

RETURN INDEX THEMATIC SERIES BRIEFING #2

THE GROWING ROLE OF RECONCILIATION IN RETURN MOVEMENTS:

SNAPSHOTS FROM THE RETURN INDEX

NOVEMBER 2019

The Return Index Thematic Series provides singular analysis and insights on specific indicators, their distribution across conflict-affected areas of Iraq and how they fit within the context in which they are collected.

THEMATIC SERIES PRESENTATION

As of 30 August 2019, nearly one and a half years after the official end of the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), more than 4.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their places of origin across eight governorates in Iraq. The Return Index, developed by IOM DTM, the Returns Working Group, and Social Inquiry, provides a means of measuring the severity of living conditions in the locations to which they are returning. This allows partners working in Iraq to better strategize for interventions and resource allocation in vulnerable areas. The first thematic briefing developed using Return Index data, “The Physical and Social Dimensions of Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas,” was published in January


2019. Using data of the Return Index Round 4 collected in March–April 2019, this second thematic report focuses on the role of reconciliation in return movements. More specifically, it presents

- the overview of reported reconciliation needs at sub-district level;
- the links between reconciliation, other Return Index indicators, and additional factors; and
- the outline of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Iraq.

KEY FINDINGS

- The latest iteration of the Return Index found that reconciliation is now the most impactful indicator on the scale measuring social cohesion and safety perceptions (Scale 2), meaning it is the indicator most correlated with lack of returns in this dimension.
- A total number of 608,688 returnees, or 15 per cent of the total returnee population, currently reside in 279 locations where reconciliation is reported as needed. Of these, 241,914 returnees (6% of the total) are in locations where key informants reported that no reconciliation processes were initiated.
- The majority of locations where the need for reconciliation was reported are located in Ninewa, followed by Diyala, Baghdad and Salah al-Din governorates.
- While reconciliation is particularly localized, certain indicators in locations of return appear closely linked to it, including: residential destruction, illegal occupation of private residences, concerns over revenge, multiplicity of security actors and the reintegration of civil servants. Furthermore, some locations with reported reconciliation need and ongoing reconciliation efforts, as well as locations where reconciliation need is not reported but efforts in this regard are ongoing, fall within the disputed territories of the country.
- The report highlights that reconciliation is a complex and often context-specific process that must address a number of underlying issues. Sustainable return is an important potential outcome, but not the only one necessary to ensure durable peace, tolerance and coexistence.

Map 1. Locations with reported need for reconciliation



METHODOLOGY

The Return Index is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return and to reflect the displacement context in Iraq. It is based on 16 indicators grouped into two scales: Scale 1, on livelihoods and basic services, and Scale 2, centered around social cohesion and safety perceptions. The overall index goes from 0 (all essential conditions for return are met) to 100 (no essential conditions for return are met). Higher scores denote more severe living conditions for returnees. For more details on the methodology, refer to the Return Index Reports Round 1 and Round 3.¹

Data collection for the Return Index Round 4 took place during the months of March and April 2019 across eight governorates,

38 districts and 1,564 locations in Iraq. Locations assessed include only those that have witnessed a return of their populations displaced due to the ISIL conflict (2014 to 2017). The analysis herein relates to reconciliation needs and efforts for these locations only.

This data was further supplemented with follow-up interviews with key informants in select locations to gain greater insight into the reconciliation situation. These interviews took place during the months of May and June 2019. Reference to literature on reconciliation is also made to better put current analysis into context.

Table 1. Return Index indicator list

SCALE 1: LIVELIHOODS AND BASIC SERVICES	SCALE 2: SAFETY AND SOCIAL COHESION
Residential destruction	Community reconciliation
Employment access	Presence of multiple security actors
Water sufficiency	Blocked returns
Recovery of agriculture	Checkpoints controlled by non-state security actor(s)
Electricity sufficiency	Daily public life
Recovery of businesses	Illegal occupation of private residences
Access to basic services	Mine presence
Reincorporation of government employees	Sources of violence
SCALE 1 SCORE = 100	SCALE 2 SCORE = 100
OVERALL SEVERITY INDEX = AVERAGE OF SCALE 1 AND SCALE 2 SCORES	

¹ Reports available at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/>

INTRODUCTION

The Return Index is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return and to reflect the displacement context in Iraq. It is based on 16 indicators grouped into two scales: Scale 1, on livelihoods and basic services, and Scale 2, centered around social cohesion and safety perceptions. Scale 2 includes reconciliation as an indicator in order to assess its impact on facilitating or preventing returns. The latest iteration of the Return Index model generated in early 2019 found that reconciliation is the indicator with the highest impact on the social cohesion and safety perceptions scale. The impact on returns differs depending on whether the need for reconciliation is reported and whether a relevant process is taking place: locations with reported need and no ongoing reconciliation efforts are three times less likely to have full return of their pre-conflict populations. Reconciliation is therefore significant for its potential to facilitate the social recovery of communities and ease the return of displaced populations in the aftermath of conflict.

Locations with reported need and no ongoing reconciliation efforts are three times less likely to have full return of their pre-conflict populations.

In the Return Index, the reconciliation indicator is collected through key informant interviews in each location with a returnee population. It consists of the following two inter-linked questions:

- Does this community need reconciliation with other ethno-religious or tribal communities in the subdistrict to achieve peaceful coexistence and prevent further violence?
- If yes, is this currently taking place?

The advantage of this approach is the ability to cover a large number of locations in a short period of time and to monitor changes over time. The limitation is that it relies on one representative per location, mainly mukhtars and community or local council representatives, who report on the views of a potentially large and diverse population. Responses may be subject to individual key informant interpretation and may not tackle all the nuances of reconciliation. In addition, in some cases, differing key informant levels of comfort in answering questions related to reconciliation may result in underreporting needs.

Thus, the aim of this thematic report is to explore the reconciliation indicator based on the results of the key informant interviews and their views. Taking these limitations into account, the report provides an opportunity to highlight the context and inter-related factors that may influence or shape reconciliation processes. It is also an invitation for further analysis of the dynamics at play within and among communities ahead of any intervention, bearing in mind that this analysis does not imply immediate action, but rather careful and considered insight and approaches that take into account the needs and views of all communities impacted by conflict. This entails moving beyond leaders and key informants to gain a deeper sense of the views and perspectives of ordinary citizens seeking to rebuild their lives and repair in some manner the social fabric of which they are a part.

