

IOM IRAQ

# REASONS TO REMAIN (PART 2): DETERMINANTS OF IDP INTEGRATION INTO HOST COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ



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The Returns Working Group (RWG) is an operational and multi-stakeholder platform on returns, which was established in line with Strategic Objective 3 of the 2016 Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan “to support voluntary, safe and dignified return” of IDPs, to monitor and report on conditions in return areas, and determine to what extent durable solutions have been achieved- or progress made- for returnees.

The key objective of the group is to establish coherence of information, data and analysis, strengthen coordination and advocacy, give guidance on activities related to the key areas, and enhance complementary action among its partners with the overall goal of supporting and reinforcing the national response to Iraq’s coming reintegration challenge.

## ABOUT SOCIAL INQUIRY

Social Inquiry is an Iraq-based not-for-profit research institution focused on influencing policy and praxis that establishes civic trust and repairs social fabric within and between fragile communities, and communities and the state. Its research focuses on three thematic rubrics: (i) social cohesion and fragility, (ii) transitional justice and reconciliation, and (iii) post-conflict political economy, exploring intersecting political, social, psychological, economic, and historical dimensions within these themes.

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# FOREWORD

Over the past few decades, dynamics in Iraq have produced multiple waves of internal displacement. In some cases, populations have not returned to their homes as they have successfully built new lives in their area of displacement. Therefore, sustainable local integration can be a durable solution to internal displacement for some internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq.

Millions of Iraqis have been displaced within the borders of the country since the beginning of the conflict against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014. Five years later, 1.8 million remain displaced; almost half of them have been displaced for more than three years.

This research study looks at the sustainable integration of IDPs in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah Governorates as these two governorates have been hosting many IDPs between 2014 and 2018, among which few have returned. The study highlights two perspectives: the experience and perceptions of the IDPs in their locations of displacement as well as that of the communities who host them. By laying out the characteristics, perceptions, and circumstances of both the IDPs and their host communities, this research is able to discern certain identifiable aspects of integration and analyses what makes IDPs feel more integrated as well as the host community feel comfortable accepting them in the longer term. The experiences of these two historically, economically and demographically different governorates on dealing with the integration of IDPs can serve as a blueprint for approaching local integration as a durable solution in Iraq that can be applied to other locations.

The study complements the Inter Agency Standing Committee's Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons which focuses on the acquisition of rights; by bringing into the picture clearly identified aspects of integration as well as the role of the host community. The attainment of rights by IDPs is a sine qua non condition for integration, however alone is not sufficient in creating environments conducive to sustainable integration. In the long run, IDPs need a real sense of belonging to the host community and host communities need to accept them for integration in earnest to occur.

I hope this report will bring a new perspective to the important issue of integration of IDPs and we look forward to receiving your feedback.

Gerard Waite  
Chief of Mission, Iraq

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order better to understand what the local integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) may look like in Iraq, IOM Iraq, the Returns Working Group (RWG), and Social Inquiry implemented a targeted in-depth study in Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad Governorates. Utilizing data on IDPs' perceptions and living conditions in displacement from those displaced more than three years (762 respondents) and data collected among host community residents (800 respondents) in the same neighbourhoods and towns in these governorates, this work seeks to identify which factors help or hinder local integration.

As such, this research is built on key questions that aim to shape policy and programming to support both post-2014 IDPs and host communities in ways that improve conditions and well-being for everyone as durable solutions are achieved. While displaced families might be able to get by in terms of livelihoods opportunities, attainment of rights, and access to public goods, this is just one aspect of belonging. Local integration must also be understood through other lenses: through IDPs' own perceptions of being integrated, through the host community views of IDPs remaining in the long term, and through the environmental factors which may impact the standing of both groups.

Thus, two sets of multivariate analyses were developed to evaluate different areas of integration:

- What impacts the likelihood of IDPs in feeling integrated (belonging) within the host locations;
- What impacts the likelihood of the host community in being willing to accommodate (accept) the IDP population.

The different explanatory variables tested comprise a variety of indicators, such as physical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors of the displaced, the host communities, and the host locations. Findings are generalizable beyond local dynamics within each governorate because the analysis controlled for specific localized factors. Therefore, these trends can inform strategies on local integration as a durable solution to displacement across locations in Iraq.

### DETERMINANTS FOR INTEGRATION

With respect to IDPs, the study shows that their economic situation is a major factor in explaining their reported feelings (or lack thereof) of integration. This includes still having savings, low levels of debt, and relative financial security (e.g., having government employment). Another expected trend uncovered is higher integration when IDPs feel safe and report a good mental health status. Beyond this, social capital and cohesion are critical and complex factors. Specifically, at the individual level, IDPs' feelings of trust in residents and local actors and especially of cultural compatibility with the host community increase their likelihood of integration. At the same time, the social functioning of the host community overall also matters. Those locations with a rigid sense of cohesion make it difficult for IDPs to integrate; however, having too weak cohesion also hinders integration. Interestingly, certain aspects of localized fragility help with fostering integration among IDPs. This is particularly true in places that are economically disadvantaged and have weaker institutions. IDPs in these locations reported a greater sense of belonging and acceptance. In contexts where everyone is equally disadvantaged, newcomers and residents alike may share a common narrative in rather than a competitive one, while weaker institutions enable IDPs to be "unnoticed" and blend in.

### DETERMINANTS FOR ACCEPTANCE

For host communities, most of the indicators on household and local economic development matter for acceptance of IDPs. This expresses itself across different economic domains and living conditions. Host community members who rent, for example, are less inclined to accept IDPs. This sense of competition also translates with regard to service provision, particularly when host communities are frustrated by the level of provision and feel it is unequal. Furthermore, when host communities perceive that they are more marginalized than IDPs (i.e., that they do not share a common narrative of disadvantage), they are less likely to accept IDPs. This marginalization seems particularly connected to international aid provision or the lack thereof for host communities. At the social level, common narratives between host communities and IDPs helps in fostering acceptance. Such compatibilities for the host community include sharing kinship and identity with the host location as well as similar cultural values (e.g., rural versus urban divides regardless of ethno-religious identity). Past grievances around violence and conflict, and shared narrative between host communities and IDPs therein, also matter. A particularly interesting finding within this sample of host community residents is that a relatively substantial

proportion have experienced either previous displacement or conflict related violence. Those host communities who experienced violence and displacement pre-2003 are less likely to accept IDPs than those who had such experiences after 2003. Finally, in terms of spatial patterns, segregation of non-camp IDPs to specific areas or neighbourhoods within hosting locations lowers the likelihood of residents accepting them as does a high proportion of IDPs relative to the host community.

Taken together, what is needed to foster smoother integration and by extension acceptance, are interventions from authorities and the international community that seek to address longstanding inequalities and grievances that impact the communities that both groups are in. In other words, particularly in places where people have been displaced for a long time, this means shifting away from shorter-term humanitarian approaches to longer-term considerations for development, governance, and justice for all groups.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Interventions in locations hosting people who remain displaced for a lengthy time need to better and more meaningfully put the host community into the picture ensuring their needs are also considered.
- In areas where there are socioeconomic disparities and scarce opportunities, interventions supporting livelihood creation and strengthening government capacity open the door for equality and inclusion, which in turn, can create a window for integration and acceptance. Real and perceived socioeconomic factors remain one of the biggest determinants to integration and, while obvious, must be paid attention to and innovated around. This does not mean only addressing immediate needs or creating short-term impact, but rather, tackling more structural concerns to address overarching urban poverty. For example, the struggle for housing can be addressed through cash-for-rent type of programs that are targeted to IDPs, which is a patch that may cause further tension in the host community, or can be tackled at its root, more holistically, through supporting affordable housing policies.
- A critical paradox here relates to compatibility. That is, IDPs, by a wide margin, feel they are culturally compatible with their host communities while host community residents themselves have much more rigid and specific criteria for what compatible looks like for them. Bridging this gap through policy and programming is critical. More emphasis needs to be placed on interventions that are specifically oriented around social cohesion and finding common narratives. This includes local level programming as well as policies geared towards cohesion, inclusion, and integration. This would entail helping to ensure sustained, meaningful inter-personal contact between IDPs and host community residents and allowing for both to expand their own sense of identity and community without having to give up core aspects of who they are. This could include establishing more mixed-use public spaces for engagement and sharing of narratives, lifting restrictions on where IDPs can live or encouraging more spread to limit the concentration of groups in specific areas or neighbourhoods in a location, and access to linguistic support where needed.
- One remaining obstacle toward integration, acceptance, and shared narratives also seems to be lack of justice or at least formal acknowledgement of both IDPs and host communities' experiences of violence and displacement. This is critical as host communities who feel unsatisfied with the way conflict-related violence in the past has been dealt with tend not to accept IDPs. Any processes aimed at accountability and redress for violations of this most recent conflict should not overlook the deeper issues that led to it in the first place which remain unresolved for many and can often lead to collective blame.

