PROGRESS TOWARD DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN IRAQ: DIYALA

DECEMBER 2024



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ACRONYMS

CCCA	Central Committee for Compensating the Affected
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
DS	Durable Solutions
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EGRIS	Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics
FHH	Female Headed Households
Gol	Government of Iraq
НН	Household
НоНН	Head of Household
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IRIS	International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ID	Identity Document
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MoMD	Ministry of Migration and Displacement
NES	Northeast Syria
PMU	Popular Mobilization Units

DEFINITIONS

Critical shelters – Tents/caravans/makeshift shelters/mud or brick houses, unfinished/abandoned buildings, public buildings or collective shelters, religious buildings, school buildings and uninhabitable residences located, for IDPs, at the location of displacement and, for returnees, at the location of origin.

Dependency ratio – The number of children (aged 0–17 years) and elderly persons (aged 60 years or over) in relation to the working-age population or active citizens (aged 18–59 years).

Durable Solution – A durable solution is achieved when displaced people no longer have any specific assistance or protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through three processes – return, local integration or relocation (Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) framework¹) with the end goal of all three being (re)integration.

Economically inactive – A person or members of the household who are pre-school children, students, retired persons, doing housework or not employed and not actively looking for a job.

Essential identity documents – The documents considered to be essential are proof of nationality, national ID, residency card and birth certificate. All others are not considered to be essential for the purpose of this study.²

Female-headed household – Households that are headed by a female member. When female heads of households are described as residing 'alone', it means that they are single, widowed, separated, divorced or, if married, not living with their husband.

Household – Group of people who regularly share meals, income and expenditures together. Members must acknowledge the authority of one person as the head of household and that person must live with the rest of the household members. In polygamous households, each wife is treated as a distinct household when the wives live in different houses, cook separately and take decisions independently.

Housing, land and property – An area of humanitarian practice that examines and seeks to address issues related to rights over immovable property, in the context of emergency response.

Internally displaced person (IDP) – Person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix unit (DTM) in Iraq considers IDPs all Iraqi nationals who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards.

Location – An area that corresponds either to a village for rural areas or a neighborhood for urban areas.

Returnee – IDPs who have returned to their place of habitual residence, that is, the place where they used to live at the time of the displacement-causing event. IOM DTM Iraq considers as returnees all those displaced since January 2014 who have returned to their location of origin, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or another shelter type. The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy for ensuring durable solutions.

Stable income sources – Regular income generated from salaried work (public or private sector), pensions, owned business or from rented property that is not fluctuating significantly on a month-to-month basis.

Stayee – The population who was not forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence due to the 2014-2017 crisis. This group is used as a baseline for comparison with IDPs and returnees to assess displacement-related vulnerabilities against a population group which has not been displaced. This comparison forms the basis for assessing progress along the solutions pathway, in line with the International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS).³

Unified Card – A card that serves as proof of an individual's Iraqi identity and is a substitute for the Iraqi nationality certificate, civil status identity and residence card.

CONTEXT AND DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

Diyala has a diverse ethnoreligious composition, with Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkmen making up the majority of inhabitants (60%), followed by Shiite Arabs and Shiite Turkmen (25%) and Kurds (15%).⁴ The diverse nature of the province, in combination with historic and contemporary grievances, makes it prone to conflicts among the different ethnoreligious groups.⁵ Political disputes have continued to the present day, as reflected in the stalemate over the governorship in 2024.⁶ This gridlock contributes to governance challenges such as provision of services.⁷

With the end of Saddam Hussein's rule, Iraq adopted a governance system known as *Al-Muhasasa*, which distributed political power between Shia, Sunni and Kurds.⁸ This approach sought to address the repression faced by Kurds and Shiite Arabs under the Ba'athist Party by granting these previously marginalized groups greater political representation.⁹ However, critics of the system claim it exacerbated ethnosectarian tensions and divided the country.¹⁰

In a Shitte-dominated government, Sunnis felt alienated and polarized by the state.¹¹ Firstly, they viewed as illegitimate state-building processes initiated by a foreign power.¹² Secondly, Sunni leaders were both unwilling and unable to mobilize along sectarian lines.¹³ Consequently, they boycotted post-2003 governance processes, including the drafting of the 2005 constitution and parliamentary elections.¹⁴ In Diyala, the refusal of Sunni communities to participate in the 2005 provincial elections resulted in limited seats on the provincial council.¹⁵ This approach of disengagement weakened the representation of Sunnis within the laws and governance of the new state.¹⁶ While Sunnis in Diyala participated in the 2009 provincial elections, accusations of electoral fraud, especially in Markaz Khanaqin, further undermined the perceived legitimacy of these processes.¹⁷

The ensuing power vacuum and legitimacy crisis gave space for extremist groups to emerge. ¹⁸ Following the 2003 intervention, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was founded under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. ^{19, 20} Zarqawi would later declare Diyala the future capital of AQI's Islamic State of Iraq. ²¹ By 2007, the group controlled significant swaths of Diyala, including the centre of the governorate capital, Ba'quba. ²² This resulted in high levels of violence and hindered the ability of the local government to provide services, aid and even salaries. ²³ While AQI's indiscriminate tactics contributed to popular backlash and a decline in its activities during the *Sahwa* or 'Awakening Movement', the group was able to resurface in 2013 as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ^{24, 25}

Map 1: Districts in Diyala Governorate



DISPLACEMENT FROM DIYALA GOVERNORATE DURING THE 2014-2017 CRISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was first declared in April 2013. Within just over a year, the group had seized the cities of Fallujah, Mosul, parts of Ramadi and Tikrit. However, despite favourable conditions for insurgent activity in Diyala, including difficult terrain, economic challenges and sectarian grievances, ISIL failed to fully capture the governorate. The Kurdish peshmerga and Shiite paramilitaries, supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran, played a critical role in preventing the advances of ISIL. Moreover, in the early phases of its conquests in Iraq, ISIL appeared to place lower strategic priority on Diyala, as reflected in the relatively smaller number of attacks launched in the governorate compared to others captured. Instead, the group focused its attention on northern areas of the governorate such as Jalula, As-Saadia and Qara Tabe due to their links with tribes based around Lake Hamrin. In August 2014, ISIL captured Jalula following a large-scale attack on the subdistrict.

After six months of clashes between ISIL, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), ISIL was defeated in Diyala in January 2015.³³ The crisis resulted in immense destruction of the governorate, including agriculture and water resources.³⁴ The conflict, accompanied by the PMU control of the area, led to the displacement of 311,282 individuals, many of whom were Sunnis forcibly evacuated from the governorate.^{35, 36}

The first wave of displacement in Diyala took place in a context of growing violence, economic precarity and targeting of minority groups such as Turkmen.³⁷ This latter group began to leave their areas of origin as early as August 2013 in response to direct threats.³⁸ Between March and April 2014, the conflict in Diyala escalated with attacks on urban areas like Buhriz and polling stations during the parliamentary elections.^{39,40} Nevertheless, by September 2014, families started to return to their areas of origin in Diyala, even as new displacement was recorded elsewhere in the governorate.⁴¹ Returns peaked between April 2015 and February 2016, motivated by improved security conditions and the relative proximity of families living in displacement.⁴² However, a significant share of returning families resided in critical shelters such as unfinished or abandoned buildings.⁴³ These trends of increased returns and precarious housing continued through 2016 and 2017.⁴⁴

CURRENT DISPLACEMENT AND RETURNS TRENDS

As of April 2024, Diyala Governorate hosts 4 per cent of Iraq's total IDP population (42,252 individuals), nearly all of whom had been displaced for more than five years. ⁴⁵ The majority of these IDPs (89% or 37,632 individuals) originate from the same governorate. At the district level, almost half of IDPs in Diyala are in Ba'quba (44% or 18,792 individuals), followed by roughly a third in Khanaqin (30% or 12,654 individuals) and a seventh in Kifri (15% or 6,258 individuals).

Figure 1: Governorate of origin for IDPs in Diyala




Figure 2: Districts of displacement of current IDP population in Diyala




Figure 3: Number of IDPs from Diyala by governorate of displacement

In Diyala, over half of the IDPs (54% or 22,902 individuals) reside in locations with low severity living conditions, while only 10 per cent (4,380 individuals) live in high severity locations. As April 2024, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in Iraq has indicated a significant reduction in the number of IDPs living in severe conditions in Diyala, with a decrease of 858 individuals. This reduction was most notable in Ba'quba, specifically in Ba'quba Centre subdistrict, where 798 fewer IDPs in severe conditions were recorded compared to the previous round. This improvement is largely attributed to the enhanced electricity supply in the area.