This report provides an opportunity to highlight the context and the interrelated collected indicators that may influence or shape reconciliation processes. It is also an invitation for further analysis of the dynamics at play within and among communities ahead of any intervention.

Using data of the Return Index Round 4 collected in March–April 2019, this second thematic report focuses on the role of reconciliation in return movements. More specifically, it presents

- the overview of reported reconciliation needs at subdistrict level;
- the links between reconciliation, other Return Index indicators, and additional factors; and
- the outline of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in Iraq.

RECONCILIATION IN THE TECHNICAL LITERATURE AND IN THE IRAQ CONTEXT

Reconciliation is often difficult to grasp and define because conceptually it refers to both the end goal of societies in the aftermath of conflict and the process by which they achieve it. As a process, reconciliation can be understood as a means through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future.² It occurs when actors involved in and/or affected by conflict seek to resolve disputes, address grievances, and (re)build trust to live peacefully together in a mutually beneficial way. This is often a long-term endeavor and can take place at all levels of society, within and between political / security actors; within and between communities; within and between individuals; and between individuals or communities and the state.

While reconciliation and forms of justice or accountability are often misconstrued as being mutually exclusive, in practice they can and do interact through various dimensions including dialogues, healing and trauma recovery, truth seeking/commissions, sharing of narratives, admissions of guilt, judicial or other forms of accountability, and forgiveness.³ In its most intrinsic sense, the aim of reconciliation as a process is not only to foster peaceful coexistence or tolerance of others but also to seek to restore dignity, reverse structural causes of marginalization and discrimination, and restore all victims as rights bearers within their societies.⁴

Within the Iraq context, reconciliation is often synonymous with forgiveness only, and as such, many local civil society actors highlight the need to include justice and redress for victims of conflict as part and parcel of reconciliation.⁵ What this means varies within and between communities in Iraq. This variance in language reflects not only community practices, but differing levels of attention from the international community as well. For some, a precursor to reconciliation entails formal transitional justice mechanisms including criminal justice proceedings, reparations and truth-seeking, among others. For others, existing tribal mechanisms, which often include compensation, are a preferred method. For others still, because of the complexity of this conflict, including who victims and perpetrators are and the blurred line between the two, tribal mechanisms in conjunction with more formal state processes for accountability and redress are necessary. What seems clear across conflict-affected communities, however, is the need for acknowledgement by the state and society of what happened to them.⁶ As such, reconciliation in Iraq varies from an understanding that it is a process among tribes and between ethno-religious groups to one that includes the fulfillment of certain rights and safety via a range of mainly local actors including government authorities, community leaders, and security actors among others.

² David Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes, and Luc Huyse (eds.), *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook* (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003).

³ Paul Seils, "The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice: Conceptions and Misconceptions," *ICTJ Briefing Paper* (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017).

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ PRWG, "Stakeholder Mapping Report" (Erbil: GIZ, 2019).


⁶ Nadia Siddiqui, Roger Guiu, and Aaso Ameen Shwan, "Among Brothers and Strangers: Identities in Displacement in Iraq," *International Migration* 57 no. 2, 2019: 80-95.

1. WHAT DO KEY INFORMANTS REPORT ON THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION ACROSS THE SUB-DISTRICTS?

For analytical purposes, all 1,564 assessed locations can be grouped into three categories:

- 'Locations where reconciliation is needed and taking place' (120 locations);
- 'Locations where reconciliation is needed and not taking place' (159 locations);
- 'Locations where reconciliation is not needed' (1,285 locations).

Figure 1. Distribution of returnees by reported reconciliation need



There are 608,688 returnees, or 15 per cent, of the total returnee population in Iraq, currently residing in the 279 locations where reconciliation is reported as needed, whether taking place or not. Of these, 241,914 returnees (6% of the total) are in locations where key informants reported no processes have initiated.

Ninewa Governorate contains the majority of locations where need for reconciliation was reported. These areas are comprised of 158 locations hosting 327,066 returnees, 41 of which are locations where reconciliation is reported needed and happening and 117 of which are locations where reconciliation is reported needed and not happening. Following Ninewa are Diyala (45 locations with 51,582 returnees), Baghdad (33 locations with 25,008 returnees) and Salah al-Din (25 locations with 87,936 returnees) governorates. The governorates of Erbil and Kirkuk do not present any locations where reconciliation was reported as needed by key informants. Subsequent sections of this report will provide more insight into locations, including Kirkuk, where reconciliation is reportedly not needed, but where contextual factors and interventions reveal a different scenario.

Table 2. Number of locations and returnees per governorate by category of reconciliation need

Governorate	Reconciliation needed and happening		Reconciliation needed but not happening		Reconciliation not needed		Total	
	No. of locations	No. of returnees	No. of locations	No. of returnees	No. of locations	No. of returnees	No. of locations	No. of returnees
Anbar	18	117,096	0	0	219	1,181,040	237	1,298,136
Baghdad	24	19,044	9	5,964	75	61,938	108	86,946
Diyala	34	38,526	11	13,056	166	172,050	211	223,632
Erbil	0	0	0	0	20	41,070	20	41,070
Kirkuk	0	0	0	0	184	321,858	184	321,858
Ninewa	41	158,208	117	168,858	456	1296,018	614	1,623,084
Salah al-Din	3	33,900	22	54,036	164	527,292	189	615,228
Total	120	366,774	159	241,914	1,285	3,602,046	1,564	4,210,734

Further analysis is conducted at subdistrict level, and the different reconciliation needs and conditions are classified into three categories: 1) reconciliation is reportedly needed and taking place in the majority of locations in the subdistrict, 2) reconciliation is reportedly needed and not taking place in the majority of locations, and 3) a combination in which reconciliation is reportedly needed and taking place, needed and not taking place, and/or not needed across locations.⁷

The next section highlights the context-specific nature of the dynamics across these three categories of reported

reconciliation. All subdistricts in Ninewa Governorate presented in the analysis, except Markaz Tal Afar, have key informants who reported reconciliation is not taking place. The same situation was found in Salah al-Din Governorate, where key informants in all subdistricts except Yathreb reported the same. In Diyala, Anbar, and Baghdad governorates, reconciliation is mostly taking place in the subdistricts that reported the need for it. While most of the subdistricts presented below list ethno-religious division as the basis for reconciliation need across categories, there are also some instances of tribal divisions.