# 1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

## A. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS

Nearly five years since the start of the ISIL-conflict and over a year since its official end, 1.8 million Iraqis remain internally displaced, with almost half of them in displacement for more than three years. A first study, exploring this population, completed in November 2018, elucidated the factors that may protract displacement and keep internally displaced persons (IDPs) from seeking return as a durable solution.<sup>1</sup> The focus of that work was on conditions people may face in their places of origin should they go back. Such data is critical and provides a window into the experiences of IDPs as they seek to resolve their displacement in relation to their former home communities. As the rate of return slowed in 2018, attention must also be paid to the ways in which IDPs are resolving their displacement in relation to the communities they live in now. Therefore, it is necessary to also understand the dynamics of IDPs in their place of displacement, potentially on a path to another durable solution: local integration.

Thus, in order to better understand what local integration may look like in Iraq, IOM Iraq, the Returns Working Group (RWG), and Social Inquiry implemented a targeted, in-depth study of Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad Governorates as a second part of this exploration. The purpose of this study is to identify which factors help or hinder local integration, utilizing data on perceptions and living conditions of IDPs displaced for more than three years and data collected from host community residents. The purpose here being to guide strategies and interventions to support both those displaced and those who host them move towards a new dynamic where all are equally woven into the local fabric at large.

The findings presented herein highlight that socioeconomic, cultural, and spatial factors at the individual and structural levels matter for integration and acceptance. Most of the evidence collected here points to the fact that better integration and acceptance is found among more socioeconomically equal communities, those with strong but more elastic social cohesion, and in places where host communities feel historical grievances related to violence and conflict have been dealt with satisfactorily. While it is difficult to find a single location that has all three of these characteristics,

most locations in this study, and in Iraq in general, have at least some combination of these. Interventions therefore should be targeted toward reducing inequalities, building more inclusive social cohesion, and redressing past wrongs.

## B. DIMENSIONS OF INTEGRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Integration, particularly as it relates to refugees and migrants, can be thought of as a complex enterprise that may be influenced by spatial, economic, political, legal, psychological, and cultural factors. The aim is not assimilation whereby differing identities are supplanted to produce one homogenous culture nor one-way adaptation or acculturation to the dominant culture and way of life, but rather a lengthy process in which both displaced and receiving communities undergo change to better foster the two living together.<sup>2</sup>

In terms of IDPs, the standard metric for determining integration is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. Within this framework, IDPs achieve local integration (or sustainable return or relocation) when they: (i) no longer have specific assistance and protection needs and vulnerabilities that are directly linked to their displacement and (ii) enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.<sup>3</sup> There is recognition here too that achieving these conditions are a long-term process and the general indicators tend to focus on the structural acquisition of rights. This includes enjoyment without discrimination of safety and security; adequate standard of living including access to adequate food, housing, healthcare, and education; access to employment and livelihoods; access to mechanisms for the restitution of housing, land, and property or compensation if restitution is not possible; access to and replacement of personal and other documentation; voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement; participation in public affairs; and effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations, and information about the causes of violations.

1 IOM, Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, *Reasons to Remain: Categorizing Protracted Displacement in Iraq* (IOM, Erbil, 2018).

2 Scottish Refugee Council, "Integration Literature Review" (Scottish Refugee Council: Glasgow, 2010).

3 IASC, *Framework for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2010).

These are critical needs and rights for IDPs to better resolve displacement, but alone may not capture the complexity of what it means to be a part of a place and community as a central tenet of integration.<sup>4</sup> This is experienced in the context of social networks and in relation to meaningful places in individuals' lives.<sup>5</sup> It is the difference between participating in core institutions and identifying with those institutions to give a sense of belonging.<sup>6</sup> Thus, how people conceptualize the space and place they are in and the impact this has on how they identify themselves, their sense of belonging, and their participation in society, is also important in further understanding what fosters integration or not.

Unpacking this is not possible without analysing who IDPs are and their perceptions about their displacement and host community, as well as inquiring into the host community itself in terms of its composition, their views of IDPs and their own conditions as residents. This is critical because while displacement may cause tension or conflict between these two groups, this may not, in and of itself, have negative implications but rather can be seen as an important step in the process of integration through which those displaced and those hosting become aware of their identities, specific needs, and are able to both make claims in terms of access to resources and rights.<sup>7</sup> If addressed well, upheaval such that brought about by displacement can provide an opportunity for the displaced and those hosting to know each other. This could further enable both populations to cross and eventually change group boundaries, thereby enlarging the concept of 'us'.<sup>8</sup> It may also further harden group boundaries, actually making integration even more difficult.

Policies towards the displaced that are focused on giving newcomers legal status without requiring civic adaptation or linguistic knowledge can help in setting the pace for inclusive rather than closed views with regard to identity and group dynamics.<sup>9</sup> So too does coordinating host community concerns into any efforts that seek to foster regeneration of space and greater cross-group connection.<sup>10</sup> It seems particularly important to avoid framing such intervention in purely identitarian terms, but rather in ways that foster reciprocal understanding. Spatial dimensions also play a role in fostering better feelings of integration and belonging, in that locations that do not have identity-based enclaves but rather allow for newcomer groups to live spread across neighbourhoods tend to be less inclined to blame and division and allow for better inclusion of IDPs.<sup>11</sup> Linked to this, the availability and use of mixed public, residential, and work spaces also enables greater inter-group interaction and friendship.<sup>12</sup> This type of friendship is correlated with greater levels of general social trust, inter-group trust, and tolerance toward outgroups.<sup>13</sup>

- 4 Nadia Siddiqui, Roger Guiu, and Aaso Ameen Shwan, "Among Brothers and Strangers: Identities in Displacement in Iraq," *International Migration*.
- 5 Lisa M. Vandemark, "Promoting the Sense of Self, Place, and Belonging Among Displaced Persons: The Example of Homelessness," *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing* 21 no. 5 (2007): 241–248.
- 6 Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann, *Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities* (Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006).
- 7 Robert Ezra Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (University of Chicago Press, 1921).
- 8 Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzio, "Introduction," in *Inter-Group Relations and Migrant Integration in European Cities* eds. Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzio (Springer Cham Heidelberg: New York, 2016).
- 9 Joaquin Arango, "Exceptional in Europe? Spain's Experience with Immigration and Integration (Migration Policy Institute: Washington, D.C., 2013).
- 10 Claudia Kohler, "Rise and Resolution of Ethnic Conflicts in Nuremberg Neighborhoods," in *Inter-Group Relations and Migrant Integration in European Cities* eds. Ferruccio Pastore and Irene Ponzio (Springer Cham Heidelberg: New York, 2016).
- 11 Ami C. Carpenter, "Havens in a Firestorm: Perspectives from Baghdad on Resilience to Sectarian Violence," *Civil Wars* 14 no. 2 (2012): 182–204; and Claudia Trillo et al., "Integrating Communities: How Spatial Patterns Matter?" *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences* 223 (2016): 244–250.
- 12 Phil Wood and Charles Landry, *The Intercultural City: Planning for Diversity Advantage* (Earthscan: London, 2007); and Jens Rygdren, Dana Sofi, and Martin Hällsten, "Interethnic Friendship, Trust, and Tolerance: Findings from Two North Iraqi Cities," *American Journal of Sociology* 118 no. 6 (2013): 1650–1694.
- 13 Rygdren et al., "Interethnic Friendship, Trust, and Tolerance."

Layered on top of these localized dynamics, there are structural factors linked to the level of fragility of a given place that may influence the daily lives and perceptions of its inhabitants as well as its overall ability to withstand shocks and upheaval, including war, violence, or an influx of displaced people. Fragility can be defined as a condition in which governments or institutions “lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence.”<sup>14</sup> At the same time, fragility may also be seen as a function of the strength of civil society and the extensiveness of social capital.<sup>15</sup> This indicates that the state alone is not the only actor or even the most powerful actor in staunching fragility and that varying physical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors at a number of levels can change the level of fragility, up or down, at the community-level – which in turn may have an effect on IDPs’ real and perceived ability to integrate as well as the host communities real and perceived struggles. Recent research on fragility in Iraq has focused on measuring it by considering demographic history and diversity; governance and security; past development neglect; lack of livelihoods; and community mobilization.<sup>16</sup>

The literature presented above on integration is particularly relevant to Iraq at present, given that almost five years since the start of the ISIL conflict, and over one year since its official end, 1.8 million people remain displaced in the country in predominantly urban or peri-urban non-camp host settings, with nearly half living in such locations for over three years. While some IDPs may be “stuck” in protracted displacement, others wittingly or not may be moving towards some form of local integration. Understanding what this looks like on the ground may help the Government of Iraq and its partners in shaping effective policies and interventions to help communities in reaching this durable solution. This study takes objective and subjective measures of both IDP and host community conditions as well as the more structural factors of the locations in which they reside into account in doing so. It serves as an important step in discerning not only what integration looks like in Iraq, but what specifically may help or hinder it.