Diyala ranks fifth in terms of governorates of origin for IDPs in Iraq. 49 Currently, 69,518 IDPs from Diyala remain displaced, with the majority originating from Khanaqin District. Most of these IDPs remain within Diyala (54% or 37,632 individuals), with the next largest group displaced to Sulaymaniyah (33% or 23,279 individuals). These IDPs are primarily in protracted displacement, having faced failed returns largely due to extensive residential destruction and unstable security conditions, including threats from ISIL.





Figure 5: Rate of return in districts in Diyala Governorate⁵⁰



According to IOM DTM's Return Index Round 21 (January - April 2024),⁵¹ 241,278 individuals have returned, reflecting a 78 per cent return rate. In other words, 22 per cent of the IDPs who were originally displaced from Diyala Governorate have not yet returned. Notably, no returns to Ba'quba or Baladrooz districts have been observed.


Diyala Governorate hosts the fourth largest returnee population in Iraq as of April 2024 (241,278 individuals) after Ninewa, Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates, representing only 5 per cent of the overall caseload.⁵² The majority live in Khanaqin (44% or 105,660 individuals), followed by Al-Khalis (31% or 74,292 individuals) and Al-Muqdadiya (25% or 59,826 individuals).

Around two thirds of returnees in Diyala have medium severity living conditions (65% or 157,686 individuals), while just under a quarter reside in locations with high severity living conditions (22% or 52,608 individuals). About 83,934 individuals live in two 'hotspots' – almost all in Jalula (98% or 82,434 individuals) with a smaller percentage in Qara Tabe (2% or 1,500 individuals). However, compared to the previous data collection period (Return Index Round 20, September – December 2023), there has been a decrease of 750 individuals in severe conditions, attributed to a reduction in armed groups other than the Iraqi army at checkpoints in the Jalula subdistrict. However, concerns about

possible ISIL attacks still persist. Additionally, there is insufficient water and electricity in As-Saadia subdistrict and poor water supply in Markaz Khanaqin subdistrict.

These factors hinder returnees' ability to stay in their area of origin and increase the risk of re-displacement, undermining the sustainability of their return. Therefore, assessing progress towards durable solutions to displacement in Iraq is crucial for informing targeted interventions in key areas of concern.

Figure 6: Districts of return of current returnee population in Diyala



KEY FINDINGS

As of April 2024, Diyala Governorate hosts the fourth largest returnee population in Iraq (241,278 individuals)⁵⁶ and the seventh largest IDP population (42,252 individuals). ⁵⁷ It is also the fifth largest governorate of origin for IDPs in Iraq (69,518 individuals), most of whom are displaced within Diyala.⁵⁸ Additionally, Diyala Governorate hosts the fifth largest number of IDPs (4,380 individuals)⁵⁹ and the fourth highest number of returnees (52,608 individuals) living in high severity conditions.⁶⁰

Nearly all remaining IDPs in Diyala have been displaced for 10 years. Experiences of multiple displacements are fairly common among both IDPs and returnees. Moreover, nearly one in five IDP households tried to return but were not able to stay (failed return).

Most IDP households (86%) prefer to stay in their current location. Notably, IDPs in Diyala are more inclined to remain where they are compared to IDPs in Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar. Among IDP households who want to return, the main obstacles include destroyed housing and lack of livelihood opportunities. With respect to returnees, nearly all households plan to remain in their current location. These preferences indicate the importance of addressing challenges for IDPs in their current locations, rather than in their locations of origin.

COMPARING LIVING CONDITIONS

This study compares living conditions for IDP, returnee and stayee households across five criteria: (1) safety and security, (2) adequate standard of living, (3) access to livelihoods, (4) restoration of housing, land and property (HLP) and compensation and (5) documentation and participation.

In general, returnees have achieved greater progress toward durable solutions than IDPs. However, stayee households tend to outperform both IDP and returnee households in the domains listed above.

As observed in other governorates, the biggest gap between IDP and stayee households was recorded in the HLP domain, driven primarily by access to legally recognized documentation for housing and resolution of compensation claims for loss of property, death or absence of family members and career and education disruptions. Notably, less than half of IDP households had a successful compensation claim. Challenges related to HLP are particularly pronounced in the subdistricts of Markaz Khanaqin and Markaz Kifri for IDP households and Jalula for returnee households. Nevertheless, IDP households in Diyala appear to outperform those surveyed in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din on these criteria. The higher average score for IDPs in Diyala reflects more limited concerns around eviction.

Consistent with previous research findings, all three groups appear to struggle on livelihoods criteria. Despite high levels of engagement in the labour market, households frequently rely on unstable sources of income through irregular earnings, daily labour and social welfare. As a result, households are not able to build financial safety nets as measured by their ability to face unexpected expenses of up to 450,000 Iraqi dinar (IQD). These issues appear particularly acute for IDP households in the subdistricts of Markaz Kifri and Markaz Khanagin.

In terms of standard of living, certain challenges relating to shelter conditions and access to improved sanitation facilities were reported. Notably, living conditions for returnees appear to be worse than those indicated by IDPs and stayees. At least a quarter of all three groups reside in bad condition housing or critical shelters. Moreover, returnees, stayees and, to a lesser extent, IDPs also indicate difficulties accessing improved sanitation facilities. On the other hand, relatively high shares can access healthcare. Additionally, almost no households face food insecurity.

By contrast, fewer challenges were reported in the personal documentation and

participation domain. Nearly all households have essential personal documentation and registered the birth of their children. However, IDP households feel less accepted by the community and were less likely to participate in the 2021 **elections**. These challenges are especially pronounced for IDP households residing in Markaz Kifri subdistrict.

With respect to safety and security, high shares of IDP, returnee and stayee households report feeling safe and having freedom of movement. At the same time, more limited shares feel comfortable getting help from authorities.

MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD **DURABLE SOLUTIONS**

Households were rated according to the number of criteria met to measure the overall progress toward solutions. Those who met only one criterion or none are categorized as low progress, while those who met two or three criteria are classified as medium progress and those who met four or all five criteria as high progress.

Figure 6: Number of criteria met per progress group



Returnees appear to have achieved a higher degree of progress than IDP households, as reflected in the average number of criteria met. While just over half of returnees fall in the medium progress group, around two in five are classified as having attained high progress. Among IDP households, less than a third have achieved a high level of progress, with the largest share falling in the medium progress group. At the same time, a minority of IDP and returnee households are considered to have attained low levels of progress.

Compared to other governorates, IDP households in Diyala Governorate received a higher average score than those assessed in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates. Returnee households in Diyala Governorate outperform those in Ninewa and Salah al-Din but fall short of the average recorded in Anbar Governorate. Stayees, for their part, received a comparable score to those in Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates.

Figure 7: Percentage of IDP and returnee households by progress group





Figure 8: Percentage of IDP and returnee households by criteria met



FACTORS ENABLING AND PREVENTING PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTIONS

This study offers evidence on the factors facilitating or hindering durable solutions, the distinct challenges faced by IDP and returnee households compared to those who never displaced and the distinguishing characteristics of low progress households

Certain demographic characteristics are associated with lower levels of progress toward durable solutions. A greater share of low progress IDP and returnee households are **headed by women and widows** relative to other progress groups. Additionally, low progress IDP households tend to have a **higher dependency ratio**, although this relationship is less clear among returnee households. This points to the challenges faced by single-parent households with a larger number of dependents. Female heads of households in particular may struggle to find work while caring for others in their households.

With respect to displacement history, **experiences of multiple displacements** appear to be linked to lower levels of progress, particularly among IDP households and to a lesser extent among returnee households.

Across the domains assessed, **standard of living** and **livelihoods** appear to have the greatest effect on progress level. Given the widespread challenges observed in the HLP domain, the relationship between these indicators and progress levels is not as stark, as even the high progress groups face issues. The domain of documentation and participation is also linked to progress levels, albeit to a lesser extent. Lastly, the association between security concerns and progress is stronger among returnees than IDPs.

Regarding standard of living indicators, low progress IDP and returnee households are far less likely to live in adequate shelters. Additionally, access to improved sanitation facilities appears to influence progress levels among returnees in particular. Moreover, notable shares of low and medium progress IDP and returnee households do not have adequate access to healthcare.

When it comes to livelihoods, having a **stable source of income** and **being able to face unexpected expenses** are both positively correlated with progress. However, considerable shares report these challenges even in the high progress group, highlighting the difficulties of underemployment for all IDPs and returnees.

In terms of HLP restoration and compensation, the indicator that appear to have the greatest impact on progress among IDP households is **successful resolution of compensation claims**. For returnee households, however, **having legally recognized documentation** appears to differentiate the progress groups to a greater degree. Moreover, fear of eviction had a greater influence on progress among returnee households than IDP households. Lastly, a greater share of low progress IDP and returnee households reported having a member who is missing, dead or imprisoned.