SUB-DISTRICTS IN CATEGORY 1: RECONCILIATION REPORTEDLY NEEDED AND HAPPENING

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Garma	Falluja	Anbar
117,504 returnees		

This subdistrict on the northern side of Falluja District is a historically fragile place and was considered to be one of the most violent in Iraq between 2005 and 2008. Because of the more recent ISIL conflict, most of its original population was displaced to the neighbouring Amiriya camp near the Anbar-Baghdad border and to Abu Ghraib district in Baghdad. Although most of Al-Garma's pre-conflict population is reported to have returned, key informants indicated that a reconciliation process had just recently been initiated, mainly focused on solving intra-tribal issues linked to perceived ISIL affiliation of some families. Reconciliation efforts are reportedly led by local actors, mainly tribal sheikhs, with the participation of security forces and local authorities. It is likely that targeted families will be expected to pledge to obey security regulations and the rule of law.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Sab'a al-Bour	Kadhimia	Baghdad
7,764 returnees		

Sab'a al-Bour is a small subdistrict consisting mainly of one city with 1,200 returnees. While its population is both Sunni and Shia Arab, the groups seem to reside in ethno-religious enclaves, as the neighbourhoods are not mixed. Reconciliation is needed between the different tribes residing there to address ongoing tribal issues that pre-date the ISIL conflict. Efforts in this regard are currently taking place, and in fact are reportedly ongoing as they were taking place prior to 2014 as well. These efforts involve security forces at the national level, the local council and mukhtars as well as tribal leaders.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Markaz Tal Afar	Tal Afar	Ninewa
157,548 returnees		

Within Tal Afar District, the centre is the only subdistrict with ongoing reconciliation taking place, as reported by all local key informants. Markaz Tal Afar is the largest Turkmen enclave in Ninewa, home to both Sunni and Shia communities. Sectarian division spiked after 2003, as did the appearance of Sunni and Shia enclaves in the previously mixed subdistrict. The area was also the site of major clashes and attacks, as well as failed reconciliation attempts pre-2014.⁸ During the most recent crisis, the subdistrict was one of the first areas controlled by ISIL and one of the last to be retaken by Iraqi Security Forces. The Shia Turkmen population was severely targeted by ISIL and as such, nearly the entire population was displaced, as was a significant portion of their Sunni counterparts, though the periods of displacement of the two groups differed. Return dynamics have impacted demographics:⁹ given current security configurations, Shia Turkmen have been able to return at a higher rate than Sunnis, who remain displaced within Tal Afar District as well as abroad in Syria and Turkey.¹⁰ Their return is subject to restrictions due to community tensions related to the alleged participation of some Sunni tribes in violence and violations against Shia Turkmen and the neighbouring Yazidi population. Key informants indicate that reconciliation is needed between Shia and Sunni counterparts to rebuild confidence and restore trust and that they see this as necessary for encouraging the rest of the displaced population to return as well. Government officials, community leaders, and clan elders are involved in such processes. In addition, international actors, including UNDP, IOM, and NGOs are also carrying out programming in this regard.

⁷ Refer to "Annex 1: Subdistricts by Reported Need for Reconciliation" for further details.

⁸ George Packer, "The Lessons of Tal Afar," *The New Yorker*, April 3, 2006.

⁹ IOM, *Tal Afar District Center: Rapid Conflict Assessment* (Erbil: IOM, 2018).

¹⁰ As of August 2019, the Ministry of Transportation reported that it bused 1,136 ISIL conflict-displaced Iraqis from Turkish territory to their places of origin across Iraq in line with the government's voluntary returns program. See: <http://www.motrans.gov.iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7618>.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Yathreb	Balad	Salah al-Din
29,304 returnees		

While Yathreb subdistrict was less impacted than others by ISIL presence and subsequent military operations to retake areas under their control, the crisis exacerbated historical divisions between Shia and Sunni Arab tribes in the area, causing displacement on both sides. Returns to Yathreb have been

blocked for more than four years given the grievances between these Shia and Sunni tribes, the alleged ISIL affiliation of some tribes as well as the killing of members of others. Key informants reported that relevant Shia and Sunni tribes reached an agreement in March 2019 that would allow for the gradual return of the 2,000 families currently displaced. This reconciliation process was sponsored by the Federal Government and the Sunni Endowment, the latter financially compensating the aggrieved tribes.¹¹

SUB-DISTRICTS IN CATEGORY 2: RECONCILIATION REPORTEDLY NEEDED BUT NOT HAPPENING

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Qahtaniya	Al-Ba'aj	Ninewa
864 returnees		

Returns to Al-Qahtaniya subdistrict did not begin until the second half of 2018 – it was one of the last areas in the country retaken from ISIL. Most of the subdistrict remains significantly uninhabited, as the majority of population remains displaced. It is estimated that nearly 18,000 families originally from Ba'aj District are displaced within camps in Ninewa and Duhok governorates. The subdistrict had a pre-conflict population of both Sunni Arab and Yazidi residents. Of the locations assessed here, one is Yazidi and the remainder are Sunni Arab. All locations reported that reconciliation is needed but not happening. Specifically, key informants indicate that reconciliation is necessary between the Sunni Arab and Yazidi populations living in the subdistrict (and wider governorate area). This would reportedly help in achieving peaceful coexistence and preventing further violence between the two groups, including that which occurred in the aftermath of ISIL, in part preventing further returns. Despite this, no such initiatives are taking place, reportedly due to lack of will to initiate dialogues that would help start any process. This reported inaction may be due to certain necessary conditions not being in place for reconciliation to begin for some groups, as indicated in greater detail by key informants in neighbouring districts, like Sinjar (see below).