### C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

While displaced families might be able to get by in terms of livelihoods opportunities, attainment of rights, and access to public goods, this is just one aspect of belonging. Local integration must also be understood through other lenses: through IDPs’ own perceptions of being integrated, through host community views of IDPs remaining in the long term, and through environmental factors – including overarching policies in a given location – which may impact both groups. The combination of all of these have the potential to influence whether integration may occur or not.

For this reason, this research is built on key questions that aim to shape policy and programming to support both post-2014 IDPs and host communities in ways that improve conditions and well-being for everyone, while attaining durable solutions to displacement. Such questions include: What set of IDP household characteristics and host environment factors influence the likelihood of IDPs feeling integrated? Do these factors also play a role in the likelihood of host community members’ willingness to accept these displaced populations? What pathways for intervention should be considered for supporting these factors?

In practical terms, the research aims to apply quantitative methods to elucidate if there is a causal relationship (and its magnitude) between different indicators as shown in Figure 1. Two sets of multivariate analyses were developed to evaluate different areas of integration:


- What impacts the likelihood of IDPs feeling integrated (belonging) within the host locations;
- What impacts the likelihood of the host community in being willing to accommodate (accept) the IDP population.

14 World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2011), xvi.

15 OECD Development Center, Perspectives on Global Development: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World (Paris, OECD, 2011).

16 IOM and Social Inquiry, Reframing Social Fragility in Areas of Protracted Displacement and Emerging Return in Iraq: A Guide to Programming (IOM, Erbil, 2017).

Figure 1. Dependent and explanatory variables under analysis



Note: Arrows indicate the flow of the impact on each dependent variable (the blue boxes).

The different explanatory variables tested comprise a variety of indicators, such as physical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors of the displaced, the host communities, and the host locations. This study is focused on two specific governorates of displacement: Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad. These two governorates were selected as they are part of the Longitudinal Study on Access to Durable Solution for IDPs in Iraq (LS), implemented from 2015 to the present by IOM and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration.<sup>17</sup> Both governorates host out-of-camp IDPs displaced for more than three years. Furthermore, of the four governorates within the LS, Sulaymaniyah has maintained most of its IDP population since the start of the LS while, in Baghdad, a significant number of IDPs have returned to their places of origin. This allows for comparison of factors that may influence IDPs’ decision to integrate.

Altogether, this research relies on the following datasets:

- Data on IDPs hosted in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah governorates from the LS Round 3, carried out between June and September 2017, supplemented with data from LS Round 1, collected between March and April 2016. The dataset includes 762 IDP households surveyed in the two governorates: 360 IDPs in Sulaymaniyah (spread across the subdistricts of Sulaymaniyah Centre, Bazian, Dukan, and Arbat) and 402 in Baghdad (in Karkh Centre, Khan Dhari, Husseiniya, and Mahmudiya Centre). These subdistricts were selected because they had a relatively high proportion of IDPs remaining in the LS Round 3, although the sample size is not statistically representative for subdistrict level comparison.
- Data on the host community of Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah governorates, generated through a survey tool administered specifically for this study in December 2018. The dataset includes 800 host community households across the same subdistricts as listed above, with 100 respondents interviewed in each to allow for results representative at the 90 per cent confidence interval at the subdistrict level. The interviews were conducted in the same locations where the LS IDP participants reside.

17 Rochelle Davis et al., *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq* (Washington, D.C. / Erbil, Walsh School of Foreign Service at the Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University and IOM, 2017); and Salma Al-Shami et al., *Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Three Years in Displacement* (Washington, D.C. / Erbil, Walsh School of Foreign Service at the Institute for the Study of International Migration and the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University and IOM, 2019).

Furthermore, to supplement more structural factors of hosting locations not objectively captured in the host community survey, specific poverty and public service endowment data from the 2012 Iraqi Household Socio-Economic Survey was used.<sup>18</sup> Data related to spatial and demographic patterns in locations was obtained from IOM’s Locations Assessment III, collected between March and May 2018.<sup>19</sup>

Combined, all of these datasets provide useful descriptive statistics regarding IDP and host community perceptions as well as conditions in hosting locations that can be combined in a multivariate analysis. The trends of this analysis are generalizable to understand whether other governorates in Iraq have conducive environments for local integration of IDPs.

The empirical strategy of the study combines both place and household factors as explanatory variables to assess IDP feelings of integration on one side and host community willingness to accept IDPs on the other. These variables are combined in three different statistical models exploring integration or acceptance.<sup>20</sup> The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in impact matrix tables to simplify their interpretation. The coding used for these impact matrices are derived from the statistical coefficients generated through the analysis and are explained in Table 1. For every model, the variable with the highest coefficient is used as a benchmark to rate the other variables in terms of their relative impact over the condition assessed (either integration or acceptance).<sup>21</sup> Cross-analysis of explanatory variables as a whole ultimately provides a comprehensive understanding what influences integration and acceptance.

Table 1. Interpretation of codes in the impact matrix tables

++++	The coefficient for this variable is found to be <b>positively</b> correlated with integration or acceptance at least within a 90% confidence interval, statistically speaking. That is, respondents who meet the variable condition are <b>more likely</b> to feel integrated (for IDPs) or to accept IDPs (for host community members).	In both cases, the greater the number of symbols, the greater the impact on integration or acceptance. The number ranges from one to four.
----	The coefficient for this factor is found to be <b>negatively</b> correlated with integration or acceptance at least within a 90% confidence interval, statistically speaking. That is, respondents who meet the variable condition are <b>less likely</b> to feel integrated (for IDPs) or to accept IDPs (for host community members).	
•	The coefficient for this factor is <b>not</b> found to be correlated with integration or acceptance. That is, respondents that meet the variable condition are <b>as likely</b> to feel integrated or to accept IDPs as respondents who do not.	

18 CSO and World Bank, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2012).

19 IOM, Integrated Locations Assessment III: Thematic Overview (Erbil, IOM, 2018).

20 Explanatory variables are not all combined in one single model due to a certain degree of conceptual overlap among them. That is, explanatory variables in one group may be directly or indirectly related to variables in the other group.

21 The fact that all explanatory variables are binary or categorical allows for the coefficients (or odds ratios) to be compared, making them relative to each other.

## D. PROFILES OF BAGHDAD AND SULAYMANIYAH

- **Demographics:** Baghdad Governorate has an estimated population of 8.1 million (not including IDPs).<sup>22</sup> Of its subdistricts assessed in this study, only Karkh Centre is in the core urban area of Baghdad City, while the other subdistricts are within the wider peri-urban boundaries of the city. The population in general is mixed, comprised mainly of Sunni and Shia Arabs with small pockets of Christians, Sunni and Shia Kurds, and Sunni and Shia Turkmen (these groups are not within the study sample). For Sulaymaniyah Governorate, estimates give a population of 2.2 million people. As with the subdistricts assessed in Baghdad, only one in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Sulaymaniyah Centre, is part of the main urban metropolis. The other subdistricts are not geographically far from the centre and could also be defined as peri-urban. The population in Sulaymaniyah Governorate is predominantly Sunni Kurd, with a much smaller representation of Shia Kurds, Sunni and Shia Arabs, and Christians.
- **Governance:** There are significant differences in governance in Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad as the former is part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and as such is administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Baghdad Governorate falls under the Federal Government of Iraq. This implies a de facto separate governance system between the two locations of study.
- **Security:** Since 2003, the security situation in Baghdad Governorate could be described as unstable at best. As of 2012, Abu Ghraib and Adhamiya districts were ranked as two of the most violent and insecure places across Iraq.<sup>23</sup> Two of the subdistricts within this study, Khan Dhari and Husseiniya, respectively are located within these districts. Since then, and despite the outbreak of the ISIL-conflict, Baghdad has witnessed a dramatic improvement in its security situation – it is the safest it has been since 2003, enabling the removal of checkpoints and blast walls and the return of people to the streets.<sup>24</sup> This is in comparison to Sulaymaniyah Governorate, which has been relatively stable security-wise since 2003, like the rest of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.<sup>25</sup>
- **Socioeconomic situation:** Before the ISIL conflict, Sulaymaniyah Governorate had significantly fewer families below the poverty line than Baghdad Governorate.<sup>26</sup> Baghdad also saw a lot of economic inequality between its districts. Areas like Khan Dhari, Husseiniya, and Mahmudiya (all in this sample) were among the poorest in the governorate. Karkh Centre, on the other hand, in the middle of Baghdad City, had one of the lowest poverty rates in Iraq as a whole. Within Sulaymaniyah Governorate, all districts reported the same low levels of poverty as Karkh Centre. This may have changed since 2012, given the financial crisis that struck the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2014 where the regional government could not pay public salaries nor sustain regular public service provision.
- **Previous experiences of displacement:** Both governorates have significant past experience with forced displacement, in terms of people fleeing and in taking people in. These differ in terms of time periods and causes. Sulaymaniyah Governorate bore the brunt of a series of uprisings and conflict from 1961 to 1991, including the 1986–1989 Anfal killings which caused mass forced population movement.<sup>27</sup> During this time, Sulaymaniyah hosted populations fleeing violence and repression from other predominantly Kurdish areas of Iraq. For Baghdad, significant forced movement began after 2003, particularly during the sectarian war in the mid-2000s. People often moved between neighbourhoods to avoid targeting and violence based on their identities. This significantly changed the demographic composition of some locations, turning previously diverse areas into homogenous ones.<sup>28</sup> Karkh Centre in particular hosted the largest number of IDPs from this period. A small proportion also fled to Sulaymaniyah Governorate.

