying the number of households by six, the average size of an Iraqi household as per governmental statistics, for all out-of-camp IDPs and returnees. Since the July-August 2020 period (Round 117), the number of individuals for in-camp IDPs has been calculated by multiplying

the number of households by five,¹⁰ which is the average camp household size according to the Iraq CCCM Cluster since 2018.

RATE OF CHANGE BETWEEN IDP AND RETURNEE CASELOADS

The rate of change of the IDP caseload and that of the returnee caseload may differ due to several factors. Firstly, DTM continues to record families who are displaced for the first time, families arriving from other locations of displacement (secondary displacement) and families who become displaced after returning (failed returns). Additionally, because DTM counts IDPs and returnees at the family level, marriage and other changes within the family can influence the size of the caseload. Furthermore, some families may be counted in both caseloads if: a) part of the family remains displaced while others have returned or b) families may move back and forth between their area of displacement and return. Finally, IDPs living in inaccessible areas may not be counted due to security concerns; upon their return, however, they may be included in the returnee caseload.

DIFFERING LENGTHS OF REPORTING PERIODS

The Master List is produced on a tri-annual basis. Previous reports were published on a quarterly basis. Additionally, since January 2021, three reports (120, 121 and 123) covered a two-month period. The changing length of the reporting period may impact comparison between rounds.

CHANGES TO SHELTER TERMINOLOGY

Since Round 122, DTM made changes to the shelter terminology to align with the Iraq CCCM Cluster's [Technical Note on Informal Sites Definition for Iraq](#) (September 2020). Please find shelter definitions in the glossary below.

10. Prior to Round 117, DTM calculated the number of in-camp IDPs by multiplying the number of families by six.

GLOSSARY

Critical shelter	<p>For returnees, critical shelters includes the following shelter types: residences of origin (uninhabitable), tents/caravans/makeshift shelters/mud or brick houses, unfinished/abandoned buildings, public buildings or collective shelters, religious buildings or school buildings.</p> <p>For IDPs, critical shelters include those listed above for returnees except residences of origin, as well as apartments/houses that are not owned or are uninhabitable.</p>
Failed return	Individuals arriving from their area of origin after a failed attempt at return.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	For the purposes of the DTM assessments, all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.
Location	An area that corresponds either to a village for rural areas or a neighbourhood for urban areas (i.e. fourth official administrative division).
Location of no return	A location that recorded displacement during or since the 2014-2017 conflict with ISIL but has either not recorded any returns or have subsequently recorded that all returnees have redisplaced.
Private settings	<p>For returnees and IDPs, includes hotels/motels, houses of host families or apartments/houses that are not owned.</p> <p>For IDPs, it also includes their own property.</p>
Protracted displacement	Displacement that has lasted for longer than three years. As displacement data are collected in 'waves' of displacement that cover a period of several months, displacement that occurred before January 2021 is considered to be protracted.
Rate of return	Used to estimate the proportion of returns in a district of origin and computed as the ratio of returnees to a district to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same district.
Residence of origin	For returnees only, refers to their residence prior to displacement.
Returnees	For the purposes of the DTM assessments, all those displaced since January 2014 who have returned to their location of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type. The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy for ensuring durable solutions.
Secondary displacement	Individuals displaced more than one time and arriving from another location of displacement.

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