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Shamal (Sinuni)	Sinjar	Ninewa
45,288 returnees		

Al-Shamal, also known as Sinuni, is an ethno-religiously diverse area comprised of Yazidi and Sunni Arab communities. It is currently the most populated subdistrict by far in Sinjar District due to the relatively high rate of returns of predominantly Yazidi

residents and an increasing number of Sunni Arabs. It is also hosting a large proportion of Yazidi IDPs from other less secure areas of the district. With the emergence of ISIL, nearly all of the Yazidi population and some of their Sunni Arab counterparts in the subdistrict were displaced amid gross human rights violations, in many cases perpetrated by neighbours.¹² The remaining Sunni Arab populations then also displaced during the military operations to retake the subdistrict in 2015, with the Yazidi population returning in the aftermath to a complex landscape of security actors. Between the retaking of Al-Shamal and the return of some of its population, retaliatory actions were also taken against Sunni Arabs from the area.¹³ The Sunni Arab population's return to their villages in the north of the subdistrict only began in late 2018 / early 2019 as the security configuration in the area shifted, allowing these communities back but without much in the way of reconciliation. Key informants from the two ethno-religious groups unanimously report that reconciliation is needed between the Yazidi and the Sunni Arab communities, both returnees and those still displaced. Reconciliation is needed to due to the lack of trust and confidence as well as to the growing strife between both groups, given the events of 2014 and their aftermath. It would also contribute to increased returns and help stabilize the area in terms of security. Presently, there is reportedly no trade between these two groups nor can they visit each other's villages, particularly due to restrictions on the movement of the newly returned Sunni Arab population. While key informants in Sunni Arab locations indicate that reconciliation is not taking place at any levels due to mistrust and disagreement between the two communities, key informants in Yazidi locations are more specific: before reconciliation efforts are undertaken, the community needs to know the whereabouts of the remaining missing Yazidi women and children, the exhumation of all mass graves, and an international judicial investigation into the events of 2014.

¹¹ Sanad for Peacebuilding, "Announcement of Peaceful Coexistence and Stabilization Agreement in Yathreb," Press Release, March 4, 2018. This information was further confirmed in discussion with Sanad for Peacebuilding staff involved in facilitating the related dialogues for this agreement.

¹² See, Social Inquiry, "Scenarios of Fragility in Northern Ninewa," (Erbil: Social Inquiry, 2017); and Azam Ahmed, "Betrayal of Yazidis Stokes Iraqi Fears of Return to 2006 Sectarian Horrors," *New York Times*, August 26, 2014.

¹³ Human Rights Watch, "Ezidi Fighters Allegedly Execute Civilians," *Human Rights Watch*, December 27, 2017.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Qaeyrrawan	Sinjar	Ninewa
3,822 returnees		

This relatively small subdistrict within Sinjar District is also largely ethno-religiously mixed between Yazidis and Sunni Arabs. However, only the Arab communities have returned thus far, and only very partially. The pre-conflict Yazidi population from Qaeyrrawan remain virtually all displaced, as their villages and communities were particularly hard-hit targets of ISIL violence and violations. Key informants reported the need for reconciliation to help more families from both groups to return to their original places of residence and, with that, prevent demographic change in the area. Such a process and potential ensuing returns would also help restore stability of both security and service provision to prevent future problems. Despite this need, as is the case in other subdistricts in the governorate, there is reportedly no will among relevant actors to initiate such processes. Again, this may be linked to the lack of preconditions in place to make reconciliation possible for some groups, as described by other key informants in nearby subdistricts.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Markaz Sinjar	Sinjar	Ninewa
10,584 returnees		

Key informants in all but one location in Markaz Sinjar reported the need to initiate or implement a reconciliation process between the communities living there. This largely diverse area is comprised of Yazidi, Shia Kurd, and Shia Arab populations who have begun to return, as well as a smaller Sunni Arab population that has not yet returned. More than half of the district's pre-conflict population, particularly Yazidis, remain displaced – mostly in Duhok Governorate and in the northern parts of Sinjar District. Given the conflict and political dynamics in the district, including the multiple, competing armed groups operating therein, reconciliation is required at various levels. On one side, emerging intra-Yazidi political divisions remain one of the largest obstacles for local stabilization.¹⁴ On the other, key informants almost unanimously report that reconciliation between the different ethno-religious communities is necessary to address the seemingly intractable grievances stemming from the recent conflict and to prevent further violence.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Ayadhiya	Tal Afar	Ninewa
24,294 returnees		

This subdistrict has experienced recent returns of its displaced populations, specifically Sunni Turkmen, Sunni Arab, Sunni Kurd,

and, to a lesser degree, Shia Turkmen communities. Reportedly, the return movements enhanced the need for reconciliation to avoid perpetuating grievances against this diverse population. Key informants reported that all communities in the subdistrict needed to restore trust among each other, with reconciliation playing an important role in facilitating returns, preventing demographic changes and helping to secure and stabilize the area. To this end, an agreement was brokered and signed between Sunni and Shia Turkmen tribes in August 2018 to achieve peaceful coexistence between the two groups and foster returns.¹⁵ Nevertheless, key informants indicated that reconciliation was not happening in the subdistrict as there is no will to initiate dialogue in this direction. This may be reflective of the fact that the August 2018 agreement excluded the Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd communities of the subdistrict and the perception that so far, little formal action has been taken to implement what was formally agreed upon.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Zummar	Tal Afar	Ninewa
88,434 returnees		

The subdistrict of Zummar, roughly split in population between Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds, has experienced population returns since 2015 when the area was retaken from ISIL. The majority of the displaced Kurdish population and a subset of the Sunni Arab one displaced elsewhere in the district or within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and returned in this aftermath. The rest of the Sunni Arab population, predominantly displaced into Mosul and surrounding areas, was blocked from return by Kurdish-led security forces in the area until October 2017, when the security configuration of the subdistrict changed and allowed their return. The events that took place when ISIL entered the subdistrict and during the military operations to remove them, the prolonged blockage of certain groups, as well as the historical rivalry between the area's Sunni Kurds and Arabs, have pitted communities against each other.¹⁶ As such, Zummar has some of the most severe conditions related to social cohesion and security concerns within the Return Index overall, and nearly all locations reported the need for reconciliation. While some local initiatives have been attempted, it seems more efforts are necessary as key informants reported that initiatives, particularly more formal ones, are needed and not happening.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Markaz Al-Balad	Balad	Salah al-Din
3,432 returnees		

Reconciliation in the subdistrict of Markaz Al-Balad is focused around the Sunni Arab-majority town of Azeez Balad, located on

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, "A Way Forward for Sinjar" International Crisis Group, December 14, 2018.