22 Iraq Central Statistics Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics (Iraq Central Statistics Office: Baghdad, 2017).

23 CSO and World Bank, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.

24 Raya Jalabi, "As Baghdad Life Improves, Some Still Seek Refuge in Its Past," Reuters, 9 April 2018; and Liz Sly, "Baghdad Gets Its Groove Back," Washington Post, 23 August 2018.

25 CSO and World Bank, Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.

26 Ibid.

27 KRSO, IOM, UNFPA. Demographic Survey. Kurdistan Region of Iraq. July 2018.

28 IDMC, Iraq: A Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation (IDMC / NRC, Geneva, 2010).

- Displacement 2014 to 2018:** By the end of 2018, Baghdad Governorate hosted 11,000 families (69,000 individuals) displaced due to this most recent conflict. This corresponds to 5 per cent of the total post-2014 IDP population in Iraq. Sulaymaniyah Governorate, on the other hand, hosted 25,000 families (150,000 individuals), which is 10 per cent of the total post-2014 IDP population in the country.<sup>29</sup> Both governorates began hosting IDPs at the same time (July 2014). At the peak of the displacement crisis (early 2016), Baghdad hosted 100,000 families. From

this peak, the number of IDPs began steadily decreasing as people returned to their places of origin or moved elsewhere (Figure 2). Sulaymaniyah, on the contrary, hosted a maximum of 30,000 families at the peak of the crisis – and these families by and large still remain in the governorate (Figure 3). Sulaymaniyah also saw an increase of IDPs in late 2017, corresponding to changes in the administrative and security configuration in the disputed territories. These most recent IDPs are predominantly Sunni Kurd, unlike the earlier arrivals, who are Sunni Arab.

Figure 2. Number of IDP families hosted in Baghdad Governorate, 2014 – 2018




Figure 3. Number of IDP families hosted in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, 2014 – 2018



- ISIL conflict:** Sulaymaniyah Governorate did not see any direct military operations within its boundaries during the conflict, while certain portions of Baghdad Governorate, Khan Dhari and Mahmudiya, briefly comprised military frontlines. As the military operations to retake Mosul

began in 2016, both Baghdad Governorate and the governorates in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq restricted the influx of new conflict-affected IDPs into their boundaries.

29 IOM DTM, Round 107.

## 2. IDPs: FEELINGS OF INTEGRATION

This section aims to analyse the integration of IDPs into their host communities through subjective measures, based on how IDPs report their levels of belonging, perceived acceptance by the host community, and overall satisfaction with their current life. In the absence of one single indicator for IDP integration, the three main proxies—belonging, acceptance, and satisfaction—are used to approach this nebulous concept. A summary and discussion of IDP responses to these indicators across the different subdistricts is given below.

Following this, the analysis then seeks to go deeper into what factors contribute to making IDPs more (or less) likely to feel integrated within their host community and location. Some of these factors are based on respondent characteristics,

others on the place they live in, and others still on their vital experiences in displacement. An understanding of these factors is obtained from a multivariate analysis and they are grouped as follows:

- Household characteristics
- IDP experiences and perceptions vis-à-vis their host community
- Structural and place factors of host location

### A. HOW TO MEASURE IDP INTEGRATION

While the attainment of rights in displacement is seen as the initial pathway for local integration (see the IASC Framework), it does not account for the identificational aspects of it – that is, the difference between participating in core societal institutions and norms and identifying with them. This latter


aspect can be proxied with IDP perception of their current locations and communities and their experiences in it. These less physically tangible dimensions of integration are therefore defined as follows:

	BELONGING	ACCEPTANCE	SATISFACTION
Comparative Category	Respondent feels strong belonging or somewhat belonging to the community of displacement.	Respondent feels very or somewhat accepted as member of this community.	Respondent feels very satisfied or pretty satisfied with life.
Base Category	Respondents feel neither belonging nor unbelonging, somewhat unbelonging or strong unbelonging to the community of displacement.	Respondent feels neither accepted nor rejected, somewhat rejected or very rejected as members of this community.	Respondent feels not very satisfied or not satisfied at all with life.

As seen in Figure 4, a large majority of respondents had positive answers for these three integration indicators. Rates of acceptance and belonging exceed 75 per cent among those IDPs displaced in Sulaymaniyah Governorate and are close to 90 per cent among those in Baghdad Governorate. Life satisfaction is lower than the other two indicators across

both governorates, with two thirds of respondents feeling satisfied. Nevertheless, in all cases, most responses are clustered into somewhat belonging, somewhat accepted, or pretty satisfied – only a minority opted to respond with the most positive response options.

Figure 4. Breakdown of IDP responses to integration indicators



## B. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

This section explores factors linked to the personal situation of the IDP respondent and family linked to their identity, livelihood, and demographic characteristics. They are indicators not necessarily defined or influenced by their

place of displacement, but more by the respondent's pre-displacement situation and abilities. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor on integration based on the results of the multivariate analysis.

Table 2. Relative Impact of IDP Household Characteristics on IDP Integration

FACTORS INFLUENCING IDPs' LIKELIHOOD TO FEEL...	...BELONGING	...ACCEPTED	...SATISFIED IN LIFE
Displaced in same district as place of origin	+++	•	--
Respondent is female	++	•	-
Member of a national minority group	•	+++	•
In current displacement location 3 or more years	•	•	-
Experienced displacement previously (pre-2014)	•	•	--
Income source was daily labour before displacement	•	•	•
Income source was government salary or pension before displacement	+	•	•
Family is still indebted	•	•	-
Family has savings left	++++	+++	+++
Family owns property in place of origin	•	++	•
Respondent has fair or poor mental health	•	---	--
Family member with lost personal documentation	•	•	•
Living in critical shelter	•	•	•

Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of origin; governorate of displacement; education level of respondent; age; and urban versus rural place of origin.

- IDPs who are displaced within their districts of origin are twice as likely to have high feelings of belonging to the host community but are less likely to report positive life satisfaction as compared to other IDPs. About half of the respondents in Mahmoudiya Centre and Khan Dhari subdistricts in Baghdad Governorate are displaced from other places within the same district (Mahmoudiya and Abu Ghraib, respectively). While this particular situation gives IDPs a higher feeling of belonging to the community than IDPs displaced from elsewhere (probably linked to sharing kinship ties as well as more familiarity with the place), it does however negatively affect satisfaction with their situation – this may be associated with low expectations of being able to return to their places of origin any time soon, or ever.<sup>30</sup>
- Being protractedly displaced plays a slightly negative role in perceived satisfaction, while not affecting any other indicator of integration. Up to 22 per cent of IDP respondents in Baghdad Governorate and 32 per cent of those in Sulaymaniyah Governorate report living in their current locations for more than three years. Of the remaining IDPs in the sample, the vast majority have been living in their displacement locations between two and three years and less than 5 per cent across both governorates moved there within the previous year. Taken together, this is indicative of a significantly protracted situation across respondents – a factor that is linked to being less satisfied in life than those who have been living in the location for fewer years, keeping all other factors constant.

30 Intra-district displacement in Iraq is usually linked to protracted sectarian and/or tribal disputes within place of origin. Thus, IDPs are frequently blocked from return or fear violent retaliation and therefore remain displaced. This is not the first time Baghdad has experienced intra-district displacement. Post-2003 sectarian conflict caused many residents to displace across districts, often fleeing neighborhoods where their ethno-religious group was in the minority and targeted by armed groups because of this.