Within the documentation and participation domain, the main factor linked to progress among IDPs and returnees appears to be participation in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Moreover, low and medium progress IDP households tend to feel less accepted by the community relative to high progress IDP households.

Concerning safety and security, low progress returnee households were less likely to feel comfortable getting help from authorities compared to the medium and high progress groups. Among IDPs, similar shares of low and medium progress households reported this challenge.

Despite these difficulties, a larger share of low progress IDP households prefer to stay in their current location compared to higher progress groups. This may be related to the larger share of low progress IDP households who cited fear of the security situation in their area of origin relative to the medium and high groups. On the other hand, a greater proportion of high progress IDP households prefer to return. However, a lack of livelihood opportunities appeared to weigh more heavily among their reasons for not returning compared to the low and medium progress groups. Among returnees, nearly all households prefer to remain where they are. However, a slightly higher share of low progress returnee households prefer to move to a third location or go abroad.

Taken together, returnee households in Diyala Governorate have achieved greater progress toward durable solutions than IDP households in the same governorate. At the same time, both returnee and IDP households received a lower average score than stayee households, highlighting persistent challenges linked to displacement. In terms of thematics, the greatest gap between groups was observed in the HLP domain, while the lowest average scores were recorded in the livelihoods domain. Interestingly, the standard of living score was slightly lower among returnees compared to IDPs, driven by shelter conditions and access to improved sanitation facilities and healthcare. On the other hand, IDPs underperformed on metrics related to social cohesion, namely participation in the 2021 elections and feeling accepted by the community.

Focusing on geographic priorities for programming, IDP households in the subdistricts Markaz Kifri and Markaz Khanaqin have made less progress toward durable solutions compared to other areas. In Markaz Kifri, this stems from challenges reported in the documentation and participation, livelihoods and HLP domains. IDP households in this district were less likely to have a formal rental agreement and successfully resolved compensation claim. They also had greater concerns about safety and security in their area of origin compared to IDPs in other subdistricts. Additionally, significant shares of IDPs do not feel accepted by the community and did not participate in the 2021 election. In Markaz Khanaqin, the limited progress toward durable solutions among IDPs was driven by challenges in HLP, livelihoods and standard of living. Compared to other subdistricts, IDP households in Markaz Khanagin were less likely to reside in adequate housing, have documentation for their housing or a formal rent agreement and a successfully resolved compensation claim. Additionally, IDPs reported less access to improved sanitation facilities and health care. Among returnees, those in Jalula subdistrict tended to face difficulties related to HLP, livelihoods and standard of living. In terms of housing, they are less likely to report adequate housing conditions, housing documentation and successful resolution of compensation claims. With respect to livelihoods, they suffer from unstable livelihoods and an inability to face unexpected expenses. Lastly, lower shares of returnee households in the subdistrict have access to health care.

INTRODUCTION

This report on Diyala Governorate is the third round of the pilot project aimed at assessing progress towards durable solutions⁶¹ to displacement for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees in the governorates with the largest shares of the displaced population in Iraq.

The goal is to understand where IDPs and returnees stand five years after the end of the 2014-2017 crisis and in which aspects they are still struggling compared to the population who never left their location of origin ('stayees'). In this respect, this project contributes to a broader discussion and Action Agenda around measuring progress towards solutions - and determining the end of displacement – which aims at operationalizing the eight criteria of the Framework for Durable Solutions produced by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and informing targeted interventions in key areas of concern.⁶²

The analysis of this project builds on the information and knowledge gained by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) regarding the 2014-2017 ISIL crisis. IOM Iraq has been tracking and monitoring IDP stock figures as early as December 2014 through the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM).⁶³ The collection of returnee stock figures began in April 2015, although returnee stock figures have been retroactively reported since October 2014. IOM Iraq also uses the Displacement Index⁶⁴ and Return Index⁶⁵ as tools to monitor the

living conditions of the IDP and returnee populations at the location level across key sectors, such as livelihoods, housing, services, safety, social cohesion and inclusiveness. Since 2015, IOM Iraq and Georgetown University implemented a longitudinal study, Access to Durable Solutions in Iraq, to understand how IDPs take steps to build lasting durable solutions. The study has regularly surveyed non-camp IDP families since their displacement in 2014-2015, including some families who managed to return to their area of origin since 2017.66 Since 2019, IOM Iraq has been monitoring protracted⁶⁷ and urban displacement⁶⁸ in the main districts of origin and displacement to provide a contextualized categorization and inform planning and development of durable solutions strategies.

The analytical framework for this pilot was developed according to the IASC Framework for Durable Solutions and the recommendations provided by the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS)/UN Statistics Division (UNSD) on IDP statistics and composite measures for progress towards durable solutions and overcoming key displacement-related vulnerabilities. All indicators selected for the composite measure were selected from the Interagency Indicator Library and, as such, they align with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

METHODOLOGY

SAMPLING DESIGN

Two sources of data were utilized as sampling frames to obtain the estimated base number of IDP, returnee and stayee households in each subdistrict in Diyala Governorate. DTM Master List Round 130 data, collected between May and August 2023, was used as a sampling frame for IDP and returnee households, while the source for stayee households was 2021 population data from the Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning of Iraq.

A two-stage sampling procedure was used. In the first stage, locations in each subdistrict were selected with a probability proportional to the population size. In the second stage, IDP and returnee households were selected proportionally to the total number of households in the location. All locations where IDPs and returnees were present according to DTM Master List Round 132 were included in the frame. For stayees, the procedure was slightly different and based on 2021 Iraqi Central Statistical Office population estimates at the subdistrict level, which are available upon request. Only locations with IDPs and returnees were included in the frame and the number of households was based on the total number of stayees in the subdistrict. In cases where no stayees or few stayees were present at the selected location, households were replaced within the subdistrict.

Data collection for this report took place in between March and May 2024 across 6 districts and 22 subdistricts in the Diyala Governorate of Iraq. Data were collected through IOM's Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs), composed of 13 staff members (30% of enumerators are female). They collected data through structured face-to-face interviews with a sample size of 4,194 households, almost evenly split between three groups: IDP (1,182), returnee (1,127) and stayee (1,885) households. This sample size and design allow for comparison between the three groups as well as generalization of the findings per population group at the district level. Overall, surveyed households represent 7,360 IDP households, 40,196 returnee households and 256,323 stayee households. The margin of error is 2.4 per cent at the governorate level for all groups (IDP, returnees and stayees), and at subdistrict level ranges from 4.4 to 5.8 per cent for IDP estimates, from 8.7 to 9.9 per cent for returnee estimates and from 7.2 to 7.5 per cent for stayee estimates (although in their case, only district estimates can be produced).

SELECTION OF INDICATORS

Indicators to assess the advancement toward durable solutions stemmed from the IASC Framework.⁶⁹ The framework defines three 'durable solutions' sustainable return, sustainable integration or sustainable resettlement — each of which depends on the fulfilment of eight criteria: (1) long-term safety and security; (2) adequate standard of living; (3) access to livelihood and employment; (4) access to effective and accessible mechanisms to restore housing, land and property; (5) access to personal and other documentation; (6) family reunification; (7) participation in public affairs and (8) access to effective remedies and justice.

Figure 9: IASC Durable Solution Framework's criteria to measure the progress toward achieving durable solutions



In consultation with partners and following the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS), indicators across those criteria were developed and organized into a questionnaire. The questionnaire and indicators were further refined following the pilot testing in Ninewa. Two additional indicators were included since the pilot round: 1) 'reunification' in the restoration of HLP and compensation criteria and 2) 'acceptance' in the personal documentation and participation domain. The 'Reunification' considers whether any household members are deceased, imprisoned or missing because of the 2014-2017 crisis. 'Acceptance' measures feelings of acceptance by the community. Additionally, three indicators were adjusted: the head of household's source of income was adjusted to the household's source of income (livelihood); HLP loss and

compensation include all three groups and the status of the compensation claim (HLP); and essential documentation includes Iraqi nationality together with ID (documentation and participation).