¹⁵ Sanad for Peacebuilding, "The Successful Return of 1,000 Families to Al-Ayadhiya, Tal Afar Following Reconciliation Efforts by Sanad for Peacebuilding," Press Release, November 11, 2018.

¹⁶ UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council, and Social Inquiry, "Population Return Trends, Protection, and Social Dynamics in Northern Ninewa, Iraq" (Dohuk: DRC, 2018).

the outskirts of the mostly Shia Arab capital Markaz Al-Balad. This need is reportedly due to the alleged ISIL affiliation of some members of Azeez Balad, attacks launched from the area into the capital as well as the killing of civilians in 2014. A portion of the pre-conflict population of Azeez Balad remains displaced in neighbouring Al-Dujeel and Al-Duloeyah subdistricts and is currently not allowed to return. Key informants also reported that reconciliation between communities is not taking place due to differing views as to what the outcome of the process should be. The reported position of tribes within the capital is that reconciliation is conditional upon taking land from Azeez Balad, a position with which their Azeez Balad counterparts disagree.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Markaz Tooz	Tooz	Salah al-Din
27,600 returnees		

The pre-conflict population in this subdistrict was comprised of Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds, and Sunni and Shia Turkmen. At present, most of the subdistrict’s Sunni Arab displaced population is blocked from returning.¹⁷ Dynamics in Markaz Tooz have been impacted by severe social tensions among ethno-religious communities in the subdistrict, specifically Sunni Kurd and Shia Turkmen populations currently residing there. In the aftermath of ISIL’s expulsion from the area in 2016, competition and clashes between the subdistrict’s rivalling security actors, the Shia Turkmen-led Population Mobilization Units (PMUs) and Kurdish Peshmerga, spurred tensions.¹⁸ The October 2017 change in security and administrative configuration of the subdistrict caused violence and the additional displacement of some of the Kurdish population,¹⁹ many of whom have reportedly now returned. Reconciliation is reportedly needed in relation to these events but is not happening, despite some initial work and discussion among authorities. Nothing is reportedly achieved yet given that the Shia Turkmen population is in a

stronger position in terms of security and administration, posts once held by Kurds. This situation has created an impasse in part because both groups have historic claims to the centre.²⁰

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Amerli and Suleiman Beg	Tooz	Salah al-Din
117,504 returnees		

Reconciliation needs in these two subdistricts of Tooz District must be analysed jointly as dynamics are linked to each other, according to key informants. ISIL took hold of the largely Sunni Arab area of Suleiman Beg in 2014, and from there launched a two-month siege of neighbouring Al-Amerli, a Shia Turkmen enclave with small Sunni Arab villages surrounding it. This siege took place in addition to other attacks on the population of Al-Amerli. The breaking of this siege and retaking of the area from ISIL led to attacks and retaliatory actions, this time pitting Al-Amerli against Suleiman Beg. This violence caused further displacement and destruction in Suleiman Beg. Both subdistricts still remain largely inaccessible due to entrenched security concerns. Both of these episodes reportedly factor into the need for reconciliation. Key informants indicated that the city council and mayor of Suleiman Beg started to coordinate with local PMU leaders and political parties to resolve displacement and improve the security situation. This coordination included laying out initial objectives aimed at identifying ISIL members among local tribes, plans to establish more equal sharing of the security portfolio between communities, and plans to facilitate compensation for destruction and killings on both sides. However, reportedly no initiatives have been implemented yet. These steps may be precursors to reconciliation according to key informants and may explain why they report that it is needed but not actually happening.

¹⁷ András Derzsi-Horváth, *Iraq After ISIL: Tooz* (Berlin: Global Policy Public Policy Institute, 2017).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ UNAMI, “Summary of UNAMI Findings in Tooz Khormatu” United Nations Iraq, December 23, 2017.

²⁰ Derzsi-Horváth, *Iraq After ISIL: Tooz*.

SUB-DISTRICTS IN CATEGORY 3: MIXED REPORTED RECONCILIATION NEED

The following subdistricts present cases in which only a fraction of locations reported that reconciliation was needed and taking place. The remaining locations either 1) do not need reconciliation, or 2) need reconciliation, but it is unclear whether reconciliation processes are taking place.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Latifiya	Mahmoudiya	Baghdad
9,864 returnees		

Within this predominantly Sunni Arab subdistrict, key informants noted three scenarios: five locations reported that needed reconciliation was taking place, another four reported that needed reconciliation was not taking place, and two reportedly did not need it. Among those five locations where reconciliation was needed and taking place, it was occurring between different tribes living there and pertained to ongoing issues that pre-date the ISIL conflict. Efforts in this regard were reportedly ongoing as they were occurring prior to 2014 as well. Reconciliation processes involved security forces at the national level, the local council and mukhtars as well as tribal leaders. For those four locations where reconciliation was reportedly needed and not happening, it is again important to address tribal issues as well as connecting security actors and communities in a positive way. While currently not taking place, preparations are reportedly under way between security forces, tribal leaders and local authorities to begin discussions. Finally, for those two locations where reconciliation is not needed, it was reported that specific measures have already been implemented.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Markaz Al-Muqdadia	Al-Muqdadia	Diyala
53,166 returnees		

The reconciliation needs in this subdistrict are largely divided into three different scenarios. Key informants in 22 locations reported that no reconciliation was needed, and 24 locations had ongoing reconciliation efforts underway. Another 10 locations were reported to need reconciliation, but no initiatives are currently taking place. Tensions emerged between the predominantly Sunni and Shia Arab populations when ISIL approached the subdistrict in 2014, leading to the displacement and blockage of a significant proportion of Sunni Arab residents. Where reconciliation is needed, the main aim was to address issues among returning families due to alleged affiliation with ISIL or related groups and to prevent future conflict. In the locations where reconciliation was reportedly taking place, it was locally led with community leaders and elders engaged in dialogue with

returnees. In locations where reconciliation is not yet taking place, this is reportedly due to the fact that the parties to the conflict have not agreed to such a process as of yet. These overall dynamics match with existing contextual community-level data, which indicates that the vast majority of residents across ethno-religious lines regarded reconciliation in Al-Muqdadia as very important, particularly related to human rights violations that occurred from 2014 onward.²¹

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Mansouriya	Al-Khalis	Diyala
49,092 returnees		

Out of the 35 locations with returns assessed in this subdistrict, only nine (mainly localized to the rural parts of the subdistrict) reported that reconciliation was necessary between communities. Efforts in this direction are already taking place. The focus of reconciliation activities was on the Sunni Arab returnee population and tensions among them, since the majority of the pre-conflict population has returned. Key informants reported that ongoing meetings are taking place at all levels, involving national religious and political figures as well as parliamentary members, local council representatives and local religious, tribal and community leaders. In addition, the UN is involved through community policing initiatives. In the majority of locations in the subdistrict where reconciliation was not needed, the stated reason was that the situation is stable with no major problems.