- The economic situation of IDPs at the time of their first displacement is of help in facilitating their feelings of integration.* Among economic factors, financial savings is the most relevant one – the impact associated with still having savings available after years of displacement is significant for all three indicators of integration, and relatively higher than the other factors. This is a positive finding and indicates an increased ability to cope with displacement. However, only a minority of IDPs in the sample reported still having savings left – 7 per cent in Baghdad Governorate and 18 per cent in Sulaymaniyah. To the contrary, the majority, up to 63 per cent of IDPs across both governorates have exhausted their savings while in displacement and 25 per cent were displaced without savings. Finally, also linked to the economic background of the respondent, having government employment as their main income source is positively linked with a higher likelihood of belonging, while indebtedness plays a negative role in satisfaction. On this latter indicator, it is worth noting that indebtedness is about twice as frequent for the IDPs in Sulaymaniyah than those in Baghdad. General evidence for the role of both public employment and indebtedness in influencing integration is, nevertheless, weaker and less consistent than savings.
- Evidence points to a correlation between poor mental health of IDPs and relatively lower feelings of satisfaction and being accepted, but the direction of the relation is uncertain.* Among the 29 per cent of respondents who self-reported poor mental health, the likelihood of not feeling either satisfied or accepted is significantly higher than those who reported good mental health, although the rates are still high in general terms (see Figure 6). Poor mental state is more prevalent among men (31%) than women (22%). Sources of mental distress are diverse and were not explored in more detail – however, they may stem from experiences in fleeing their place of origin, current experiences in displacement and the ability or inability to cope in this context, pre-conflict factors, or some combination thereof. For these reasons, while the correlation seems relevant, the relationship may go both ways: poor mental health can impede integration, and inability to integrate due to any other reason(s) may contribute to worsening mental health.

Figure 5. Breakdown of IDP responses on selected economic indicators





Figure 6. Breakdown of IDP responses to integration indicators by self-reported mental health status



### C. IDP EXPERIENCES AND PERCEPTIONS VIS-À-VIS THEIR HOST COMMUNITY

This group of factors is comprised of indicators that capture different experiences and perceptions that IDPs hold in displacement, arising from their interactions with the host community and environment. Responses given by IDPs to

these indicators are likely dependent not only on their identity but that of the host community as well as the organization and functioning of said community. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor in integration.

Table 3. Relative Impact of IDP Experiences and Perceptions vis-à-vis their Host Community on IDP Integration

FACTORS INFLUENCING IDPs' LIKELIHOOD TO FEEL...	...BELONGING	...ACCEPTED	...SATISFIED IN LIFE
Respondent trusts direct neighbours	++	•	++
Trusts other people in the neighbourhood	++	•	++
Trusts local officers	•	•	+++
Feels cultural compatibility with host community	++++	++++	+++
Reports not having freedom of movement	---	•	---
Feels safer now than pre-2014	•	•	+
Experienced exclusion from buying or renting housing	•	•	---
Experienced exclusion from accessing public services	---	--	+
Experienced exclusion from accessing employment	+	•	--
Member of an ethno-religious group that is not found in the host community	---	•	•
Chose the location because of the presence of extended family or friends	•	•	•

Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of origin; governorate of displacement; gender; age; ability to openly practice religion in place of displacement; and membership in a group or organization in displacement.

- *Different measures of social capital reported from the IDPs’ perspective, including trust in their host community and perceived cultural affinity, are strongly linked with all measures of integration. Where there is better trust between IDPs and host community members, including local officials, IDPs report higher levels of belonging as well as satisfaction with their current life situation. However, trust levels are not the same across all actors in the host community. IDPs tend to trust their neighbours significantly more than other residents in the community and local officers (Figure 7). Importantly, for other residents and local officers, the majority of IDPs reported trusting them somewhat to not at all. The data on trust in officers (higher in Sulaymaniyah compared to Baghdad) is particularly relevant as it can also be seen as a proxy for the relation that IDPs have with local institutions.*

In addition to trust, another element of social capital consists of the perceived cultural compatibility between the IDP and the host community. This is the most consistently impactful explanatory factor for all indicators of integration, as seen in Table 2. Cultural compatibility is at the crux of social cohesion and can include ethno-religious background as well as other elements such as sharing common institutions and norms (“Iraqiness”). This is important in order to understand why up to 76 per cent of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, the majority of whom are Sunni Arab and who displaced into a predominantly Sunni Kurd host community with strong ethnic identification, reported their culture being strongly compatible with their hosts. Among IDPs in Baghdad, this percentage is 90 per cent. Across locations, high levels of perceived cultural compatibility are strongly correlated with IDP feelings of integration, on all indicators as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 7. Breakdown of IDP responses to trust in host community indicators





Figure 8. Breakdown of IDP views on cultural compatibility with host community



- *Barriers to IDP movement are also critical barriers to integration.* IDP movement restrictions were only reported in Baghdad Governorate, especially in Karkh Centre.<sup>31</sup> Within the governorate, 10 per cent of IDP respondents indicated that they cannot move around the area freely, a factor that is associated with a much lower likelihood of feeling belonging and life satisfaction compared to those that did not indicate movement restrictions. This did not however have any impact on IDPs’ feelings of acceptance.
- *Negative experiences and interactions IDPs have in displacement, including exclusion from housing, public services, or employment, are correlated with low integration.* Similar to the previous point, some IDPs have faced barriers in accessing housing, public services or employment. This is impacting feelings of life satisfaction, above other indicators of integration. Among IDPs in both Sulaymaniyah and Baghdad, barriers are more frequently cited in relation to employment (52% of IDP respondents) than housing (34%) or public services (31%). This may not necessarily be associated with discrimination against IDPs

per se but may be an overall issue faced by everyone in the hosting location—evidence of this is detailed in the next section of this report on the host community.

#### D. STRUCTURAL AND PLACE FACTORS OF THE HOST LOCATION

The final set of explanatory factors consist of more structural and deep-rooted characteristics related to the place of displacement in the dataset and the host communities living therein. They include indicators on development, governance, security, and social capital, which are representative of the host community for the eight subdistricts included in the dataset.<sup>32</sup> These indicators are used to understand how the hosting environment functioned before the influx of post-2014 IDPs. That is, they provide a window into what context IDPs displaced into and may shape their perceptions related to integration. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor on integration.

31 Follow-up consultation with mukhtars in these locations confirmed that movement restrictions did apply to IDPs in some cases, including Karkh Centre.

32 All indicators come from the host community dataset collected as part of this report with the exception of indicators linked to families living below the poverty line and host community members employed in education and health. These two are compiled from the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.

Table 4. Relative Impact of Structural and Place Factors of Host Location on IDP Integration

FACTORS INFLUENCING IDPs' LIKELIHOOD TO FEEL...	...BELONGING	...ACCEPTED	...SATISFIED IN LIFE
High level of safety felt by host community in the location	+++	+++	•
High level of strong intra-group interactions within host community	++	•	•
Large proportion of host community members living in neighbourhood or town for more than 20 years	--	-	•
High levels of host community trust in democracy and institutions	---	-	•
High level of families below poverty line	++	++	•
High level of host community members indicating that there are no jobs available	--	-	•
High level of host community members employed in public education and health sectors	•	•	•

All factors in the table are given at the subdistrict level. Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of origin; gender; and age.

- Safety is the structural factor with the highest contribution to integration, if measured as feelings of belonging and acceptance.* In those places where host community members reported that they felt safe in their community in high numbers, such as across the four subdistricts assessed in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, IDPs residing there tend to be more likely to integrate. This does not come as a surprise taking into account that many IDPs fled areas that have been historically affected by violence and seeking safety is one of the main reasons for choosing their place of displacement.<sup>33</sup>
- Strong social capital is positively correlated with higher likelihood of integration but can have negative impacts when it is too rigid.* This is seen through intra-community interactions, where the stronger they are amongst host community members, the more likely IDPs are to feel belonging to the place. This can be linked with the previous finding, in the sense that stronger social dynamics are also key to preventing violence and would signal a positive push to integration. However, when these social ties are too rigid, they tend to act as barriers for integration of newcomers, whereas looser ties may allow for the inclusion of greater differences between residents.<sup>34</sup> This is seen in the lower likelihood of IDPs feeling belonging and acceptance when living in a community with a high proportion of residents who have been there for over two decades. This indicates that locations with generally lower population movement tend to be more closed. Among the host community study sample, locations in Baghdad Governorate tend to exhibit both of these negative traits. Intra-community interactions are the weakest in Baghdad subdistricts – the lowest rate is in Karkh Centre, with just 56 per cent of host community members reporting strong interactions among themselves. It is also these subdistricts where the host community has been rooted in place the longest, with 90 per cent reporting that they have lived there for more than 20 years.
- IDPs living in subdistricts with higher levels of poverty and lower host community confidence in institutions and democracy report a higher degree of integration than those living in more affluent and institutionally strong areas.* In other words, it is harder for IDPs to fit into institutionally more stable and better functioning host environments and, as such, more fragile contexts may provide better opportunities for integration. This may be partly due to the fact that these locations tend to be more transient (and are correlated with more internal migration generally), making it easier to access for newly arriving populations. Weak institutional capacity, for example, may better enable IDPs to absorb into the host community with less restriction and oversight – at least during the first stage of displacement; as displacement protracts, perceptions in such environments may be subject to change and align with the ones from the host community.