The questionnaire was then administered to the sample of 1,182 IDP households, 1,127 returnee households and 1,885 stayee households across 22 subdistricts and 6 districts of Diyala Governorate. Afterwards, indicators were tested and analysed across the three population groups and those that differentiated groups better and were consistent across domains were selected for analysis. Overall, 18 indicators were selected and grouped into five domains to have at least three indicators per domain (Figure 5).⁷⁰

Figure 10: IASC Durable Solution Framework's criteria, sub-criteria and indicators used in this project











No absent members of household because of

the 2014-2017 crisis



All indicators were coded as binary variables, with one representing when a displacement-related or return-related vulnerability was overcome and zero when the vulnerability remained for a specific household. For example, 'feeling safe' or 'not reporting movement restrictions' is coded as a one as this is positive progress towards solutions. Recording of missing data was performed in the following way. Missing data by design, due to skipping patterns and non-applicability, were interpreted as the absence of vulnerability. For instance, families who did not need health care were coded as 'not vulnerable' in the health sub-criterion. Missing data due to non-response were interpreted as the presence of vulnerability. For instance, families answering 'Do not know' or 'Prefer not to answer' on whether they feel safe were coded as vulnerable, i.e., 'not feeling safe'. Employment indicators were assessed at the household level and coded as the absence of vulnerability if at least one individual passed that indicator, i.e., at least one

member ages 15-60 years old is employed in the household and the household has a stable source of income. The absence of vulnerability related to personal documentation was applied where all household members owned essential documents.

COMPOSITE MEASURE

The composite measure to assess progress towards solutions was built in several steps. First, the average number of indicators met per domain was calculated. For instance, the safety and security domain include three indicators; thus, the maximum possible value is three when all indicators are met and the minimum possible value is zero, when none of the indicators are met. This allows for comparison between groups and identification of the most problematic domain.

Figure 11: The average number of indicators met per domain and population group

DOMAIN	IDPs	RETURNEES	STAYEES	MAX
Safety and Security	2.74	2.73	2.73	3
Adequate Standard of Living	3.37	3.22	3.36	4
Access to Livelihoods	1.62	1.72	1.88	3
Restoration of HLP and Compensation	2.32	2.58	3.21	4
Personal Documentation and Participation	3.60	3.88	3.83	4

Second, the average number of criteria met was calculated. To do so, domain scores were also coded as binary variables, with one representing when the IDP or returnee household met on average the same or higher number of

indicators per domain as the stayee household and zero when the IDP or returnee household met on average a lower number of indicators.

Figure 12: The score coding per domain based on the average number of indicators met

DOMAIN	0	1	THRESHOLD (Average number of indicators met by stayee households)	
Safety and Security	<2.73	= or >2.73	2.73	
Adequate Standards of Living	<3.36	= or >3.36	3.36	
Access to Livelihoods	<1.88	= or >1.88	1.88	
HLP Rights and Access to Remedies	<3.21	= or >3.21	3.21	
Personal Documentation and Participation	<3.83	= or >3.83	3.83	

Thus, the maximum possible value is five when all criteria are met and the minimum possible value is zero, when none of the criteria are met. This allows us to conduct an overall comparison between groups.

Figure 13: The average number of criteria met by population group

	IDPs	RETURNEES	STAYEES	Max
All five domains	All five domains 2.89		3.63	5

In addition, to assess the progress toward solutions, households were then rated according to the number of criteria met. Those who met only one criterion or none are categorized as achieving low progress, those who met two or three criteria as medium progress and those who met four or all five criteria as high progress.

LIMITATIONS

Some subdistricts had no or few stayees. Therefore, the sample was met using other locations in the district. This means that for the stayee population, findings can be generalized at the district, not subdistrict level.

Figure 14: Number of criteria met per progress group



I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION

This section presents an overview of the main socio-demographic characteristics of the displaced population in Diyala Governorate. This population includes households who are still at the location of displacement (IDPs) and households who have returned to the place where they used to reside before the 2014-2017 crisis forced them to move elsewhere (returnees).

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

The demographic structure of the displaced population is generally balanced – half are female and half are male. The average household size for IDPs is 6.16 and 6.40 for returnees

Around 1 in 7 IDP and returnee households are headed by a woman (16% of IDPs vs. 15% of returnees) and about 1 in 5 households is headed by an elderly person (18% of IDPs vs. 23% of returnees). Most IDP and returnee heads of household are married (85% IDPs vs. 86% returnees) and slightly over 1 in 10 are widowed (12% of

IDPs and returnees).


Education levels are comparable across IDP and returnee households. In about a third of IDP households, the head of household (HoH) has not completed any formal education (32% of IDPs vs. 26% of returnees).

Only about a third of IDP households (36%) has a stable source of income compared to almost half of returnee households (49%). In comparison, only half of stayee households (50%) report a stable income source, highlighting issues of underemployment among all three groups assessed. Most heads of household rely on daily wages or public sector employment or are retired.

Less than 1 in 10 IDP and returnee households report an absent family member (either missing, dead or imprisoned) (8% of IDPs and returnees).


Most IDP and returnee households are Sunni Arabs (86% of IDPs and 87% of returnees). Among stayee households, this share is slightly lower with roughly two thirds falling in this group (64%).

Figure 15: Characteristics of households



Almost all IDPs have been displaced for 10 years (94%) and over a third have been displaced more than once (37% of IDPs vs. 29% of returnees). Further, almost one in five IDP households reported a failed return (18%).


Figure 16: Number of displacements and failed returns



PREFERRED DURABLE SOLUTIONS AND OBSTACLES

Most IDP households prefer to stay in their current location (86% of IDPs vs. 97% of returnees), while 13 per cent prefer to return to their area of origin. The main obstacles to return are destroyed housing (68%) and lack of livelihood opportunities (66%). Additionally, around a third of IDP households report fear/ concerns regarding the security situation (34%) as a barrier to return.

Figure 17: Preferred solutions and main barriers to return



II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS PER CRITERIA

This section compares progress for IDP, returnees and stayee households across five criteria: (1) safety and security, (2) adequate standard of living, (3) access to livelihoods, (4) restoration of HLP and compensation and (5) documentation and participation.

Livelihoods and Restoration of HLP are the most challenging domains. Around half of IDP and returnee households meet all indicators for livelihoods, compared to almost 7 in 10 stayee households. Only about a third of IDPs (36%) have stable income sources (49% of returnees, 50% of stayees) and few can manage unexpected expenses (34% of IDPs, 31% of returnees, 45% of stayees). The relatively low proportion of stayee households meeting these criteria shows that this domain is challenging for all groups assessed.

Restoration of HLP is the domain with the most significant disparities between IDP, returnee and stayee households. Less than half of IDPs meet the criteria, compared to nearly 8 in 10 stayees (44% of IDPs, 53% of returnees and 79% of stayees). The most challenging indicators are legally recognized documentation (19% of IDPs, 34% of returnees, 46% of stayees) and successfully resolved compensation claim or lack of loss (45% of IDPs, 53% of returnees, 99% of stayees).

Living standards are also relatively challenging for all three groups, with similar scores across indicators. The more challenging aspects are shelter type and access to improved sanitation facilities and healthcare, where all three groups performed relatively similarly.

In contrast, safety and security, as well as documentation and participation, are relatively stronger domains for all groups. However, IDP households generally underperform compared to returnees and stayees, particularly in terms of participation in the 2021 elections and community acceptance.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

The safety and security domain considers whether households feel safe, are comfortable getting help from local authorities and are able to move in and out of their location of residence.

Figure 18: The average number of indicators met per Safety and Security domain



Consistent with findings in other governorates, displaced groups received some of the highest scores in the safety and security domain. All three groups received nearly similar scores, with over 7 in 10 households passing all three criteria (75% of IDPs, 74% of returnees and 73% of stayees). All households feel safe walking alone (100% of IDP, returnee and stayee households) and nearly all enjoy freedom of movement in and out of their area of residence (99% of IDPs and returnees, 100% of stayees). The only challenging indicator is feeling comfortable getting help from

authorities, with about 7 in 10 IDP and returnee households passing this criterion (75% of IDP and returnees, 73% of stayees). This indicator contributes to a lower average score for all three groups in this domain relative to other governorates assessed (Anbar and Ninewa).

At the same time, data from the Displacement and Return Indices highlight the persistence of certain security challenges, such as concerns over revenge attacks and ISIL attacks, violence from or between security forces or armed groups and presence of other security actors apart from federal and local forces.71, 72 These challenges appear to be concentrated in Al-Khalis, Khanaqin, Kifri and Al-Muqdadiya districts. 73,74 These findings suggest that while households generally feel safe on a day-to-day basis, they nevertheless remain concerned among the potential for future security incidents.

ADEQUATE STANDARD OF LIVING

The assessment measured adequate standards of living based on whether households have access to health care if needed or improved sanitation facilities. Additionally, this domain considered whether IDP and returnees' housing is in good condition. Finally, it examined levels of food security based on households' scores on the Coping Strategy Index.

Figure 19: The average number of indicators met per Adequate Standard of Living domain



IDPs and stayees report similar scores for the Adequate Standard of Living domain. In contrast to other governorates, however, returnee households in Diyala fared slightly worse than IDP and stayee households in terms of standard of living. Slightly over half of IDP households (55%) and about half of returnee households (50%) meet all indicators for this domain.