Subdistrict	District	Governorate
Al-Duloeya	Balad	Salah al-Din
23,346 returnees		

Of the eight locations assessed within Al-Duloeya subdistrict, only three reported reconciliation was needed and not happening. The subdistrict has a Sunni Arab population and hosts IDPs from neighbouring Azeez Balad within Markaz Balad subdistrict. The reported need for reconciliation in some locations and the reasons that it was not happening are the same as those listed under Markaz Balad. For the remaining five locations reportedly not needing reconciliation, key informants indicated that no conflicts or disagreements exist between tribes or between returned populations and those who remain displaced.

2. WHAT DO THESE PLACES HAVE IN COMMON?

While the need for reconciliation often relates to localized dynamics, an overview of the similarities and differences between reconciliation areas of interest is warranted to provide a greater understanding of the conflict drivers underpinning this need. Such analysis may also provide insight into the main issues that reconciliation processes would need to address.

This section will first explore the reported need for reconciliation against other indicators measured in the Return Index to explore any correlations therein. It will then look more closely at disputed territories and areas of no return in relation to the reported need for reconciliation.

CORRELATION WITH RETURN INDEX INDICATORS

Reconciliation is correlated with five of the Return Index indicators: residential destruction, illegal occupation of private residences, concerns over revenge, the multiplicity of security actors, and the reincorporation of civil servants. This means that those locations that need reconciliation also have a higher likelihood of issues within these domains.

RECONCILIATION AND RESIDENTIAL DESTRUCTION

There is a higher prevalence of residential destruction in those locations where reconciliation is reportedly needed compared to those where it is reportedly not needed. This correlation is particularly noted in 32 per cent of locations in Salah al-Din Governorate where key informants indicate reconciliation is needed and where severe residential destruction is also present. By comparison, severe residential destruction only affects 2 per cent of locations without reported reconciliation needs. This correlation is weaker but present in Ninewa, Diyala, and Anbar as well.

Reconciliation may add a layer of complexity when dealing with housing issues, including compensation²² – especially when these issues are connected to historical grievances and polarization between communities. Targeted residential destruction by any actor may be a consequence of pre-existing social divisions as well as the source of ongoing tension.

RECONCILIATION AND ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE RESIDENCES

The above point is even more pronounced when it comes to the illegal occupation of housing that took place during and after the recent conflict. Unlike residential destruction, illegal occupation of housing is not widespread across all conflict-affected governorates but is rather more concentrated in specific areas – the same areas that report significant need for reconciliation. These areas are Al-Garma subdistrict in Anbar, the districts of Ba'aj, Sinjar, Tal Afar in Ninewa, and Balad and Tooz districts in Salah al-Din.

Issues of illegal occupation tend to become protracted and often involve disparate actors. They range from individuals of one ethno-religious group or tribe claiming the housing of other groups, to security forces using houses for offices and barracks.²³ Illegal occupation of housing may also stem from residential destruction; people who have returned and find their own homes destroyed may occupy the homes of those still displaced. Reconciliation processes may be used to manage these cases overall, establishing a framework for their resolution rather than arbitrating them individually.

RECONCILIATION AND CONCERNS OVER REVENGE

This correlation is perhaps the most obvious: those locations that reportedly need reconciliation also have an increased likelihood of residents fearing revenge acts. In the absence of any kind of agreement for displaced communities to return to locations where groups have strong conflict-related and/or pre-existing grievances, there is increased concern that actors, including individual residents, will take matters into their own

²² Compensation may occur as a part of or supportive to a reconciliation process and/or may be claimed from the state linked to loss caused by the conflict. On this latter point, see Caroline Baudot, "We Hope, But We are Hopeless": Civilians' Perceptions of the Compensation Process in Iraq (Erbil: CIVIC, 2018).

²³ IOM, RWG, Social Inquiry, "The Physical and Social Dimensions of Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas," Return Index Briefing 1 (Erbil: IOM, 2019).

hands to resolve them.²⁴ Key informants in 68 per cent of locations reportedly needing reconciliation in Salah al-Din, 25 per cent in Ninewa, and 7 per cent in Diyala, also reported concerns over revenge.

RECONCILIATION AND MULTIPLICITY OF SECURITY ACTORS

The post-conflict context of Iraq is one in which multiple security actors, beyond the centralized Army and Federal Police in tandem with local police, continue to hold forth across large swaths of territory. Within the Return Index, locations with four or more security actors in control of security provision is correlated with low rates of return. This multiplicity is oftentimes the result of community divisions, lack of trust in previous or existing security configurations, and the need some groups feel to protect themselves from others. The latter factor may stem from the most recent conflict or possible previous marginalization and exclusion. At the same time, the bolstering of some communities through the formation of additional armed groups makes returns more complicated for those who may feel they no longer have protection in their places of origin.

Given the divisions and apparent lack of trust that enabled the proliferation of security actors, those areas with a multiplicity of security actors are also more likely to report the need for reconciliation. The security configuration appears to be a necessary aspect of reconciliation in Tooz District in Salah al-Din and Sinjar and Tal Afar districts in Ninewa to help ensure an agreed upon power-sharing arrangement and inclusive security provision for all residents. Such inclusivity would likely need to extend beyond the security aspect.