33 Rochelle Davis et al., Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq.

34 IOM and Social Inquiry, Reframing Social Fragility.

### 3. HOST COMMUNITY: WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT IDPs

This section seeks to analyse the relative willingness of host communities to accept IDPs, based on their perceptions of the current IDP population in their locations overall, of IDPs staying indefinitely, and whether or not IDPs should be able to freely choose where they reside in displacement.

Following a more detailed description of these indicators, subsequent analysis will delve deeper into which factors foster (or impede) host community acceptance of the

displaced. Understanding of the interplay of these factors is obtained through multivariate analysis, and grouped as follows:

- Household characteristics
- Perception and configuration of IDPs
- Community and place

#### A. MEASURING ACCEPTANCE OF IDPs

Like integration, acceptance is difficult to quantify in a completely straightforward manner, given that it operates across physical, psychological, and socioeconomic domains. One key element of building cohesion and, in turn, acceptance between groups is sustained interpersonal contact. This can be proxied broadly through exploring

host community residents' views on how long they are comfortable with IDPs remaining in their locations and where specifically they would prefer them to reside. These indicators were included in the host community survey conducted for this study as defined below:

	IDP RESIDING IN LOCATION	IDPS REMAINING INDEFINITELY IN LOCATION	IDPS BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE WHERE THEY WISH TO LIVE IN LOCATION
<b>Comparative Category</b>	Respondent feels happy or not bothered by IDPs in location.	Respondent is supportive or not bothered by IDPs remaining indefinitely in location.	Respondent feels that IDPs should be able to choose freely where they would like to live in displacement.
<b>Base Category</b>	Respondent feels resigned or frustrated by IDPs in location.	Respondent feels resigned, upset, or completely against IDPs remaining indefinitely in location.	Respondent feels it is better for the community if IDPs live altogether in camps.

Overall, across the subdistricts analysed, over half of host community respondents reported relatively positive views about having IDPs in their communities (77%), having IDPs stay indefinitely (64%), or IDPs choosing where they would like to reside (57%). These relatively positive feelings however tend to be geographically specific, with respondents in Baghdad Governorate viewing IDP presence more favourably than those in Sulaymaniyah Governorate (see Figure 9). In particular, respondents in Bazian, Dukan, and Arbat subdistricts report higher levels of frustration with the

presence of IDPs in their locations and are more likely to be completely against IDPs staying indefinitely than the other subdistricts analysed, including Sulaymaniyah Centre. On the question of whether IDPs should reside where they choose or in camps, there is a significant divergence between host communities in Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah, where those in Baghdad overwhelmingly do not support placing IDPs in camps. These geographic differences in responses are explained in the subsequent sections.

Figure 9. Breakdown of host community responses to acceptance indicators



BAGHDAD GOVERNORATE





Figure 9. Breakdown of host community responses to acceptance indicators (continued)



SULAYMANIYAH GOVERNORATE



Note: The figure does not include 'No response' answers.

## B. HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS

Analysis here focuses on exploring host community respondents' individual or family factors linked to their overall personal situation. These include gender, homeownership status, employment and general economic status, past experiences of violence, and personal views related to marginalization, belonging, diversity, democracy,

and how well past episodes of violence have been dealt with. This provides a basis for understanding who host community members are in relation to the IDPs they are living with. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor on acceptance based on the results of the multivariate analysis.

Table 5. Relative Impact of Host Community Household Characteristics on Acceptance of IDPs

FACTORS INFLUENCING HOST COMMUNITY'S LIKELIHOOD TO HAVE POSITIVE FEELINGS ABOUT...	...IDPs IN LOCATION	...IDPs REMAINING INDEFINITELY IN LOCATION	...IDPs BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE WHERE THEY WISH TO LIVE IN LOCATION
Respondent is female	--	-	-
Not a homeowner	--	•	•
Unemployed (either looking for work or inactive)	•	•	•
Household income source includes daily labour	•	-	+
Economic situation for family is same now as before 2014	+	++	+
Feels very marginalized socially or politically	•	•	•
Feels marginalized by NGOs	---	•	•
More belonging to ethno-religious group than Iraqi identity	•	--	•
Indicates that diversity makes society stronger	•	++	+
Unsatisfied with how past experiences of violence have been dealt with	-	--	•
Satisfied with how past experiences of violence have been dealt with	•	•	•
Experienced conflict or repression-related violence pre-2003	•	--	•
Indicates that democracy makes society stronger	+	•	•

Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of residence; age; education level; ability to speak a foreign language; having spent significant time living abroad (non-conflict migration); having been born in a different governorate than current one; and believing that tribal influence does more harm than good to society.


- *Women are less likely to accept IDPs overall across all indicators.* The data reflected here indicates that female host community members tend to hold more negative

views in relation to the IDPs living in their locations, IDPs staying indefinitely, and IDPs residing outside of camps, than their male counterparts.

- *Host community residents who do not own their homes are less likely to hold positive views in relation to the IDPs living in their locations.* While this finding is only significant for the first acceptance indicator, the trend across the other two with a wider margin of error is also negative (not shown in table). Among the host community in this sample, approximately 16 per cent overall pay rent for their places of residence. These rates are highest in

Mahmudiya Centre (26%), Husseiniya (24%), Karkh Centre (21%), and Sulaymaniyah Centre (17%) – all of which are major urban areas, save for Husseiniya which is a larger peri-urban town. Thus, host communities may perceive the presence of IDPs as increasing the competition for affordable housing in their areas. This perception is substantiated by housing data indicating that districts with higher influx of IDPs have higher rent costs.<sup>35</sup>

Figure 10. Comparison of Host Community and IDPs who rent housing



- *Perceived economic well-being is associated with higher acceptance of IDPs across all indicators, particularly with regard to IDPs remaining indefinitely.* In other words, those within the host community who are economically thriving are less likely to perceive IDPs as economic threats than those who are struggling. Across this host community sample, respondents in Baghdad tend to report in higher frequency an improved economic situation compared to 2014 than those in Sulaymaniyah, where aside from Sulaymaniyah Centre, respondents indicate a deteriorated economic position. These perceptions may be attributable to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s recent financial crisis, particularly as this area had high affluence prior to 2014. Such sentiments highlight the precarity Sulaymaniyah residents still feel, despite the fact that more objective measures of economic well-being, comparing reported sources of income before 2014 and at present, across all study locations, found no differences between time periods.
- *Perceived marginalization by NGOs, UN, and international community has negative effect on host community views of the IDPs living in their locations.* Across subdistricts, on average, 44 per cent of respondents feel very socially or politically marginalized and another 32 per cent feel somewhat marginalized. Respondents place responsibility for this primarily on local (69%) and national (54%) authorities; however, perceived marginalization from these actors does not influence host community views on the displaced living among them. Rather, it is perceived marginalization by the international community (24%) that seems to be the flashpoint in this regard. This may stem from the view that IDPs should not be the only ones to receive the help they need, and inclusiveness of assistance does play a role in acceptance, particularly if NGO and international presence was nascent in these locations before 2014. This type of marginalization is reportedly highest in Husseiniya subdistrict (34%) and lowest in Sulaymaniyah Centre subdistrict (3%).

35 UNHCR, JIPS, and the Sulaymaniyah Statistics Office, Displacement as Challenge and Opportunity: Sulaymaniyah Urban Profile of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Host Communities (Sulaymaniyah, UNHCR, 2016).