The most challenging indicator under this domain is shelter type. Both IDP and returnee households report lower scores for shelter conditions compared to other indicators. About 7 in 10 IDP and returnee households live in houses or apartments in good condition (73% of IDPs, 69% of returnees and 73% of stayees). The remaining proportion tends to live in damaged or destroyed houses/apartments in poor condition.

Most households have access to improved sanitation and healthcare facilities. Over 8 in 10 IDP households (84%) can access sanitation facilities, compared to a slightly lower proportion of returnees (75%) and stayees (74%). A similar proportion can access healthcare when needed, although this is less common among IDPs and returnees than stayees (82% of IDPs, 78% of returnees and 89% of stayees).

Almost no households report experiencing food insecurity (1% of IDP, returnee and stayee households)

ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS

The livelihoods domain assessed whether at least one member of the household (ages 15-60) is employed, whether the household has a stable source of income and whether households are able to face unexpected expenses of up to 450,000 IQD.

Figure 20: The average number of indicators met per Access to Livelihoods domain



Access to livelihoods is the most challenging domain for all three groups. Just over half of IDP and returnee households pass at least two indicators for this domain (52% of IDPs and 58% of returnees), compared to almost roughly two thirds of stayee households (67%). However, IDP households in Diyala received a slightly higher average score in this domain compared to IDP households in other governorates assessed (Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al Din).

The majority of households has at least one employed family member (aged 15–60 years) with minimal differences between groups (92% of IDPs and returnees compared to 93% of stayees).

However, only about a third of IDP households (36%) has a stable source of income, compared to around half of returnee and stayee households (49% and 50%, respectively). The share of IDP households with stable income is nevertheless higher than that observed in other governorates assessed. Most IDP households rely on irregular earnings or daily labour, followed by social welfare network salaries. Returnees and stayees show similar trends, though to a lesser extent.

Relatedly, only one third of IDP and returnee households can handle unexpected expenses (34% and 31%, respectively). Among stayee households, this share is slightly higher at 45 per cent. Compared to other governorates, the share of both IDP and stayee households in Diyala who can afford unexpected expenses is larger.

In terms of geographic variation, IDP households in **Markaz Kifri** (34%) and **Markaz Khanaqin** (42%) have lower proportions of households meeting these criteria.



RESTORATION OF HIP AND COMPENSATION

their housing, whether they are at risk of eviction, whether their property was damaged and whether they have applied for compensation and the claim has been resolved. Additionally, the presence of deceased, imprisoned or missing members was added as a measure of vulnerability.

Figure 21: The average number of indicators met per Restoration of HLP and Compensation domain




Restoration of HLP and compensation is the domain with the biggest gap between IDP and stayee households. Less than half of IDP households (44%) meet at least three criteria for this domain, while a slightly higher proportion of returnees (53%) meet the criteria. In contrast, almost 8 in 10 stayee households (79%) meet at least three criteria. Compared to other governorates, however, IDP households in Diyala received higher average scores in this domain.

In strong contrast to nearly all stayee households (99%), less than half of IDPs (45%) and slightly over half of returnees (53%) have had a successful compensation claim or have not suffered a loss.

Further, only one in five (19%) IDP households have legally recognized documentation, compared to 34 per cent of returnee and 46 per cent of stayee households. Around half of IDP households have informal rental agreements in contrast to roughly 1 in 10 returnee (11%) and stayee (16%) households. However, relative to other governorates, returnee households were less likely to have legally recognized documentation.

Figure 22: Legally recognized documentation



Despite these challenges, most households do not report fears of eviction, with 75 per cent of IDPs, 78 per cent of returnees and 78 per cent of stayees feeling secure in their ability to remain in their current residence. Notably, a lower share of IDP households in Diyala reported fears of eviction than those in other governorates assessed.

Lastly, almost no households report missing family members, with only 8 per cent of IDPs and returnees and 3 per cent of stayees experiencing this issue.

Across Diyala, the worst performing areas for HLP criteria are **Markaz Khanaqin** (22%) and **Markaz Kifri** (38%) for IDP households and **Jalula** (36%) for returnee households.

DOCUMENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

With respect to personal documentation, households were asked whether all members of their household have essential personal documentation (that is, a national or unified ID, Iraqi nationality and a birth certificate). Additionally, regarding participation in public affairs, the assessment considered whether all eligible members of the household voted in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Households were also asked to evaluate the extent to which they felt accepted by the community.

Figure 23: The average number of indicators met in the Documentation and Participation domain



Documentation and Participation is one of the least problematic domains, with IDPs, returnees and stayees receiving relatively high scores. However, IDP households slightly underperform in this domain compared to returnee and stayee households due to a lack of acceptance in the community and lower levels of participation in the 2021 election. Just under two thirds of IDP households (63%) met all four criteria in this domain against 89 per cent of returnees and 83 per cent of stayees.

Almost all households possess key personal documentation. Nearly all have a unified ID and Iraqi nationality (99% of IDPs and returnees and 97% of stayees) and all households have their children's birth certificates (100% across all groups).

The main difference between groups appears to be driven by **feelings of acceptance** in the community. About a quarter of IDP households (23%) report not feeling accepted, compared to only 6 per cent of returnee households and 7 per cent of stayee households.

Participation in the 2021 election also distinguishes the groups. About 17 per cent of IDP households did not participate in the elections compared to smaller proportions of returnee and stayee households (5% returnees and 7% stayees).

Across subdistricts, IDP households in **Markaz Kifri** report the lowest scores for this domain (21%).

III. PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS

OVERALL PROGRESS TOWARDS DURABLE SOLUTIONS

The five criteria discussed in the previous section were summed to obtain a composite measure to measure the overall progress toward solutions. Stayee households meet on average 3.63 out of 5 criteria, while IDP and returnees meet 2.89 and 3.17, respectively.

Households were then rated according to the number of criteria met. Those who meet only one criterion or none are categorized as low progress, while

those who meet two or three criteria are classified as medium progress and those who meet four or all five criteria as high progress.

Figure 24: The average number of criteria met per population group

	IDPs	returnees	STAYEES	
Average	2.89	3.17	3.63	

Figure 25: Number and percentage of households by number of criteria met and progress group

		Number of criteria met							
		Low p	rogress	Medium progress		High progress		Total	
		0	1	2	3	4	5	1	
IDPs	# of households	60	604	1,930	2,686	1,673	408	7,360	
	% of households	1%	8%	26%	36%	23%	6%	100%	
Returnees	# of households	325	2,361	7,693	13,053	10,462	6,302	40,196	
	% of households	1%	6%	19%	32%	26%	16%	100%	

About 6 in 10 IDP households (63%) fall into the medium progress group, with less than a third (29%) in the high progress group and the remaining 9 per cent in the low progress group. **Markaz Kifri** is the subdistrict with the highest proportion of IDPs in the low progress group (16%). Compared to other governorates assessed, however, IDP households have achieved a high degree of progress, as measured by the average score and the share of households in the high progress group.

Returnees have achieved higher progress than IDP households. Slightly over half of returnee households (52%) are in the medium progress group, around 42 per cent are classified as high progress and only 7 per cent fall into the low progress group.

KEY FACTORS LINKED TO PROGRESS

This section presents an overview of the main characteristics of IDP and returnee households by their level of progress towards solutions, highlighting the main factors enabling or preventing households from achieving durable solutions. As discussed further in this section, adequate standard of living, livelihoods and restoration of HLP have the strongest connection with progress toward durable solutions.

Adequate standard of living and livelihoods have the strongest connection with progress between groups. Low progress IDPs are significantly more likely to live in critical shelters (77% low, 28% medium, 12% high), such as damaged or

poor-condition housing. They also tend to have less access to improved sanitation facilities and healthcare. With respect to livelihoods, the largest gaps between progress groups are seen in income stability and the ability to handle unexpected expenses, with only a small proportion of low progress IDP households meeting these criteria (13% for income stability, 2% for handling unexpected expenses).

Restoration of HLP is particularly challenging for low progress IDPs. These households often have precarious tenure arrangements, with only a few having legally recognized documentation and many living under informal rental agreements. Additionally, a higher proportion of low progress IDPs have unresolved compensation claims or have not suffered a loss compared to higher progress groups.

While most safety and security indicators are similar across progress groups, low progress households are less comfortable seeking help from authorities.

Certain indicators related to participation affected progress between groups. Low progress IDP households are significantly less likely to have participated in the 2021 election and report lower feelings of acceptance, revealing the impact of social cohesion on progress.