RECONCILIATION AND REINCORPORATION OF CIVIL SERVANTS

This indicator explores the presence or absence of public sector employees back to their posts in administration, health, education, and others, within areas of return. It should be noted that public sector employment in Iraq is generally associated with some level of power and financial security. The data indicates that locations reportedly needing reconciliation are also those where the majority of public employees have reportedly not returned to their posts. This is particularly true for locations in Ninewa and Salah al-Din governorates: 49 per cent and 16 per cent of the respective locations in these governorates reportedly needing reconciliation have witnessed less than half of their public employees reincorporated into their posts.

A potential explanation for this stems from the fact these areas report lower rates of return in general. Relatedly, the groups that had relative majority in public sector positions are still displaced;

for example, most Shia Turkmen in Tal Afar District and Sunni Kurds in Tooz District. The absence of civil servants in these locations makes it more difficult for the state to restore its presence to pre-conflict levels more broadly. Distribution of public sector employment also highlights a bigger challenge related to the lack of inclusive governance prior to the conflict, which allowed certain groups to dominate others in this regard. Therefore, this latter issue, linked to power-sharing, would also need to be addressed in tandem with more recent grievances linked to the ISIL conflict and its aftermath within a reconciliation process.

DISPUTED TERRITORIES

A relatively high number of reported reconciliation areas of interest (7 of 18 subdistricts) are located in the disputed territories between the Federal Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These areas are Markaz Sinjar, Al-Shamal, Ayadiha, Zummar subdistricts in Ninewa and Markaz Tooz, Al-Amerli, and Suleiman Beg subdistricts in Salah al-Din. The disputed nature of these areas in terms of administration and security provision indicate that reconciliation to help facilitate or sustain returns would also encompass deeper, unresolved social and political concerns that may have worsened in the aftermath of conflict.

A number of notable disputed areas reported no need for reconciliation within the Return Index, but external sources highlight that numerous reconciliation efforts related to wider political concerns have begun or restarted in the wake of the recent conflict. For example, key informants in Hamdaniya Centre and Bartella subdistricts in Ninewa reported that reconciliation is not needed because different groups did not face impediments to return as in other areas and that the groups get along. However, the multitude of NGO and government initiatives underway to mitigate challenges between different groups suggest that tensions persist. One such initiative aims to manage tensions between Shabak and Christian communities, including proposals to reallocate district and subdistrict boundaries.²⁵ These tensions relate less to the ISIL conflict, during which the overall community was targeted and fled, than to subsequent changes within the security configuration and administration of these areas in the aftermath of conflict, and to pre-existing grievances and inter-group competition.

A similar case is found in Kirkuk Governorate, which was the stage of renewed, and forthcoming, efforts to resolve disputed internal boundaries in Iraq.²⁶ Efforts also aim to address growing political divisions within and among groups in the governorate. While the return of conflict-displaced populations is part of these efforts, it is only one among many pressing concerns. In Khanaqin District (specifically Jalula and Saadiya subdistricts) in Diyala, reconciliation is reportedly not needed because the once ethno-religiously mixed area is now fracturing into ethno-religious enclaves. These

²⁴ See, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset from June 2019, where different acts of revenge and remote violence are listed within reconciliation hotspot locations.

²⁵ See, PRWG, "Stakeholder Mapping Report;" and Kirkuk Now, "A Struggle for Demographic Change between Shabaks and Christians in a Small Geographic Area," Kirkuk Now, 10 June 2019. (Originally in Arabic.)

²⁶ The recently expired UNAMI mandate included priority for resolving issues pertaining to disputed internal boundaries in Iraq, of which Kirkuk is the largest. Draft language for UNAMI's new mandate in the country also contains provisions in this regard. There is also increasing diplomatic interest in Kirkuk in this regard in terms of entry points for negotiation and reconciliation.

emerging cleavages relate to broader security and administrative dynamics that, if left unresolved, could give rise to further tensions down the line.²⁷ The current climate has also prevented any returns from occurring in a number of locations within Khanaqin.²⁸


NO RETURNS

Indeed, another factor prevalent across reported reconciliation areas of interest is the relatively high concentration of locations with no returns, often evidenced by empty villages, towns or neighborhoods. IOM DTM identified 249 such locations across conflict-affected governorates in Iraq. Over one third of these locations (88) are within the reported reconciliation areas of interest. Tooz District (Markaz Tooz, Suleiman Beg, and Al-Amerli subdistricts) contain the largest number of locations with no returns, with 31 cases identified. This is followed by Sinjar District (Markaz Sinjar and Qaeyrrawan subdistricts)

with 23 locations, and Ba'aj District (Qahtaniya subdistrict) with 19 locations.

This absence of return and potential absence of reconciliation may be linked. Returns to these areas are not possible without a negotiated process to ensure they are safe and sustainable. At the same time, reconciliation is difficult when communities are physically remote from one another, with little communication between them. In this regard, it is important to highlight the case of Babylon Governorate, specifically Jurf al-Sakhar subdistrict, a predominantly Sunni Arab enclave that is inaccessible for assessment and where no returns have been registered.²⁹ This means a large proportion of the population from Jurf al-Sakhar has remained displaced for more than four years, due in part to security conditions and configuration that prevent returns. Given this scenario, it would seem that a reconciliation or negotiation process with various security actors may be necessary to enable this population to return.

Map 2. Locations with no returns and locations in need of reconciliation



27 Zmkan Ali Saleem, Mac Skelton, and Christine M. van den Toorn, "Security and Governance in the Disputed Territories under a Fractured GOI: the Case of Northern Diyala," Middle East Centre Blog, 14 November 2018.

28 RWG and IOM, "Areas of No Return Insight Report 3: Focus on Saadiya, Khanaqin District" (Erbil: RWG, 2019).

29 For more details on Jurf al-Sakhar, refer to "Insert reference of RWG report"

CONCLUSION: RECONCILIATION IN MOTION?

In exploring the need for reconciliation in areas of return in Iraq based on Return Index data and key informant insights, this thematic report highlights the context-specific and localized nature of social, political and security divisions. At the same time, these areas share overarching commonalities that suggest that reconciliation efforts need to go beyond simply facilitating returns to address the ISIL conflict-related grievances of all victims. As described in this analysis, these grievances intersect with deeper-seated issues within communities linked to historical governance failures. Reconciliation efforts then must target the root causes of divisions and consider return as one of many possible outcomes, but not the only one.

One question of critical importance is how well current or future reconciliation initiatives are connected to formal rule of law processes and institutions.