- *Positive views on diversity and a greater sense of a national identity among host community members increases the likelihood of acceptance of IDPs for the long-term.* Alternatively, those who feel that ethno-religious diversity does more harm than good in their communities as well as those who hold more ethno-religious identitarian views are less inclined to have positive views on IDPs remaining in their locations indefinitely. This tracks with literature on social cohesion, where too tightly held and closed views of identity and group belonging make integration more difficult for newcomers.<sup>36</sup> Within this sample, between 50 per cent and 58 per cent of host community respondents in Sulaymaniyah reported completely belonging to their ethno-religious group as compared to between 15 per cent and 45 per cent who felt complete belonging to a broader Iraqi identity. The opposite held true for Baghdad respondents, who reported a stronger national identity (between 48% and 78%) than an ethno-religious one (between 22% and 44%). Of note, however, is that across all locations, the majority of respondents (on average 63%) felt that ethno-religious diversity makes society stronger.
- *Hosting the displaced brings previous receiving community grievances related to violence and conflict to the fore, negatively impacting the willingness to accept IDPs in the short- and long-term.* Host community respondents who experienced violence pre-2003 are less likely to feel positive about IDPs staying in their communities indefinitely. Respondents in Sulaymaniyah report having experienced such violence in greater number, particularly in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, linked to the Anfal campaigns, Kurdish uprisings, and the Kurdish civil war. That much of this violence was perpetrated by the previous Sunni Arab regime in Iraq, and that the majority of IDPs in the governorate are themselves Sunni Arab, may account for some of the uneasiness regarding their long-term stay. For the host community in Baghdad, experiences of violence are more recent and seemingly ongoing, and reported as having taken place from 2003 to 2018.<sup>37</sup> In a sense, the ISIL conflict may be seen as an extension of the upheaval that affected them since 2003.<sup>38</sup> What ties both governorates – and their respective subdistricts of study – together is the majority of respondents who feel unsatisfied with the way in which this violence has been dealt with (overall 64%). This is highest in Arbat (74%), Bazian (73%), Dukan (72%), and Khan Dari (72%) subdistricts. For the rest, between 40 per cent and 63 per cent report being unsatisfied. Such feelings negatively influence not only perceptions of IDPs remaining indefinitely, but in the immediate term as well.

### C. COMMUNITY AND PLACE

Here, the focus of analysis is on host community respondents' perceptions of the social and physical space they live in as a whole as relates to pre-conflict population composition, availability of jobs, levels of economic inequality, levels of public service and aid provision, and comfort moving around.

The aim is to better understand how host communities view their own communities and the influence of that on levels of IDP acceptance. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor on acceptance based on the results of the multivariate analysis.

36 Marc et al., *Societal Dynamics and Fragility: Engaging Societies in Responding to Fragile Situations* (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2013); and Andrew Norton and Arjan de Haan, "Social Cohesion: Theoretical Debates and Practical Application with Respect to Jobs," Background Paper for World Development Report 2013 (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2013).

37 Some of the subdistricts within Baghdad analyzed here were frontline sites during the ISIL conflict, for example.

38 Christoph Reuter, "Secret Files Reveal the Structure of the Islamic State," *Der Spiegel*, 18 April 2015.

Table 6. Relative Impact of Host Community Perceptions of Community and Place on Acceptance of IDPs

FACTORS INFLUENCING HOST COMMUNITY'S LIKELIHOOD TO HAVE POSITIVE FEELINGS ABOUT...	...IDPs IN LOCATION	...IDPs REMAINING INDEFINITELY IN LOCATION	...IDPs BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE WHERE THEY WISH TO LIVE IN LOCATION
Indicates multiple ethno-religious groups living in the location before 2014	+	•	+
Reports no jobs available for people between the ages of 16 and 40 in the location	--	--	•
Perceives high levels of economic inequality across families in the location	•	•	•
Frustrated with current level of public service provision in the location	--	-	•
Frustrated with levels of aid provision provided to host community	--	•	•
Not very comfortable to very uncomfortable moving around location day or night	•	•	•
Resides in governorate capital	-	•	•


Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of residence; gender; age; duration of time living in current neighbourhood or town; levels of belonging felt toward location; reported pre-2014 presence of IDPs in the location; and ability to economically advance.

- *Greater recognition of ethno-religious diversity in hosting locations pre-2014 increases the likelihood of host community members to have positive feelings about IDPs in general and in their ability to choose where they wish to reside in displacement.* Given that host community composition and that of the IDPs tend to be different, this is an encouraging finding. However, it must be noted that in this sample the plurality of respondents (41%) recognized only one group as having resided in their locations before 2014. This rate was highest in Khan Dari, Sulaymaniyah Centre, and Arbat subdistricts where roughly half of respondents recognized only one ethno-religious group as having lived in their neighbourhoods and towns before the ISIL conflict.
- *Host communities who are frustrated with current levels of public service provision or with aid provision directed towards them are less likely to accept IDPs across two indicators – residing in their locations in general and staying indefinitely.* Overall frustration with levels of public service provision unsurprisingly make residents less inclined to want a continued presence of IDPs in their communities. This again may be related to the perception

that any newcomer by their presence increases the competition for limited resources. This is borne out by host community perceptions data; within the sample, respondents in Baghdad, specifically in Husseinia (64%), Khan Dari (61%), and Mahmudiya Centre (51%), expressed the highest levels of frustration over service provision. Residents within these locations also reported, in higher proportion than the rest of the sample, that services were provided completely unequally in their locations. They indicate that the main causes for poor provision have to do with structural factors linked to financial crises and incompetence and corruption – and not specifically to the presence of IDPs. Aid provision is reported as not being delivered in seven of the eight subdistricts in this sample (Sulaymaniyah Centre being the exception). However, it is only residents in those subdistricts in Baghdad who report being frustrated by this lack of provision in large number (between 48% to 70% as compared to 1% to 14% in Sulaymaniyah subdistricts). This may be linked to the overall dissatisfaction these residents hold towards service provision in general.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> While not significant, there is a slight positive trend in the analysis that those who are frustrated by aid provision to the host community may be more likely to accept IDPs freely choosing where they would like to live in the location than wanting them to reside in camps. This perhaps indicates that host community members recognize that IDPs are often what bring aid into their locations in general at this time.

Figure 11. Breakdown of host community perceptions on equality of service provision in their neighbourhood / town



- *The view that there are no job opportunities available for working age populations in a location also decreases the likelihood of host community members accepting IDPs' presence in their locations in general and indefinitely.* This aligns with other findings presented here with respect to housing, services, and economic well-being. Perceived

limitations in opportunity within the host community limit willingness to accept the displaced. Within the sample, Sulaymaniyah Centre reported the lowest rate (7%) of no job opportunities across the sample, with its neighbouring subdistricts reported the highest (59% in Arbat, 48% in Dukan, and 47% in Bazian).

#### D. PERCEPTION AND CONFIGURATION OF IDPs

This last set of analyses provides a window into which factors related to host community views specifically on IDPs, as well as their spatial configuration, shape willingness to accept them. The factors here come from host community responses to questions related to perspectives on how well IDPs are integrated, how much of a security threat IDPs pose, comparative rates of marginalization between themselves

and IDPs, and individual proximity to IDPs on their streets of residence. This is combined with more objective measures of whether or not IDPs have existing links to the host community, if they come from urban versus rural places of origin, and spatial patterns of IDP distribution. The following table summarizes the relative impact of each factor on acceptance based on the results of the multivariate analysis.

Table 7. Relative Impact of Host Community Perceptions of IDPs and their Configuration on Acceptance of IDPs

FACTORS INFLUENCING HOST COMMUNITY'S LIKELIHOOD TO HAVE POSITIVE FEELINGS ABOUT...	...IDPs IN LOCATION	...IDPs REMAINING INDEFINITELY IN LOCATION	...IDPs BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE WHERE THEY WISH TO LIVE IN LOCATION
<b>Subjective measures:</b>			
Feels that IDPs are not well integrated	---	---	---
Perceives that the arrival of IDPs to the location is a security threat	---	---	---
Feels marginalization is worse for host community than IDPs	--	-	•
Feels marginalization is less for host community than IDPs	•	•	•
Has IDP neighbours	•	•	•
<b>Objective measures:</b>			
Member of the same ethno-religious group as the majority of IDPs in the location	•	•	+
High percentage of IDPs who have extended family/friends in the location	•	•	+++
High percentage of IDPs that come from rural places of origin	•	-	---
IDPs live in enclaves rather than spread throughout the subdistrict	•	•	--
Higher proportion of non-camp IDPs over host community in the location	•	•	---

Other control factors included in the analysis but not reported in the table: governorate of residence; gender; and age.


- *Host communities who feel they are more marginalized than the IDPs residing in their locations are less likely to accept their presence, regardless of time period.* This is in a sense a summation of many of the findings identified in the previous sections. Host communities who feel a general precarity about their own circumstances compared to those who are displaced are more inclined to have negative views on IDPs in general and on their staying for the long-term. Among the study locations, this is seen particularly within Sulaymaniyah Governorate, where 53 per cent of respondents in Dukan and 50 per cent in Arbat reported to be more marginalized than IDPs.
- *Host communities who feel IDPs are not integrated or are a security threat tend to hold more negative views across all three acceptance indicators.* Respondents in both Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah subdistricts, by and large, do not view IDPs as a security threat, with only 17 per cent on average reporting this across locations. There are geographical differences however in how well host community respondents perceive the integration of IDPs living in their locations. Specifically, while the vast majority of respondents in Baghdad subdistricts felt IDPs were somewhat to very integrated (between 91% and 96%), those in Sulaymaniyah subdistricts felt IDPs were not very well to not at all integrated in higher proportion (between 27% in Sulaymaniyah Centre and 41% in Arbat).