IDPs' preferred solution across progress groups is stay in their current location. Notably, low progress households are more likely to prefer to stay in their current location than high progress groups.

Living standards and livelihoods are also crucial in determining progress among returnee households. Specifically, shelter type and access to improved sanitation facilities are particularly challenging for low progress returnees compared to other progress groups. Income stability and ability to face unexpected expenses have the most critical relation with progress. Less than 1 in 10 low progress returnee households (9%) has a stable income source (compared to 37% of medium and 69% of high progress) and almost none can handle unexpected expenses (1% of low, 16% of medium, 55% of high progress).

As with IDPs, restoration of HLP is a critical area for returnees. Only a small portion of low progress returnee households have legally recognized documentation and resolved compensation claims or lack of loss, with many fearing eviction.

In terms of safety and security, low progress returnee households similarly were less likely to feel comfortable seeking help from authorities, with the proportions increasing by progress group.

Other factors such as participation in the community had a correlation with progress. Participation in the 2021 elections and feelings of acceptance distinguished low progress households from those in the medium and high groups, although to a lesser extent compared to IDPs.

LOW PROGRESS - IDP HOUSEHOLDS

644 Households

9% of IDP caseload


The low progress group includes IDPs who have made progress on only one criterion or fewer. Overall, less than 1 in 10 households fall in this category (9% of the IDP caseload or 664 households), including 1 per cent who have met no criteria and 8 per cent who have met one. Markaz Kifri has the highest proportion of IDPs in the low progress group at 16 per cent.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

In terms of demographic characteristics, the share of female-headed households in the low progress group (29%) is almost double that observed in higher progress groups (16% of medium, 14% of high). Additionally, a higher share of low progress IDP households are headed by a widow compared to other progress categories (18% of low, 13% of medium and 9% of high). Nearly 4 in 10 low progress households (39%) have limited or no formal education, compared to smaller proportions in the higher progress groups (37% of medium, 19% of high).

Households in the low progress group also tend to be larger and have a higher dependency ratio.⁷⁵ Almost half of low progress households (48%) have a dependency ratio of 200+ compared to medium (31%) and high progress (27%) groups.

Figure 26: Dependency ratio of households by progress group




The ethnoreligious composition of low progress households is generally homogeneous, with nearly all IDPs being Sunni Arabs (87% of low, 85% of medium and 88% of high).

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

Most IDPs were displaced in 2014 at the beginning of the crisis. In fact, nearly all IDPs have been displaced for 10 years (91% of low, 95% of medium and high).

However, the number of times displaced appears to be correlated with progress, with low progress households more likely to have undergone more than one displacement. Nearly two thirds of low progress households (63%) have been displaced two times or more compared to higher progress groups (32% of medium, 41% of high). Low progress IDPs are also slightly more likely to report failed returns (26% of low, 15% of medium and 23% of high).

Figure 27: Number of times displaced by progress group



STANDARD OF LIVING


Adequate living standards is the most challenging domain for low progress IDPs. Almost no low progress IDP households (2%) meet all criteria for this domain, compared to almost half of medium progress households (51%) and over 8 in 10 high progress households (81%).

Only half of low progress households live in an adequate shelter (51%), measured by the number of people per room, access to drinking water and improved sanitation. In comparison, a higher proportion of medium (65%) and high progress households (82%) tend to meet these indicators. Only 67 per cent of low progress households have access to improved sanitation facilities (81% of medium, 96% of

high) and are able to access healthcare when needed (78% of medium, 95% of high). Low progress IDP households in Markaz Khanaqin report higher proportions struggling to access healthcare.

Nearly 8 in 10 low progress IDP households (77%) live in **critical shelters**. This proportion is over six times higher than households in the high progress group (12%). This is related to over half of low progress IDPs living in damaged, destroyed or bad condition apartments or houses (55%) or other precarious types of housing such as mud or block structures (12%). Many low progress IDP households in Markaz Kifri and Markaz Khanaqin reported this issue. In contrast, significantly higher proportions of medium (72%) and high progress (88%) households live in housing in good condition.

Figure 28: Shelter type by progress group



However, almost no households report experiencing food insecurity (2% of low and medium, 0% of high progress).

LIVELIHOODS


Access to livelihoods is one of the most challenging domains for low progress IDP households, with only 3 per cent meeting at least two criteria for this domain in strong contrast with medium (45%) and high progress households (84%).

The majority of households tend to have at least one employed family member in the household (ages 15-60), with the proportion gradually increasing by progress group (74% of low, 92% of medium and 98% of high).

However, only 1 in 10 (13%) of low progress households has a stable income source compared to around 3 in 10 (28%) medium progress households and 6 in 10 (59%) high progress households. Most households in the low progress group tend to rely on irregular earnings or daily labour, followed by a social welfare network salary and money from family/friends in Iraq.

Additionally, almost no low progress households can manage unexpected expenses, compared to almost a third (32%) of medium progress households and half (50%) of high progress households.

Figure 29: Ability to face unexpected expenses by progress group




HOUSING

The vast majority of low progress IDP households face significant challenges in the restoration of housing, land and property (HLP) and compensation. Less than 1 in 10 low progress households (9%) meet at least three criteria for this domain, compared to 4 in 10 medium progress households (38%) and 7 in 10 high progress households (69%).


One of the main drivers affecting progress is the absence of legally recognized documentation. Only 9 per cent of low progress households have secure tenure arrangements, compared to 11 per cent of medium progress households and 39 per cent of high progress households. Most low progress households live in informal arrangements, either through informal rental agreements (63%) or living for free (14%). Lack of legal documentation tends to be particularly prevalent amongst low progress IDPs in Ba'quba Centre, Markaz Kifri, Hibhib and Markaz Khanaqin.

Figure 30: Security of tenure by progress group



Having a successfully resolved compensation claim is also closely tied to progress. Only 24 per cent of low progress households have not lost any property rights or have successfully resolved a compensation claim. This proportion is almost half of that found in higher progress groups (45% of medium, 53% of high), indicating significant challenges for low progress households. Many low progress IDP households in Ba'quba Centre, Markaz Kifri, Markaz Khanaqin and Hibhib indicated this challenge.

Figure 31: Fear of eviction and compensation by progress group



Relatedly, almost a third of low progress households fear eviction (34%) compared to only 10 per cent of high progress households.

Finally, about 2 in 10 (22%) low progress households report having an absent family member, compared to smaller proportions in the higher progress households (8% of medium, 3% of high).

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Over half of low progress IDP households (56%) meet all criteria for safety and security, compared to 68 per cent of medium progress households and 95 per cent of high progress households, indicating that this domain remains somewhat challenging for lower progress groups.

Feeling comfortable seeking help from authorities appears to be strongly linked with progress. Only 6 in 10 low progress households (60%) report feeling comfortable getting help from authorities, compared to almost 7 in 10 medium progress households (69%) and almost all high progress households (95%). Most low progress IDP households in Hibhib subdistrict reported this issue.

Conversely, almost all households feel safe walking alone in their area (97% of low progress, 100% of medium and high progress) and enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement (96% of low progress, 99% of medium progress and 100% of high progress).


DOCUMENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

Documentation and participation are also relatively challenging for low progress IDPs. Only 22 per cent of low progress households meet all criteria, compared to 57 per cent and 91 per cent of medium and high progress households.

Low progress households encounter specific challenges related to participation. Only about a third of low progress IDPs (35%) have participated in the 2021 election, in comparison to most medium (84%) and almost all high progress households (96%). Feelings of acceptance also appear to be correlated with progress. About 7 in 10 low progress households feel accepted by their community (70%) compared to nearly all high progress households (94%).

On the other hand, IDP households across progress groups have all essential documents, including a national ID and Iraqi nationality (100% of low, 99% of medium and 100% of high) and their children's birth certificate (100%).

Figure 32: Participation in the election and feelings of acceptance by progress group



PREFERRED SOLUTION

Most IDP households across progress groups prefer to stay in their current location. Compared to the overall proportion observed in the governorate (86%), low progress households are more likely to prefer to stay in their current location (88%) compared to high progress households (79%). A relatively larger share of high progress IDP households want to return (21%), although most still prefer to remain in their current location (79%). In other governorates assessed, intentions to remain tend to positively be correlated with progress.

Amongst those who want to return, housing destruction is the main obstacle (72%), which was also the main reason cited by medium (69%) and high progress groups (63%). Disaggregating by progress group, a greater share of low progress IDP households cited concerns regarding the **security situation in their area of origin** (56%) relative to medium and high progress households (34% and 26%, respectively). On the other hand, a larger portion of high progress households pointed to a **lack of livelihoods** (72%) and a **desire to remain where they are** (42%).