This analysis also raises other questions regarding reconciliation in Iraq and the many definitions of reconciliation that are applicable in this context. One of critical importance is how well current or future reconciliation initiatives are connected to formal rule of law processes and institutions (and if they need to be). In some cases, efforts have been led by national and local authorities, while in others, more tribal or customary mechanisms have prevailed, and in others still a combination of national and local mechanisms were used. Analysing how each of these processes functions leads to another set of questions regarding how binding and enforceable they are, how inclusive, which issues are raised and resolved and by whom, whose rights are protected, and whether they continue to perpetuate blame or an unfair status quo. Another important aspect to consider further would be how well ongoing or potential reconciliation processes manage the views and expectations of community leaders versus those of community members. Critical to this point is whether or not the timing is right to engage this type of process in the first place without further groundwork being laid for such a prospect in conflict-affected communities. A remaining question is whether a local approach, targeting each subdistrict individually, would be an efficient, effective and sustainable way of dealing with overarching root causes of conflict and marginalization. These issues highlight the need for additional focused research on the evolving and

complex perceptions and practices of reconciliation in Iraq in order to better understand the evolving context dynamics and inform the design and implementation of further interventions, particularly in light of what is currently taking place.

The range of ongoing initiatives reported by key informants and taking place at various levels and locations reflects the diversity of actors working on reconciliation. The following breakdown is a very broad mapping of these initiatives:

- At the national level, the Prime Minister recently established the Coexistence and Communal Peace Committee as the central body to deal with the post-conflict situation in Iraq.³⁰ The Committee has a 12-point mandate that includes reconciliation and IDP returns. This committee was formed from the merger of the National Reconciliation Committee and Higher Commission for Coexistence and Social Peace.
- At the governorate level, the Federal Government of Iraq established Governorate Return Committees in 2018 in coordination with UNOCHA to facilitate principled and safe returns.
- At the local level, tribes have attempted to provide solutions to remaining displacement challenges through customary processes and agreements. These are sometimes brokered with support from governorate and national authorities as well as the international community and national civil society.
- At the international level, there is increasing support and discussion among donors on issues related to peacebuilding, reconciliation, transitional justice and social cohesion. This is in part reflected in the work of UN agencies and bodies including UNDP, IOM, UNAMI, and the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Daesh/ISIL (UNITAD).
- At the coordination level, the Peace and Reconciliation Working Group was formed in late 2018 in an effort to map and coordinate national, local, and international efforts in relation to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and social cohesion. The initial focus of the Working Group is on Ninewa Governorate.
- Finally, a wide range of local, national, and international NGOs are working across communities and engaging with national and international stakeholders on return and reconciliation issues. These include more citizen-led, informal initiatives that may be taking place on the ground as well.

³⁰ PWRG, Meeting Minutes, 26 May 2019, Erbil, Iraq

ANNEX 1: SUBDISTRICTS BY REPORTED NEED FOR RECONCILIATION

The table below presents only subdistricts where need for reconciliation was reported in at least one location. Subdistricts where none of the key informants reported key informants reported no a need for reconciliation in all locations are not included.

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	SUBDISTRICT	REPORTED RECONCILIATION NEED	# OF LOCATIONS
Anbar	Falluja	Al-Garma	Reconciliation is needed and happening	17
			Reconciliation is not needed	1
			Total	18
		Markaz Falluja	Reconciliation is needed and happening	1
			Reconciliation is not needed	29
			Total	30
Baghdad	Abu Ghraib	Khan Dhari	Reconciliation is needed and happening	4
			Reconciliation is needed but not happening	2
			Reconciliation is not needed	15
			Total	21
	Kadhimia	Sab'a Al-Bour	Reconciliation is needed and happening	10
			Total	10
	Mahmoudiya	Al-Latifya	Reconciliation is needed and happening	5
			Reconciliation is needed but not happening	4
			Reconciliation is not needed	2
			Total	11
	Tarmia	Meshahda	Reconciliation is needed and happening	5
			Reconciliation is needed but not happening	3
			Reconciliation is not needed	10
			Total	18
	Diyala	Al-Khalis	Al A'dheem	Reconciliation is needed and happening
Reconciliation is not needed				52
Total				54
Al-Mansouriyah			Reconciliation is needed and happening	8
			Reconciliation is needed but not happening	1
			Reconciliation is not needed	26
Al-Muqdadia		Markaz Al-Muqdadia	Reconciliation is needed and happening	24
			Reconciliation is needed but not happening	10
			Reconciliation is not needed	22
			Total	56

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	SUBDISTRICT	REPORTED RECONCILIATION NEED	# OF LOCATIONS
Ninewa	Al-Ba'aj	Al-Qahtaniya	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	5
			Total	5
	Sinjar	Al-Shamal / Sinuni	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	30
			Reconciliation is not needed	9
			Total	39
		Markaz Sinjar	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	10
			Reconciliation is not needed	1
			Total	11
	Qaeyrrawan	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	7	
		Total	7	
	Tal Afar	Ayadiya	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	20
			Reconciliation is not needed	2
			Total	22
		Markaz Tal Afar	Reconciliation is needed and happening	40
			Total	40
Zummar		Reconciliation is needed but not happening	45	
	Reconciliation is not needed	2		
Total	47			
Salah al-Din	Al-Fares	Markaz Al-Dujeel	Reconciliation is needed and happening	1
			Reconciliation is not needed	1
			Total	2
	Baiji	Markaz Baiji	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	2
			Reconciliation is not needed	29
			Total	31
	Balad	Al-Duloeyah	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	3
			Reconciliation is not needed	5
			Total	8
		Markaz Al-Balad	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	1
			Total	1
	Yathreb	Reconciliation is needed and happening	1	
		Total	1	
	Tooz	Al-Amerli	Reconciliation is needed but not happening	5
			Total	5
Markaz Tooz		Reconciliation is needed but not happening	10	
		Total	10	
Suleiman Beg		Reconciliation is needed and happening	1	
		Reconciliation is needed but not happening	1	
Total	2			

RETURN INDEX THEMATIC SERIES

BRIEFING #2

THE GROWING ROLE OF RECONCILIATION IN RETURN MOVEMENTS: SNAPSHOTS FROM THE RETURN INDEX

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