- *With respect to compatibility, host communities are more amenable to IDPs being able to choose where they live if IDPs have extended family or friends already there, if the IDPs come from the same ethno-religious group as them, or their places of origin are of a similar urban or peri-urban character as the hosting location.* Having existing ties in the host location and/or the same ethno-religious belonging are important factors for host communities in their willingness to prefer the displaced to live among them. This ethno-religious affinity between IDPs and host community members within this sample is seen primarily in Khan Dari subdistrict and Karkh Centre subdistrict where the overwhelming majority of host community respondents (98% and 80%, respectively) are Sunni Arab.<sup>40</sup> Identity and compatibility however go beyond ethno-religious belonging and are also connected to the physical and cultural character of the places IDPs are from and the hosting communities they come into. Within the analysis, host community members in this sample are less likely to want IDPs originally from rural locations to stay indefinitely and they prefer for these IDPs to live in camps. This is telling given the urban and peri-urban nature of all the subdistricts in the sample and the residents therein. The rural-urban divide in some

cases also supersedes ethno-religious affinity if IDPs, host community members, or both, view their ways of living and cultural values as too different from one another.<sup>41</sup>

- *Finally, spatial patterns and urban morphology also influence acceptance of IDPs in that those areas where IDPs are enclaved or that have a high proportion of IDPs relative to the rest of the population, host community members prefer the displaced to live in camps.* Thus, it seems host communities prefer to have IDP populations more spread out across their locations as well as to host IDPs in lower numbers. Karkh Centre and Sulaimainya Centre, being the two large urban agglomerations in the study sample, tend to have more IDPs clustered in specific neighbourhoods or areas than in the other subdistricts, where IDPs are more spread out. This concentration in specific neighbourhoods is similar to having IDPs reside in camps, in that it segregates the displaced from the rest of the population and limits interaction—two key factors for acceptance and integration. With regard to IDP density, Dukan and Khan Dari subdistricts have the highest proportion of out of camp IDPs to host population (32% and 29%, respectively as seen in Figure 11).

Figure 12. IDP Density over the Host Population



40 It is common across all subdistricts in the study that the vast majority of IDPs are Sunni Arab.

41 See, for example, IOM and Social Inquiry, *Reframing Social Fragility*; and DRC and Social Inquiry, *Social Dynamics for Early Recovery Programming: Tikrit and Al-Alam* (DRC, Tikrit, 2017). Within these qualitative studies, Sunni Arab host communities in urban (Kirkuk Centre and Tikrit Centre) and peri-urban (Al-Alam) locations reported concerns with the IDPs currently living in their neighborhoods and towns despite their sharing ethno-religious and, in many cases, tribal affiliation. Their specific complaints related to IDP behavior and attitudes, which they equated with coming from rural and more tribal and conservative communities.

## 4. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER

The analysis above exploring IDP feelings of integration and host community feelings of acceptance highlight a number of related trends, found in both populations. This study focused on the governorates of Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah. However, the findings are generalizable beyond local dynamics because the analysis controlled for specific localized factors. Therefore, these trends can inform strategies on local integration as a durable solution to displacement across locations in Iraq.

With respect to IDPs, the study shows that their economic situation is a major factor in explaining their reported feelings (or lack thereof) of integration. This includes still having savings, low levels of debt, and relative financial security (e.g. having government employment). Another expected trend uncovered is higher integration when IDPs feel safe and report a good mental health status. Beyond this, social capital and cohesion are critical and complex factors. Specifically, at the individual level, IDPs' feelings of trust in residents and local actors and especially of cultural compatibility with the host community increase their likelihood of integration. At the same time, the social functioning of the host community overall also matters. Those locations with a rigid sense of cohesion make it difficult for IDPs to integrate; however, having too weak cohesion also hinders integration. Interestingly, certain aspects of localized fragility help with fostering integration among IDPs. This is particularly true in places that are economically disadvantaged and have weaker institutions. IDPs in these locations reported a greater sense of belonging and acceptance. In contexts where everyone is equally disadvantaged, newcomers and residents alike may share a common narrative in rather than a competitive one, while weaker institutions enable IDPs to be "unnoticed" and blend in.

For host communities, most of the indicators on household and local economic development matter for acceptance of IDPs. This expresses itself across different economic domains and living conditions. Host community members who rent, for example, are less inclined to accept IDPs. This sense of competition also translates with regard to service provision, particularly when host communities are frustrated by the level of provision and feel it is unequal. Furthermore, when host communities perceive that they are more marginalized than IDPs (i.e., that they

do not share a common narrative of disadvantage), they are less likely to accept IDPs. This marginalization seems particularly connected to international aid provision or the lack thereof for host communities. At the social level, common narratives between host communities and IDPs helps in fostering acceptance. Such compatibilities for the host community include sharing kinship and identity with the host location as well as similar cultural values (e.g. rural versus urban divides regardless of ethno-religious identity). Past grievances around violence and conflict, and shared narrative between host communities and IDPs therein, also matter. A particularly interesting finding within this sample of host community residents is that a relatively substantial proportion have experienced either previous displacement or conflict related violence. Those host communities who experienced violence and displacement pre-2003 are less likely to accept IDPs than those who had such experiences after 2003. Finally, in terms of spatial patterns, segregation of non-camp IDPs to specific areas or neighbourhoods within hosting locations lowers the likelihood of residents accepting them as does a high proportion of IDPs relative to the host community.

What these findings highlight is that integration and acceptance are indeed a two-way street. They require adaptation of both the displaced and those hosting them—this however is not the sole responsibility of citizens, and in the context of Iraq, it seems that people have been making an effort on both sides. What is needed to foster smoother integration and by extension acceptance, are interventions from government authorities and the international community that seek to address longstanding inequalities and grievances that impact the communities that both groups are in. In other words, particularly in places where people have been displaced for a long time, this means shifting away from shorter-term humanitarian approaches to longer-term considerations for development, governance, and justice.

## B. RECOMMENDATIONS

- Interventions in locations hosting people who remain displaced for a lengthy time need to more meaningfully put the host community into the picture ensuring their needs are also considered. This may mean given greater preference to interventions that take an in-depth area-based approach and ensure that services are extended or upgraded, particularly in areas that have been historically underserved. It may also mean starting to consider IDPs and host communities as one population in terms of policy and programming.
- In areas where there are socioeconomic disparities and scarce opportunities, interventions supporting livelihood creation and strengthening government capacity open the door for equality and inclusion, which in turn, can create a window for integration and acceptance. Real and perceived socioeconomic factors remain one of the biggest determinants to integration and, while obvious, must be paid attention to and innovated around. This does not mean only addressing immediate needs or creating short-term impact, but rather, tackling more structural concerns to address overarching urban poverty. For example, the struggle for housing can be addressed through cash-for-rent type of programs that are targeted to IDPs, which is a patch that may cause further tension in the host community, or can be tackled at its root, more holistically, through supporting affordable housing policies.
- A critical paradox here relates to compatibility. That is, IDPs, by a wide margin, feel they are culturally compatible with their host communities while host community residents themselves have much more rigid and specific criteria for what compatible looks like for them. Bridging this gap through policy and programming is critical. More emphasis needs to be placed on interventions that are specifically oriented around social cohesion and finding common narratives. This includes local level programming as well as policies geared towards cohesion, inclusion,

and integration. This would entail helping to ensure sustained, meaningful inter-personal contact between IDPs and host community residents and allowing for both to expand their own sense of identity and community without having to give up core aspects of who they are. This could include establishing more mixed-use public spaces for engagement and sharing of narratives, lifting restrictions on where IDPs can live or encouraging more spread to limit the concentration of groups in specific areas or neighbourhoods in a location, and access to linguistic support where needed.

- One remaining obstacle toward integration, acceptance, and shared narratives also seems to be lack of justice or at least formal acknowledgement of both IDPs and host communities' experiences of violence and displacement. This is critical as host communities who feel unsatisfied with the way conflict-related violence in the past has been dealt with tend not to accept IDPs. Any processes aimed at accountability and redress for violations of this most recent conflict should not overlook the deeper issues that led to it in the first place which remain unresolved for many and can often lead to collective blame.

Taken together, this calls for a shift in thinking that puts displacement within, rather than separate from, the continuum of urban and community dynamics. What this means in practice is focusing interventions on the attainment of rights, the elimination of discrimination, and the alleviation of poverty of all people living in a community, regardless of when they arrived.

# REASONS TO REMAIN (PART 2): DETERMINANTS OF IDP INTEGRATION INTO HOST COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ

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