LOW PROGRESS - RETURNEE HOUSEHOLDS

2.686 Households

7% of returnee caseload


Only a small percentage of returnees fall in the low progress category (7% of the returnee caseload, 2,686 households), in which is slightly less than the share of low progress IDP households (9%).

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Like IDPs in the same progress group, low progress returnee households have a higher proportion of female-headed households (29% low, 15% medium, 14% high). Low progress returnee heads of household are also more likely to be widowed (23% low, 12% medium, 10% high). With respect to education, 4 in 10 heads of household (40%) have limited or no formal education, compared to lower proportions in higher progress groups (31% medium, 18% high).

However, returnee households across progress groups tend to have similar dependency ratios.

Figure 33: Dependency ratio of households by progress group




The majority of low progress returnee households are Sunni Arabs (93%), with slightly lower shares reported among the medium and high progress groups (87% for both groups).

DISPLACEMENT HISTORY

Regardless of progress level, most returnee households were displaced in 2014 and arrived in their current location in the following three years.

Similar to IDPs, low progress returnees tend to have undergone multiple displacements, with 4 in 10 returnee (42%) households reporting two or more displacements.

Figure 34: Number of times displaced by progress group




STANDARD OF LIVING

None of the low progress returnee households meet the standard of living criteria (0% low, 28% medium, 86% high progress), indicating the severe challenges faced in this domain.

Less than a third of low progress returnee households (31%) live in adequate shelter conditions (compared to 51% medium, 71% high progress). Only 41 per cent of households have access to improved sanitation facilities (against 63% medium, 95% high progress). While roughly two thirds of households (64%) can access health care, this is far lower than the share observed among high progress IDP households (93%).

Most low progress returnees live in precarious shelter conditions, in stark contrast to the other progress groups (81% low, 45% medium, 6% high progress). These shelters are mainly damaged or destroyed housing (55%) or mud/block structures (21%).

Figure 35: Shelter type by progress group



However, almost all low progress returnee households are food secure (95% low, 100% medium and high progress).


LIVELIHOODS

Access to livelihoods is particularly challenging for returnees. No low progress households meet the criteria for this domain in strong contrast with 4 in 10 medium progress households (40%) and almost 9 in 10 high progress households (89%).

Similarly to IDPs, most households have at least an employed family member (78% low, 90% medium, 96% high progress group).

However, less than 1 in 10 low progress households has a stable source of income (9%). This proportion is significantly lower than the medium (37%) and high progress group (69%). Most low progress returnee households rely on social welfare network salaries, followed by irregular earnings or daily labour.

Figure 36: Ability to face unexpected expenses by progress group




Relatedly, the ability to face unexpected expenses is positively correlated with progress levels. Almost no low progress returnee households (1%) can face unexpected expenses. This share rises to 16 per cent among medium progress households and more than half (55%) of high progress households.

HOUSING

Low progress returnee households face significant challenges with restoration of HLP and compensation, as evidenced by the fact that only 6 per cent of households pass at least three criteria for this domain (compared to 43% medium, 74% high). Notably, no low progress returnee households in **Jalula** subdistrict pass this domain.


The main issue revolves around a **lack of legally recognized documentation**. Only 6 per cent of low progress households have such documentation, against 29 per cent of medium progress households and 45 per cent of high progress households. Most low progress returnees tend to own their property without documentation (38%). The level of ownership is tied to progress, with higher progress groups more likely to report legal ownership with documents (4% low, 24% medium, 41% high).

Figure 37: Security of tenure by progress group



As for IDPs, the resolution of compensation claims is closely linked to progress. Less than a third of low progress returnees (27%) have not lost any property rights or have successfully resolved a compensation claim compared to 51 per cent and 59 per cent in the medium and high progress groups.

Figure 38: Fear of eviction and compensation by progress group



About 42 per cent of low progress returnee households fear eviction, a proportion that is significantly higher than both the medium and high progress groups (29% and 10%, respectively).

Additionally, around 26 per cent of low progress returnee households report an absent family member, compared to 8 per cent in the medium progress group and 5 per cent in the high progress group.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

Low progress returnee household face challenges with certain safety and security criteria, with only 37 per cent meeting all criteria for this domain (65% medium, 91% high progress).

The main issue concerns **getting help from authorities** – only 43 per cent of low progress households feel comfortable seeking help compared to 65 per cent of medium progress households and 91 per cent of high progress households. Most low progress returnee households in Al-Mansouriyah did not feel comfortable getting help from authorities.

On the other hand, most households enjoy freedom of movement (91% low, 100% medium and high progress) and almost all feel safe in their current location (98% low, 100% medium and high progress).


DOCUMENTATION AND PARTICIPATION

Less than half of low progress returnees (45%) meet all criteria for the documentation and participation domain, compared to almost all medium (87%) and high progress households (98%).

Participation in the 2021 elections is a key factor behind progress. About a third of low progress households did not participate in the elections, whereas only 5 per cent of medium progress households and none of the high progress households abstained.

Additionally, not all low progress returnees feel accepted by their community. About 17 per cent do not feel accepted, compared to only 8 per cent in the medium progress group and 1 per cent in the high progress group.

Figure 39: Participation in the election and feelings of acceptance by progress group




However, almost all households have essential documentation, such as a national ID and Iraqi nationality (94% low, 99% medium, 100% high) and their children's birth certificate (100% low, medium, high).

PREFERRED SOLUTION

The majority of returnees across progress groups prefer to remain in their current location. However, compared to governorate levels (97%), a lower proportion of low progress returnee households prefer this option (90%). Low progress returnees are more likely to prefer going abroad (4%) or moving to a third location within the country (4%).

Figure 40: Preferred solution of households in the low progress returnee group




CONCLUSION

This project in Diyala Governorate offers unique insights into the progress made toward achieving durable solutions for Iraqi IDPs and returnees, eight years after the end of the 2014–2017 crisis.

Only 6 per cent of IDP households and 16 per cent of returnee households met all five criteria, indicating they have overcome displacement and return-related vulnerabilities. However, when using the conditions of stayees as a baseline, 29 per cent of IDP households and 42 per cent of returnee households have made high progress toward achieving durable solutions.

Figure 41: Percentage of IDP and returnee households by number of criteria met in Diyala



The returnee population has made more progress toward durable solutions compared to the IDP population. Over 4 in 10 returnee households (42%) have met four or all five criteria for durable solutions, whereas about 3 in 10 IDP households (29%) have reached the same level of progress. Most IDP and returnee households fall into the medium progress group. Less than 1 in 10 households are in the low progress category, with a slightly lower proportion of returnees (7%) compared to IDPs (9%) in this group. This indicates that IDPs tend to face more challenges achieving durable solutions than returnees.

It is important to note that stayee households, on average, met 3.63 out of 5 criteria. This highlights that even families who were not forced to flee during the 2014–2017 crisis do not pass all the vulnerability criteria. This finding reflects the broader impacts of the conflict beyond displacement, such as issues related to access to livelihood opportunities, as well as the presence of pre-crisis challenges. As a result, both development-focused programmes and targeted support for vulnerable IDP groups are crucial for advancing toward durable solutions.

SECTORS FOR PROGRAMMING

This project identifies the specific domains and indicators that contribute to the vulnerabilities of IDPs, returnees and stayees in Diyala. These insights can inform the creation of targeted programmatic interventions aimed at addressing critical thematic and geographic areas.

• Access to livelihoods was challenging for all three population groups. Although almost all IDPs, returnees and stayees had at least one employed family member, many relied on unstable income sources such as irregular earnings and daily labour. This instability meant many households could not face unexpected expenses. While this domain was challenging for all groups, IDPs performed considerably worse — only around a third of households had a stable income source and could manage unexpected costs, making this group particularly vulnerable to economic shocks.

- The biggest gap between IDPs, returnees, and stayees emerged with respect to the Restoration of HLP. Less than half of IDPs met the criteria for this domain, compared to nearly 8 in 10 stayees. IDPs face particular challenges related to the possession of legally recognized documentation and successful resolution of compensation claims, while underperforming across the other indicators as well. Returnees also struggled, though less so than IDPs, but still had a considerable gap compared to stayees under the same indicators. The worst-performing areas for HLP criteria were Markaz Khanaqin and Markaz Kifri for IDPs and Jalula for returnees.
- IDPs faced more difficulties with certain criteria in the documentation and participation domain. While nearly all IDPs had access to essential documentation (national ID, nationality and birth certificates), they reported lower participation in the 2021 election and felt less accepted by their community compared to returnees and stayees.
- The three groups showed similar performances in the living standards and safety and security domains.. Comparable shares of IDPs, returnees and stayees reported access to adequate shelter, improved sanitation facilities and healthcare. Although nearly everyone felt safe and enjoyed freedom of movement, about a quarter of households across all groups did not feel comfortable seeking help from authorities.

The majority of IDPs prefer to **remain in their current location**, with only 13 per cent expressing a desire to return to their place of origin. The most frequently mentioned reasons for not returning include housing destruction and lack of livelihood opportunities. This aligns with previous findings, highlighting that many low progress IDPs face unresolved property loss and compensation claims. Additionally, IDPs in the low progress group often cited security concerns, which may be linked to the proportion of households who reported difficulties in obtaining assistance from authorities.

AREA BASED PROGRAMMING

At the subdistrict level, IDP figures are significantly below average in Markaz Khanaqin and Markaz Kifri for certain domains. IDPs in Markaz Khanaqin face the most challenges in the restoration of HLP, with very few households meeting the criteria. Markaz Kifri exhibits the most pronounced difficulties with documentation and participation. Additionally, the low scores in livelihoods and restoration of HLP further highlight the subdistrict's struggles with economic and property-related issues. This is also the case for returnees in Jalula, who face similar challenges with HLP and livelihoods. The generally low scores for IDPs in Hibhib and Ba'quba Centre across all domains underscore the widespread challenges in these areas. Finally, the generally low scores across the livelihood domain for the whole governorate highlight the widespread economic challenges in Diyala.

Achieving durable solutions means that households can meet their basic needs and pursue their preferred settlement choice, whether that is staying in their current location, returning to their place of origin or moving to a new location. To support this, it is essential to implement targeted programmes in these areas to ensure sustainable integration, return or resettlement.

ENDNOTES

- 1 The IASC is the longest-standing and highest-level humanitarian coordination forum of the United Nations system. It brings together the executive heads of 18 organizations and consortia to formulate policy, set strategic priorities and mobilize resources in response to humanitarian crises.
- This definition of essential documentation used for this study includes all those considered critical in the Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (as defined by the Protection Cluster) but also considers additional documentation that is considered necessary to be able to obtain a durable solution to displacement. Additionally, the questionnaire allowed space for the respondent to list another document if missing and considered essential. Protection Cluster Iraq, Protection Analysis Report: Right to Identity and Civil Documentation (2021).
- 3 Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS), International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS), European Commission and United Nations (Luxemburg, 2020).
- 4 Michael Knights & Alexander Mello, Losing Mosul, regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State could exploit Iraq's sectarian tinderbox, *Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point*, 9(10): 1-7 (October 2016).
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Amwaj Media, 'Diyala impasse exposes fractures within Iraq's ruling Shiite coalition,' Amwaj Media (14 June 2024).
- 7 Ibid
- 8 Hamzeh al-Shadeedi & Erwin van Veen, Iraq's Adolescent Democracy: Where to Go from here, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Hague, 2020).
- 9 Thanassis Cambanis, Iraq's Sectarian Relapse: Lessons of the 'Shia' House, The Century Foundation (12 September 2023).
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- 11 Fanar Haddad, Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington D.C., 2015).
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- 13 Ibid.
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- 15 Sean Kane, Iraq's Disputed Territories: A View of the Political Horizon and Implications for U.S. Policy, United States Institute of Peace (Washington D.C., 2011).
- 16 Renad Mansour, The Sunni Predicament in Iraq, Carnegie Middle East Center (Washington D.C., 2016).
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- 19 Britannica, The Editors of Encylopaedia, 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq,' Encyclopedia Britannica (27 September 2023).
- 20 M. J. Kirdar, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Agam Futures Project Case Study Series (Washington D.C., 2011).
- 21 Michael Knights, The JRTN Movement and Iraq's Next Insurgency, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 4(7):1-5 (July 2011).
- 22 Michael Knights & Alexander Mello, Losing Mosul, regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State could exploit Iraq's sectarian tinderbox, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 9(10): 1-7 (October 2016).
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Britannica, The Editors of Encylopaedia, 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq,' Encyclopedia Britannica (27 September 2023)
- 25 Ibid
- 26 Cameron Glenn et al., Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State, The Wilson Center (28 October 2019).
- 27 Ibid
- 28 Michael Knights & Alexander Mello, Losing Mosul, regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State could exploit Iraq's sectarian tinderbox, *Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point*, 9(10): 1-7 (October 2016).
- 29 Ibid
- 30 Ibid
- 31 Ibid
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 'Diyala,' Country Guidance Iraq 2022, EUAA (June 2022).
- 34 Iraq Durable Solutions, Diyala Plan of Action 2021-2024 (n.p., 2022).
- 35 EUAA, Iraq Security Situation (Malta, 2022).
- 36 IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (Baghdad, 2024).
- 37 IOM, Iraq Displacement Crisis: 2014 2017 (Baghdad, 2018).
- 38 Ibid
- 39 lessica Lewis. The Islamic State of Iraa Returns to Divala. Institute for the Study of War (Washington D.C., 2014).
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- 43 Ibid.
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- 45 IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (Baghdad, 2024).
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- 47 Ibid
- 48 IOM, Displacement Index Findings: Round Nine (Baghdad, 2024).
- 49 IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (Baghdad, 2024).
- 50 The rate of return is computed as the ratio of returnees to a geographical area (governorate, district or subdistrict) to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same area. For main trends, refer to: IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (January April 2024) (Baghdad, 2024).
- 51 IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index Dashboard: Round 21 (Baghdad, 2024).
- 52 IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (January April 2024) (Baghdad, 2024)
- 53 IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index Findings Round Twenty-One (Baghdad, 2024).
- 54 Ibid. A subdistrict is classified as a 'hotspot' if it scores highly in terms of severity on at least one of the two scales (either livelihoods and basic services or safety and social cohesion) or if it scores medium in terms of severity but also host relatively large numbers of returnees (at least 60,000 returnees).
- 55 IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index Dataset Round 20 (Baghdad, 2024); IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index Findings Round Twenty-One (Baghdad, 2024).
- 56 IOM, DTM Iraq Master List Dataset 132 (January April 2024) (Baghdad, 2024).
- 57 Ibid
- 58 Ibid
- 59 IOM, DTM Iraq Displacement Index Dashboard Round Nine (January April 2024) (Baghdad, 2024).
- 60 IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index 21 Dashboard (January April 2024) (Baghdad, 2024).
- 61 A durable solution is achieved when displaced people no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through return, integration or resettlement. IASC, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, The Brookings Institute & University of Bern (Washington D.C., 2010).
- 62 In 2015, an interagency process, composed by a group of development, humanitarian and peacebuilding actors under the leadership of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, was established. The group started work on developing and testing indicators and guidance for comprehensive durable solutions analysis in internal displacement situations, resulting in a library of standardized indicators and operational guidance. For more information, refer to: IASC, Inter-Agency Durable Solutions Indicator Library, Joint IDP Profiling Service (Geneva, 2020)
- 63 For more information, refer to: IOM, DTM Iraq Master List (2023).
- 64 For more information, refer to: IOM, DTM Iraq Displacement Index (2023).
- 65 For more information, refer to: IOM, DTM Iraq Return Index (2023).
- 66 For more information on the study, its methodology and main findings, refer to: IOM and Georgetown University, Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq. Part One (2017). IOM and Georgetown University, Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Three Years in Displacement (Baghdad, 2019). IOM and Georgetown University, Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Four Years in Displacement (Baghdad, 2020). IOM and Georgetown University, Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Six Years in Displacement (Baghdad, 2022).
- 67 For more information, refer to: IOM, Progress Towards Solutions (2023).
- 68 IOM, DTM An Analysis of Urban Displacement in Iraq (Baghdad, 2021).
- 69 IASC, IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, The Brookings Institute & University of Bern (Washington D.C., 2010).
- 70 Food security was assessed by the reduced Coping Strategy Index (CSI) from the World Food Programme, the de facto standard for measuring food security in humanitarian settings. It is based on five core questions that were administered to households and then weighted with universally standardized weights to allow comparability across contexts. In this analysis, the threshold for the absence of vulnerability was set at 18 and includes the first two classes (Minimal/None (0-3) and Stressed (4-18)) that correspond to a situation of less severe food insecurity. World Food Programme, *The Coping Strategy Index: Field Methods Manual (Second Edition)* (2008).
- 71 IOM, Displacement Index 9 Dataset (Baghdad, 2024).
- 72 IOM, Return Index Dataset 21 (Baghdad, 2024)
- 73 IOM, Displacement Index 9 Dataset (Baghdad, 2024).
- 74 IOM, Return Index Dataset 21 (Baghdad, 2024).
- 75 This refers to a dependency ratio of +200, meaning that there are over 200 dependents for every 100 working-age individuals in the population.

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